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1  Introduction and background 
Our life is full of choices—choices that differ, among others, in the amount of information on 
which they are based. For instance, when facing a choice between two options that differ on several 
decision-relevant attributes, one could rely on the most relevant attribute only to make the decision, or 
one could integrate information from several attributes and base the choice on that combined 
information.  When a decision maker bases her choice on the most relevant attribute only, however, 
what does this mean with regard to the amount of information this decision maker had processed prior 
to making the decision: did she process information about the most relevant attribute only and ignored 
additional information, or did she consider additional pieces of information as well but let her choice 
nonetheless be guided by only the most relevant attribute? Understanding the cognitive processes 
underlying those choices that are based primarily on the most relevant attribute is the main subject of 
this thesis, in particular, the question of whether or not for these choices additional information is 
ignored, and if additional information is not ignored, how is this information being processed?  
Furthermore, the work presented here seeks to get a better understanding of the conditions under 
which decision makers may become more likely to base their choice on only one piece of information. 
Before presenting the empirical studies conducted to tackle these questions, I will give a brief 
overview of the field of decision making relevant to the present work.  
1.1  The study of multi-attribute decision making 
Facing a choice between two options that differ on several decision-relevant attributes 
constitutes a typical instance of a multi-attribute decision task, which is the kind of task the work 
presented in this thesis deals with. In a multi-attribute decision task, decision makers have to choose 
between two (or more) choice options (e.g., unit funds) the one that scores higher on a certain criterion 
(e.g., the more profitable fund). The choice options are described by several attributes or cues (e.g., 
expert recommendations) each of which is predictive of the decision criterion, also known as cue 
validity. The cues typically differ in their validities, whereby validity is commonly defined as the 
frequency with which a cue points to the correct option given that the cue discriminates between the 
options (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1996). To illustrate, Figure 1 depicts an example trial of the decision 
task used in article 3. Decision makers of this task were to choose the more profitable of two unit 
funds and they were shown the recommendations of six financial experts who varied in their 
validities
1
. The cues were arranged in descending order of their validities. In this task, cue information 
                                                          
1 This kind of multi-attribute decision task is often also called probabilistic inference task, because the cues (e.g., 
the expert recommendations) are probabilistically related to an objective decision criterion (e.g., profitability), 
rendering it possible, therefore, to probabilistically infer a ‘correct’ solution on the basis of the cue information. 
The decision criterion in a multi-attribute decision task can also be a subjective one, such as the likeability of one 
of two or more options (e.g. consumer products). This kind of multi-attribute decision task is referred to as 
preferential choice task (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). Similar processes have been suggested to 
underlie both types of multi-attribute decision tasks, but because probabilistic inference tasks allow a researcher 
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was completely shown to participants during decision making on an information board (open 
information board). However, there are also variants of multi-attribute decision tasks (which were also 
employed in the present work) where cue information is initially hidden and decision makers need to 
uncover information about single cues sequentially (closed information board); or tasks, where 
decision makers have to retrieve cue information from memory.   
 
 
Figure 1. Example trial of the multi-attribute decision task of article 3. 
The example in Figure 1 shows a decision situation where information about different cues is 
in conflict: the most valid cue points to the first option (Fund A) whereas several less valid cues point 
to the second option (Fund B). Decision-making researchers have shown an ongoing interest in 
studying how people tackle such decision situations (Gigerenzer, Todd, & The ABC Research Group, 
1999; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988), and there is now a relatively large body of evidence 
showing that decision makers—when facing such a situation—differ in the amount of information on 
which they base their decisions: Some decision makers consistently make their choices in line with the 
most valid cue (which would be indicated by the choice of Fund A in the example), whereas others are 
found to base their choices consistently on the combination of several cues (which would be indicated 
by the choice of Fund B in the example). Different frameworks of decision making exist that provide 
theoretically different explanations for these inter-individual differences in choice behavior 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Lee & Cummins, 2004). Yet although these frameworks differ on a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to define a correct solution for any decision problem a priori, the tasks used in the studies presented here were all 
of this kind.  
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theoretical level, they share a common assumption, namely that decision makers who consistently base 
their choices on the most valid cue ignored information about less valid cues. I will next present two 
frameworks that share this assumption. 
1.2  Two frameworks, one assumption: Ignoring information 
1.2.1  The multiple-strategy framework 
The multiple-strategy framework (MSF) proposed by Gerd Gigerenzer and colleagues 
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999) assumes that decision makers have a repertoire of qualitatively different 
decision strategies. When facing a choice between options, a decision maker is supposed to select 
among the set of strategies the one that fits best to the situation at hand. The framework by Gigerenzer 
and colleagues was particularly inspired by Herbert Simon’s notion of bounded rationality (Simon, 
1955)—the view that inferences about the world often have to be made “with limited time, knowledge, 
and computational power” (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000, p. 728). Taking into account the boundedness 
of rationality, Gigerenzer and colleagues proposed and specified several decision heuristics, one of 
which is the take-the-best heuristic (TTB). TTB consists of three cognitive building blocks: a search 
rule, a stopping rule, and a decision rule. The search rule specifies how cues are searched, namely in 
descending order of their validities. The stopping rule specifies when cue search is terminated: once a 
cue discriminates between options. The decision rule specifies which option to choose: the option 
pointed to by the discriminating cue. To illustrate, consider the example in Figure 1. A decision maker 
following TTB would start comparing the options on the most valid cue (search rule). As this cue 
discriminates already between the options, the search would terminate here (stopping rule) and the 
option with the positive cue value (Fund A) would be chosen (decision rule). Due to its stopping rule, 
TTB requires the processing of only part of the information whereas the rest is ignored. Although TTB 
takes into account only part of the information, simulation studies as well as analyses of data from 
real-world domains demonstrated that the predictive power of TTB (i.e., the extent to which it makes 
correct choice predictions) is close to, and sometimes even higher than, the predictive power of 
decision strategies that take into account all information available (Czerlinski, Gigerenzer, & 
Goldstein, 1999). A strategy of this latter kind is the weighted additive rule (WADD; Payne et al., 
1988). According to WADD, all cues of a decision option are considered and weighted by their 
validity. For each decision option the weighted cues are summed up and the option with the higher 
weighted evidence is chosen. Provided that the weighted sum of the less valid cues in Figure 1 is 
higher than the validity of the most valid cue, a decision maker following WADD would choose Fund 
B. Because WADD allows for the possibility that a highly valid cue can be compensated for by a 
combination of less valid cues, WADD is also called a compensatory strategy. TTB, in contrast, is a 
non-compensatory strategy. Another compensatory strategy to be considered here is the equal weight 
strategy (EQW). Like WADD, EQW takes into account all cues; but instead of being weighted by 
their validities, the cues are all weighted equally. Hence, following an EQW strategy, a decision maker 
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confronted with the decision options in Figure 1 would count the number of positive cue values for 
each option and would choose the option with the higher sum (Fund B). For sake of simplicity, I will 
concentrate on TTB and WADD in the following sections.  
TTB well captures the notion of bounded rationality; WADD, in contrast, is more in line with 
classical models of rationality—models that imply that human knowledge and capacities are 
unbounded. The MSF supposes strategy selection to be adaptive, meaning that the selection of a 
strategy depends on the structure of the environment (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011); when the fit 
between the strategy and the environmental structure is high, the MSF calls this strategy ecologically 
rational (thus, rationality in this framework is context-dependent). The mechanism by which decision 
makers select a certain strategy, however, is still not fully understood, though some research suggests 
that reinforcement learning (Rieskamp & Otto, 2006) or effort-accuracy trade-offs (Payne et al., 1988) 
might play a role. That said, although the mechanism of how strategies are selected is still not clear, 
quite a lot has been learned about the conditions under which the adoption of certain strategies, like 
TTB, becomes more likely. A full review of these studies is beyond the scope of this introduction, but 
a few findings relevant to the present work will be mentioned. In line with the idea of bounded 
rationality, decision makers were found to behave more in line with a TTB strategy when decision 
time was constraint (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008); when cues were 
redundant (Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007); when cue dispersion was high (Bröder, 2000); when 
information costs were high (Newell & Shanks, 2003); or when cue information had to be retrieved 
from memory rather than being completely shown to participants during decision making (Bröder & 
Schiffer, 2003).  
In decision research, a common way of identifying the decision strategy a decision maker most 
likely used to make her decisions is to analyze the decision maker’s actual choices (Bergert & 
Nosofsky, 2007; Bröder & Schiffer, 2003a; Bröder, 2003). To illustrate, consider the example in 
Figure 1, which is a pair of options for which TTB and WADD make opposing choice predictions 
(provided that the summed evidence of the less valid cues outweigh the most valid cue). Confronting 
decision makers with several such pairs in a decision task, one can eventually compare a decision 
maker’s actual choice pattern with the choice pattern predicted by a specific strategy. Arndt Bröder 
(Bröder, 2003) developed a choice-based strategy-classification method that follows this rationale and 
that is widely used in decision research. In a nutshell, the classification method estimates for each 
decision strategy under consideration (e.g., TTB, WADD, or EQW) the fit between the choice pattern 
predicted by that strategy and a decision maker’s observed choice pattern, and the strategy with the 
best fit is considered the strategy that the decision maker used. 
In sum, the MSF accounts for inter-individual differences in decision makers’ choice behavior 
by supposing that decision makers use different decision strategies to come up with their decisions. 
The identification of individual decision strategies can be accomplished, for example, by the choice-
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based strategy-classification method by Bröder (2003). In this regard, then, decision makers who 
consistently make choices in line with the best discriminating cue are supposed to use a TTB strategy 
to make their choices, implying also that these decision makers ignored information (as indicated by 
the TTB-stopping-rule). I will henceforth refer to these decision makers as TTB-consistent choosers 
(TTB-CC). Decision makers who consistently make choices in line with WADD (or EQW) are 
supposed to use a WADD (or EQW) strategy, implying also that these decision makers processed cue 
information completely. I will refer to these decision makers as WADD- or EQW-consistent choosers 
(WADD-CC and EQW-CC, respectively).  
1.2.2  The evidence accumulation model by Lee and Cummins (2004) 
Whereas the MSF assumes that different strategies or mechanisms underlie the choices of 
TTB-CCs and WADD-CCs, another framework of decision making suggests there to be a single 
mechanism only. This framework subsumes the class of evidence accumulation models, sometimes 
also called sequential sampling models (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Lee & Cummins, 2004; Voss, 
Nagler, & Lerche, 2013). In general, evidence accumulation models (EAMs) assume that decision 
makers who face a choice between decision options, sequentially sample evidence about these options 
(i.e., the cue values) and automatically integrate this information. Once the accumulated evidence in 
favor of an option passes a decision maker’s decision threshold, the sampling process terminates and 
the option favored by the evidence is chosen. Lee and Cummins (2004) proposed a specific instance of 
an evidence accumulation model that provided a single account for the choice behavior of both TTB-
CCs and WADD-CCs. A simplified graphical depiction of this model is shown on the left side of 
Figure 2, where the decision situation of Figure 1 is exemplified (i.e., the situation where the most 
valid cue points to option A, whereas the remaining cues point to option B). The Lee and Cummins 
(L&C) model assumes a step-wise cue search, starting with the most valid cue and continuing along 
the validity hierarchy (i.e., along the x-axis in Figure 2), as it is suggested by the TTB-search rule. 
Note that for each step in Figure 2, the cumulative evidence is depicted on the y-axis. That is, at each 
step, the evidence provided by the cue (which is determined by the cue’s validity) becomes 
automatically integrated into the preceding evidence value. The region above the midline constitutes 
evidence in favor of the TTB-option (i.e., the option pointed to by the best cue), whereas the region 
below the midline constitutes evidence in favor of the WADD-option. According to the L&C model, 
TTB-CCs and WADD-CCs differ only in their decision thresholds, with TTB-CCs having lower 
thresholds than WADD-CCs. Specifically, the decision threshold of TTB-CCs (represented by the 
dashed line) is supposed to be that low, that the discovery of the most valid cue would be sufficient to 
terminate the sampling process (in analogy to the TTB-stopping-rule). The decision threshold of 
WADD-CCs (represented by the dotted line), in contrast, is assumed to be that high that it guarantees 
the sampling of all cues, which in case of the example of Figure 1 means that the cumulative evidence 
crosses the midline, that is, the evidence points to the WADD-option. Note that in Figure 1, the 
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decision threshold supposed for WADD-CCs is still not passed even after each cue had been 
considered; but as there are no more cues available and the up-to-that-point accumulated evidence is in 
favor of the WADD-option, the decision maker would finally choose this option. To summarize, 
according to the L&C model, decision makers who base their choices on a single cue (TTB-CCs) are 
assumed to do so because they stopped information sampling at the discovery of this cue—as the 
accumulated evidence provided by this cue already passed their low decision thresholds. Decision 
makers who base their choices on a combination of several cues (WADD-CCs), in contrast, are 
assumed to do so because they sampled information about all cues and integrated this information in a 
WADD-like manner.
2
  
 
Figure 2. Left Panel: Graphical depiction of the evidence accumulation process as suggested by Lee and Cummins 
(2004). Right Panel: Graphical depiction of two possible evidence accumulation processes that differ in the way 
information is combined (compensatory weighting is shown by the red line, non-compensatory weighting is shown by 
the blue line)  
 
The EAM framework faces a similar problem as the MSF when it comes to the question of 
how decision makers set or adjust their decision thresholds—a question that has not been answered 
satisfactorily yet (e.g., Newell, 2005). However, consistent with the assumption that TTB-CCs have 
lower decision thresholds than WADD-CCs, Newell and Lee (2011) found that TTB-CCs acquired 
less cue information in a decision task with a closed information board than WADD-CCs (see also 
                                                          
2
 One might probably wonder what the difference is between a WADD strategy and some kind of EAM strategy.  
Generally, the WADD strategy is considered a deliberate decision strategy (Payne et al., 1988) where decision 
makers are supposed to consciously integrate the cue information (i.e., multiplying the cues by their validities 
and summing them up). The assumption underlying EAMs, in contrast, is that information integration occurs 
automatically.  
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Söllner & Bröder, 2015)
3
. In tasks with closed information boards, it is possible to directly draw 
conclusions about the amount of information a decision maker processed prior to making a decision. 
This is not the case, however, for tasks with open information boards or memory-based tasks, where 
the process of cue sampling cannot be directly observed and where the classification into TTB-CCs 
and WADD-CCs often relies on choice outcomes alone. One of the questions addressed in this thesis 
therefore asks whether decision makers, classified as TTB-CCs on the basis of their choices, can really 
be said to have ignored information in a task with open information boards (article 1) or in a memory-
based task (article 2), as it is implied by both the MSF and the L&C model. The assumption that TTB-
CCs may probably not ignore additional information raises the question of how such a choice behavior 
could be explained. In the next section I will outline two possible models that could account for such a 
choice behavior. 
1.3  Take-the-best without ignoring information  
1.3.1  An evidence accumulation model alternative to the Lee and Cummins model 
When a decision maker bases her choice on the best discriminating cue, she may have done so 
because she only processed information about this cue, as suggested by the MSF (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011) and the L&C model (Lee & Cummins, 2004). Yet it could also be that this decision 
maker processed cue information completely and nevertheless let her choice be guided by only the 
best discriminating cue, because this cue is considered strong enough to outweigh the joint evidence of 
the less valid cues. Such a decision behavior may well fit with the evidence accumulation framework, 
but the specific model accounting for this behavior would be different from the L&C model in 
important respects. Specifically, the alternative model would assume that TTB-CCs have decision 
thresholds higher than the evidence provided by a single cue, so that additional cues would not be 
ignored but processed as well. The additional cues would be integrated in a non-compensatory 
manner, which means that the TTB-relevant best discriminating cue would never be outweighed by 
the joint evidence provided by the additional cues; thus, the best discriminating cue would consistently 
drive the decision maker’s choice. A graphical depiction of such a decision behavior is shown on the 
right side of Figure 2 (blue line). Note that in this model, the decision threshold for TTB-CCs (dashed 
line) is not passed by even the most valid cue, which is why information sampling continues. 
However, as the cumulative evidence does not cross the midline, TTB-CCs finally choose the TTB-
option. The decision threshold of WADD-CCs (dotted line) is likewise not passed by the most valid 
cue; but as WADD-CCs combine the cues in a compensatory manner, they end up choosing the 
WADD-option (as it is implied by the original L&C model, which is represented by the red line in 
Figure 2). Thus, the difference between TTB-CCs and WADD-CCs may not necessarily be the height 
                                                          
3
 Note, however, that this finding also fits with the MSF and the assumption that people use different strategies. 
Indeed, most research on multi-attribute decision making can be considered and interpreted within both 
frameworks, and it is not until recently that attempts have been made to empirically contrast the different 
frameworks (e.g., Söllner & Bröder, 2015).  
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of their thresholds (though there could still be some differences), but the way in which they combine 
the cues.  
The L&C model does not take into account that decision makers may differ in the way they 
combine cue information (i.e., compensatory vs. non-compensatory). Rather, the L&C model is based 
on the premise that decision makers have quite accurate knowledge about the cue validities of a 
decision environment, and that they all combine the cues in the same way. When the cues of an 
environment are compensatory, the L&C model therefore predicts that decision makers would 
necessarily make choices in line with WADD when cues had been processed completely (as indicated 
by the red line in Figure 2). The assumption of equal and accurate validity knowledge across decision 
makers becomes somewhat doubtable, however, when decision makers have to learn the validities of a 
decision environment themselves, as was the case in the studies conducted to test the L&C model (Lee 
& Cummins, Newell & Lee, 2011). Specifically, previous research demonstrated that people have 
large difficulties learning cue validities (e.g., Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Newell & Shanks, 2003), 
which generally may call into question the assumption of accurate validity knowledge, but which may 
suggest that decision makers differ in the way they perceive the cue validities of an environment 
(compensatory vs. non-compensatory). Based on this assumption, the studies of article 1 (open 
information board) and 2 (memory-based) of this thesis test whether TTB-CCs would not ignore 
information about additional cues, but that they would process these cues and integrate them in a non-
compensatory manner. Furthermore, in article 1, cue validities have to be learned by participants, 
which additionally allows for testing whether TTB-CCs and WADD-CCs differ in the ways they 
perceive the cue validities (as indicated by the alternative model in Figure 2).  
Because the choices of TTB-CCs alone cannot tell whether or not additional information had 
been processed by these decision makers, decision times and decision confidence will additionally be 
assessed. The analyses of decision times and decision confidence have proven successfully in previous 
studies interested in the processes underlying decision making (e.g., Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; 
Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008). In brief, according to EAMs, decision time 
and decision confidence is a function of a decision maker’s threshold as well as of the consistency of 
the processed cue information. If TTB-CCs ignore information (i.e., low threshold) the consistency 
between the TTB-relevant best discriminating cue and additional information should not affect 
decision times nor confidence. However, if additional information is not ignored by TTB-CCs (higher 
threshold), EAMs predict slower decision times and lower decision confidence when additional cue 
information is inconsistent with the best cue rather than consistent.  
1.3.2  A connectionist account 
The alternative EAM outlined previously constitutes a formal model that could account for the 
decision behavior of decision makers who process cues completely and nevertheless make choices in 
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line with TTB. Another formal model that could account for such a behavior is of the class of 
connectionist network models, the Parallel Constraint Satisfaction model (PCS) by Glöckner and 
Betsch (2008a; 2008b). The PCS model assumes that cue information is processed holistically and in 
parallel in a PCS network where the options and the associated cues are represented as nodes, and the 
nodes are interlinked. Being faced with a choice between options, the network aims at striving for 
coherence by maximizing the difference between the options, and the lower the overall coherence of 
the cue information is, the longer it takes the network to settle on a stable solution. Originally, the PCS 
algorithm was specified in such a way that cues were combined in a compensatory manner, so that the 
complete processing of cues would result in choices consistent with WADD (as it is also implied by 
the L&C model). Recently, however, Glöckner and colleagues (Glöckner, Hilbig, & Jekel, 2014) 
specified a second version of the PCS model that allowed for a non-compensatory combination of cues 
as well; this model specification predicts the same choices as TTB even when cues had been processed 
completely. Thus, similar to the EAM account outlined in the previous section, the recent PCS model 
supposes TTB-CCs to process cues completely and to combine them in a non-compensatory manner.  
PCS is a model predominantly concerned with the processes of information integration and 
several findings reported by Glöckner and colleagues provide support for the assumption that decision 
makers integrate information in a PCS-manner (e.g., Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a, 2012; Glöckner et al., 
2014). To date, however, the model does not specify how information is searched or when information 
search is terminated. Indeed, the holistic-processing assumption might imply that cue information is 
always processed completely. Taking into account the processes of information search and the point at 
which information search terminates, however, may be of critical importance when studying decision 
making, as I will argue in the next section.  
1.4  Adaptive flexibility of information search   
An attractive feature of EAMs, in comparison to PCS, is that they are more specific with 
regard to how and how much information is processed in a decision situation before a choice is made. 
Specifically, according to EAMs, the extent of information search is a function of a decision maker’s 
decision threshold and, theoretically, decision thresholds may vary along a continuum. Thus, the 
amount of information a decision maker processes prior to making a decision is allowed to vary within 
the EAM framework. Although the specific mechanism by which decision makers set their decision 
thresholds is still not understood (e.g., Newell, 2005), findings from within the EAM literature show 
that decision makers can flexibly adjust their decision thresholds to situational demands, such as time 
pressure or need for accuracy (Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004). This evidence for adaptive 
flexibility may be of particular interest when considering again the decision behavior of TTB-CCs 
who, as supposed in section 1.3.1, combine cue information in a non-compensatory manner. As can be 
seen in Figure 2 (right side), regardless of where along the y-axis the decision threshold of those 
decision makers falls, they would consistently choose the option favored by the most valid cue. Thus, 
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without having to change their choice behavior, which is determined by the most valid cue, TTB-CCs 
have quite a large latitude in the extent of their information search behavior, ranging from minimal 
(only one cue is considered) to exhaustive (cues are processed completely). A second goal of the work 
presented here was therefore to examine how flexible TTB-CCs are in adjusting their decision 
thresholds. Information search behavior was considered under the two conditions typically considered 
in EAM research: time pressure and need for accuracy. It was further examined, how the availability 
of cue information (open and closed information boards) would affect the decision behavior of TTB-
CCs.  
In multi-attribute decision research, adaptive decision making has typically been considered in 
terms of adaptive strategy selection, which is incorporated in the MSF (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 
2011; see also Payne et al., 1988). That is, depending on the situation (e.g., time pressure, need for 
accuracy, high information costs, etc.), decision makers are supposed to either select a TTB strategy or 
a WADD strategy (or any other strategy).  As each strategy is defined by both, the extent of 
information search (minimal for TTB, exhaustive for WADD) and the choice behavior (see section 
1.1), this view suggests that situational factors would generally affect individuals’ information search 
behavior and their choice behavior simultaneously. Put differently, a change in information search due 
to situational factors (e.g., from minimal to extensive) is expected to also lead to a change in choice 
behavior (e.g., from TTB to WADD)
4
. There is some support for that view on adaptive decision 
making. For instance, studying the effects of time pressure on decision making, researchers found that 
under high time pressure, information search tended to be minimal and choices were more in line with 
TTB, whereas under low time pressure, information search became more extensive and choices were 
more in line with WADD (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999; Rieskamp & 
Hoffrage, 2008). This finding suggests that information search behavior and choice behavior vary 
together. The particular question addressed in this thesis, however, was whether individual decision 
makers (especially TTB-CCs) might adaptively adjust their information search behavior but without 
necessarily changing their choice behavior
5
. 
                                                          
4
 As can be seen in Figure 2 (left side), this assumption is also consistent with the L&C model. That is, when 
decision thresholds are higher than the evidence provided by the best cue, information search will be exhaustive 
and choices will be as predicted by WADD, but when decision thresholds fall below the evidence provided by 
the best cue, information search will be minimal and choices will be as predicted by TTB.     
5
 The findings of the cited studies, that a change in the extent of information search due to time pressure also led 
to a change in choice behavior, implies that decision makers of these studies perceived the cues as 
compensatory; because only then it seems plausible that the processing of complete cue information results in 
WADD-consistent choices, whereas the processing of only part of the information results in TTB-consistent 
choices (see also Figure 2, left side). Indeed, in the cited studies, participants may most likely have perceived the 
cues as compensatory, because the cue validities were instructed and the validity values pointed to a 
compensatory environment. The assumption that decision makers may adjust their information search behavior 
without changing their choice behavior, however, is of particular interest for those decision makers who perceive 
cues as non-compensatory because they would end up making choices in line with TTB regardless of whether 
they only considered the best discriminating cue or whether they processed cues completely.    
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Because EAMs are more specific than PCS with regard to decision makers’ information search 
behavior, I will predominantly focus on EAMs in the present work. But EAMs are not only specific 
about information search behavior; these models also make specific assumptions about how 
information is processed by decision makers. In the next section, I will discuss this latter issue in more 
detail and also present an additional assumption about the supposed processes underlying decision 
making.    
1.5  Automatic information integration and deliberate processes 
EAMs are quite specific with regard to the question of how information is being processed by 
decision makers in a multi-attribute decision task. It is supposed that information that is encountered in 
the course of information search becomes automatically integrated, and a decision option is finally 
chosen by a decision maker because the accumulated, combined evidence favored that option. 
Crucially, however, for TTB-CCs who perceive cues as non-compensatory, the combined evidence 
will always be in favor of the option pointed to by the best discriminating cue (cf. Figure 2, right side). 
The best discriminating cue might thus be said to have some rule-like properties and, in the spirit of 
the MSF, TTB-CCs might be said to follow some kind of TTB-decision-rule (‘go with the best cue’)—
though without necessarily following a TTB-stopping-rule
6
. Therefore, another question addressed in 
this work was whether, in addition to automatic integration processes (as postulated by EAMs), more 
deliberate and rule-driven processes (as suggested by the MSF) might also be at work when TTB-CCs 
make their decisions. The presence of such rule-like and deliberate processes might probably become 
most apparent when the rule is disconfirmed, that is, when information from the best discriminating 
cue, which consistently drives the choices of TTB-CCs, is in conflict with information from another 
cue, say the cue that directly follows the best cue in the validity hierarchy (i.e., the next-best cue). In 
these cases, TTB-CCs may be assumed to experience a cognitive conflict which they might want to 
reduce by inhibiting the conflicting information.  
 Inhibition has received quite some attention in research on selective attention (see Tipper, 
2001; for a review), and a prominent task where inhibition has been studied, among others, is the 
color-naming Stroop task (e.g., Marí-Beffa, Estévez, & Danziger, 2000). I will briefly outline the 
rationale that underlies the empirical investigation of inhibition in the Stroop task, because this 
                                                          
6
 Note, however, that I do not want to suggest here that the MSF could be adjusted in any possible way so as to 
account for any possible decision pattern; this would make this framework arbitrary and meaningless. However, 
an often neglected feature of the MSF is that it has at its basic units the cognitive building blocks, that is, the 
rules for search-, stopping- and choice behavior (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). Decision strategies are only 
specific (and fix) configurations of specific building blocks; in this regard, the study of decision strategies 
generally reveals insights into whether the assumptions about the postulated configurations of building blocks 
are valid or not. This approach, however, may somehow obscure the view on the cognitive building blocks 
themselves, which, in my view, are the concepts most closely related to the cognitive processes postulated to 
underlie decision making. Therefore, the notion of a TTB-decision-rule may well capture the regular pattern of 
TTB-CCs’ choices, and it reflects and acknowledges the idea of the most basic units postulated within the MSF 
(i.e., cognitive building blocks) without sticking to postulated superordinate units (i.e., the strategies).  
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rationale also applies to the present work. Participants’ task in a color-naming Stroop task is to name 
the color of a written word and the written words—their meanings—typically also denote colors. A 
general finding is that participants require more time to name the color of a word, when the meaning 
of the word is inconsistent with the color of the word (e.g., BLUE) as compared to when the meaning 
and the color of a word are consistent (e.g., BLUE). More interesting with regard to the present work, 
however, is the following finding. On inconsistent trials, participants have been found to need more 
time to name the color of a word (e.g., BLUE), when on the preceding trial the meaning of the word 
denoted that very color (e.g., RED) as compared to when it denoted another color (YELLOW). A 
common explanation for this type of negative priming effect (Tipper, 2001) is that participants, in 
order to successfully name the color of the word, inhibit the meaning of the word. According to this 
view, the slower responding to a word on trial n is due to the inhibition of that word (its meaning) on 
trial n-1.  
 In the present work, a similar rationale will be applied to a multi-attribute decision task in 
order to examine whether inhibitory processes might be at work when TTB-CCs make their decisions. 
It should be noted that inhibition might only play a role for TTB-CCs but not necessarily for WADD-
CCs. As noted above, TTB-CCs may want to inhibit information in particular when this information is 
in conflict with the best discriminating cue—for this cue has rule-like features for TTB-CCs. WADD-
CCs, in contrast, do not consistently choose the decision option favored by the best discriminating cue, 
which is why this cue does not have the same rule-like properties for WADD-CCs as it has for TTB-
CCs. Thus, WADD-CCs may not necessarily experience a cognitive conflict when cue information is 
inconsistent, and they therefore might also not necessarily want to inhibit conflicting information.  
2  The Present work within current strands of multi-attribute decision making 
2.1  Information integration, inhibition, and adaptive flexibility—Article 1  
Dummel, S., Rummel, J., & Voss, A. (2016). Additional information is not ignored: New evidence for 
information integration and inhibition in take-the-best decisions. Acta Psychologica, 163, 167–184. 
doi: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2015.12.001 
In this article, we addressed several of the questions raised in the previous sections. The first 
goal was to find evidence that TTB-CCs would not ignore information when this information is fully 
shown. In a recent study, Glöckner et al., (2014) found initial support for this assumption. The 
researchers showed that the decision times and confidence ratings of TTB-CCs were affected by the 
overall coherence of openly displayed cue information, suggesting therefore that TTB-CCs processed 
cue information completely. However, the processing of complete cue information in this research 
may have been driven by some methodological factors (for a full discussion of these factors, see the 
original article). Most importantly, in the decision task used by Glöckner and colleagues, the 
arrangement of the cues (i.e., the position of the cues on the open information board) changed trial-
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wise. Thus, participants searching for the best cue to make their decisions (TTB) may have processed 
additional cues inadvertently. We carefully controlled for this and other critical factors in our 
experiments, thereby providing a more stringent test of the assumption that TTB-CCs would not 
ignore openly displayed information. Moreover, whereas previous research on multi-attribute decision 
making exclusively focused on automatic integration processes, we sought to find evidence for more 
deliberate, inhibitory processes underlying the choices of TTB-CCs. A second goal of article 1 was to 
examine the adaptive flexibility of TTB-CCs’ information search behavior, or in terms of EAMs, their 
decision thresholds. To that end, we studied the decision behavior of TTB-CCs under varying 
conditions (open vs. closed information boards; time pressure vs. need for accuracy). Thus, rather than 
suggesting that TTB-CCs would generally process cue information completely, the work presented 
here aimed at getting a better understanding of the conditions under which TTB-CCs actually may 
become more likely to ignore information. Recent research by Söllner and colleagues (Söllner, Bröder, 
Glöckner, & Betsch, 2014; Söllner, & Bröder, 2015) showed that TTB-CCs do not consistently ignore 
information in tasks with closed information boards, but the adaptive flexibility of TTB-CCs 
information search behavior (and thus the extent to which they ignore information) has not been 
examined.  
 To tackle each of the questions just mentioned, we ran four experiments. We used the same 
decision task in all experiments: Participants were shown a series of pairs of bugs and had to choose 
the more poisonous of the two bugs. The bugs were described by four binary cues: body, antennae, 
legs, and fangs. The cues differed in their validities (i.e., the extent to which they predicted 
poisonousness) and participants of all experiments had to learn the validities in an initial feedback 
learning phase. Subsequent to the validity learning phase, participants of all experiments entered the 
test phase
7
. With the exception of Experiment 3, the test phase of the experiments consisted of two 
parts. In the first part, an open information board was used (all Experiments). To examine whether 
participants would ignore information in this task, we manipulated the consistency between the best 
discriminating cue and the supposedly TTB-irrelevant next-best cue. The next-best cue was either 
consistent or inconsistent with the best discriminating cue (in Experiment 3 we also used pairs for 
which the next-best cue was neutral, that is, non-discriminating). We also manipulated the validity 
rank of the best discriminating cue, that is, whether it was the 1st rank, the 2nd rank or the 3rd rank 
cue. The main dependent variable was decision times; in Experiments 1b and 3 we further assessed 
decision confidence (in Experiment 1b by having participants bet on some of their decisions; in 
Experiment 3 by directly asking for confidence ratings).  
 In the second part of the test phase (Experiments 1a, 1b, and 2), participants performed the bug 
decision task once again—this time with a closed information board. The main dependent variable 
                                                          
7
 From the perspective of participants, the validity learning and the test phase differed mainly in that choice 
feedback was given only in the former—in order to enable validity learning—but not in the latter. 
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here was the amount of cues participants acquired before making a decision. Participants of 
Experiment 2 performed this task twice, once with an instructional focus on decision speed and once 
with a focus on accuracy. Table 1 gives an overview of the test phases we used in the different 
experiments together with the respective main dependent variables. In each test phase, participants 
were also shown pairs for which TTB and WADD make opposing choice predictions. We used the 
choice-based strategy-classification method by Bröder (2003) to classify participants into TTB-CCs or 
WADD-CCs, respectively
8
. At the end of each experiment, participants were further asked to rate the 
predictive usefulness of each of the four cues. This enabled us to examine whether TTB-CCs and 
WADD-CCs differed in the way they perceived the cues (non-compensatory vs. compensatory).  
Table 1 
Overview of the Test Phases of Experiments 1–3 and the Respective Dependent Variables 
 Test phases of the experiments 
Experiment 
 
First part 
(open information board)  
 
Second part 
(closed information board) 
1a Decision times  Amount of acquired information (AAI)   
1b Decision times and bets  AAI 
   Manipulation of instructional focus 
   Decision speed Accuracy 
2 Decision times  AAI AAI 
3 
Decision times and confindence 
ratings 
 
- - 
 
Finally, in Experiment 3 we tested our hypothesis that TTB-CCs would inhibit information 
from a cue (here the next-best cue), when this cue information was inconsistent with the best 
discriminating cue. To this end, we modified the bug decision task with open information board in the 
following way. Participants were again shown pairs of bugs for which we manipulated the consistency 
between the best discriminating cue and the next-best cue (consistent, neutral, or inconsistent). Some 
                                                          
8
 We also considered the EQW-strategy for the individual classification; but there were only few participants 
classified as EQW-CCs at all and these participants might possibly have been misclassified. For these reasons, I 
will concentrate on TTB-CCs and WADD-CCs in this overview.    
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of the decision trials, however, were followed by a trial on which only a single cue value (i.e., a single 
feature of a bug) was shown to participants and their task was then to quickly indicate whether this cue 
value was indicative of poisonousness or not. Our manipulation was whether the single cue value 
depicted on these trials was part of an inconsistent, consistent, or neutral next-best cue on the 
preceding decision trial. The assumption was that a participant’s response to a single cue value should 
be slowed, when this cue value had previously been inhibited (i.e., part of an inconsistent next-best 
cue) as compared when it had not been inhibited (i.e., part of a consistent or neutral next-best cue).   
 In the following I will first summarize and discuss the results related to the question of 
whether TTB-CCs ignore information fully shown to them (Experiments 1–3) and whether TTB-CCs 
would inhibit conflicting information (Experiment 3). The results of all experiments showed that TTB-
CCs were sensitive to the consistency manipulation in the task with open information board, 
suggesting therefore that TTB-CCs did not ignore information. TTB-CCs made slower decisions, bet 
less on their decisions, and were less confident with their decisions, when the next-best cue was 
inconsistent with the best discriminating cue as compared to when the cues were consistent. The 
consistency manipulation also strongly affected the decision behavior of WADD-CCs. TTB-CCs’ 
decision times were further strongly affected by the validity rank of the best discriminating. Decision 
times increased with the validity rank of the best cue decreasing. The validity rank had no, or only a 
weak effect, on WADD-CCs’ decision times.  
These findings were generally in line with the predictions made by the EAM account outlined 
in section 1.3.1, which assumes that TTB-CCs combine cues in a non-compensatory manner, whereas 
WADD-CCs combine cues in a compensatory manner
9
. The assumption that TTB-CCs and WADD-
CCs differed in the way they perceived the cues received some support from participants’ predictive 
utility ratings of the four cues. In all but one experiment, the utility ratings showed a larger dispersion 
for TTB-CCs than for WADD-CCs (a high dispersion is indicative of non-compensation). The 
predictions made by the EAM account, however, were only partially supported by the decision time 
results of Experiment 3. The EAM account predicted an increase in decision times with a decrease in 
information consistency. In comparison to a neutral next-best cue, however, it was only an 
inconsistent next-best cue that affected TTB-CCs’ decisions by slowing them, but a consistent next-
best cue did not additionally speed the decisions. The slowdown in TTB-CCs’ decisions was as 
predicted by EAMs, but it was also in line with our additional assumption that TTB-CCs might inhibit 
conflicting cue information. In Experiment 3 we found first evidence for the supposed inhibitory 
processes: On those trials of the decision task on which participants were to respond to only a single 
cue value, TTB-CCs were slower in doing so, when this cue value had been inconsistent with the best 
discriminating cue on the preceding trial (assumed inhibition) as compared to when it had been neutral 
                                                          
9
 That is, when cues are perceived as non-compensatory, they are perceived as being largely different from each 
other with regard to their validities. In this case, the validity rank of the best discriminating cue may exert quite a 
strong effect on decision times, as was observed for TTB-CCs.  
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or consistent (no inhibition assumed). A similar pattern of inhibition did not emerge for WADD-CCs 
though, which was in line with our assumption that WAD-CCs may have perceived an inconsistent 
next-best cue as less conflicting than did TTB-CCs (see section 1.5 for a full explanation). Before 
further discussing some theoretical implications that we also discussed in the article, I will summarize 
the results from the experiments related to the adaptive flexibility question. For these findings, it is 
important to note that the strategy-classification procedure, which was applied for each test phase, 
revealed high consistency in individual classifications across test phase.  
 Results from Experiments 1a and 1b showed that, when cues had to be acquired sequentially 
(closed information board), TTB-CCs became more likely to ignore information. Overall, TTB-CCs 
acquired less cues before making a decision than did WADD-CCs. The finding that TTB-CCs did not 
ignore information when it was easily available (open information board), but that the same TTB-CCs 
became more likely to ignore information when cue availability decreased (closed information board), 
supported the assumption of TTB-CCs’ adaptive flexibility in information search behavior (or, in 
terms of EAMs, TTB-CCs’ adaptive adjustment of decision thresholds). The results of Experiment 2 
complemented these findings. When task instructions emphasized decision speed, both TTB-CCs and 
WADD-CCs acquired less cues before making a decision as compared to when task instructions 
stressed accuracy.  Contrary to previous research, however, we found no evidence for individual 
strategy shifts under time pressure (i.e., a shift from WADD to TTB)
10
. That is, although TTB-CCs 
and WADD-CCs adaptively adjusted the extent of information search in response to the different 
instructions, they did not change their choice behavior (from WADD-CCs to TTB-CCs). These 
findings suggest that adaptive decision making does not necessarily have to emerge as adaptive 
strategy selection (e.g., Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Payne et al., 1988), but it can emerge more 
subtle on the level of individual information search behavior.    
 In the article, we discussed two explanations for the discrepancy between our and previous 
findings. In previous research on adaptive decision making (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a; Rieskamp & 
Hoffrage, 2008), time pressure was induced by imposing an explicit time limit on participants’ 
information search. Thus, participants could probably only sample a small amount of cues, which may 
have decreased the likelihood that a highly valid cue could have been compensated for by less valid 
cues. This should then have fostered a choice behavior in line with TTB. In our experiment, in 
contrast, time pressure was stressed only in the instructions, but there was no external time constraint. 
Participants who perceived cues as compensatory (WADD-CCs) might therefore have sampled at least 
as many cues as necessary to figure out whether a highly valid cue could have been outweighed by 
less valid cues (see also Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007). Another explanation we discussed, for why 
we found no signs of strategy shifts in our experiments, suggests that decision makers may have 
                                                          
10
 For TTB-CCs a strategy shift to WADD under accuracy instruction was not expected, because we supposed 
TTB-CCs to perceive cues as non-compensatory. For these decision makers, therefore, a complete processing of 
cues would have led to the same choices as the processing of only the most valid cue.  
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adopted and routinized a certain decision strategy already during the initial validity learning phase, and 
they may have stick to this strategy throughout the experiment. There is some evidence for routine 
effects in multi-attribute decision making, showing that decision makers tend to stick to that strategy 
they initially learned in an experiment (Bröder & Schiffer, 2006). Importantly, however, even though 
we found no strategy shifts in our experiment, the finding that TTB-CCs and WADD-CCs were 
sensitive to the different instructions support the assumption of adaptive flexibility.   
 Results from the task with closed information board further showed that TTB-CCs generally 
acquired fewer cues than did WADD-CCs. This finding is consistent with the model by Lee and 
Cummins (2004), which assumes that TTB-CCs have lower decision thresholds than WADD-CCs (see 
section 1.2.1). As we argued in the article, however, the L&C model cannot account for the results 
from the task with open information board, where TTB-CCs apparently did not ignore information. 
We suggest that the L&C model could be reconciled with these findings by allowing for individual 
differences in the way decision makers combine cues (compensatory vs. non-compensatory). 
 In the article, we considered EAMs as an overarching framework for our research, because 
EAMs make specific predictions about various aspects of decision behavior, such as decision times, 
decision confidence, and information search. EAMs are also quite specific with regard to the processes 
that are supposed to underlie decision making. In our experiments we found quite some support for the 
predictions made by EAMs. However, regarding the assumptions about the processes supposed to 
underlie decision making, our findings also point to a possible limitation of EAMs. Specifically, 
EAMs suggest that decision behavior can be accounted for by a single mechanism—the accumulation 
and automatic integration of information. Based on our findings, we consider it quite likely that 
information-integration processes may have underlain the decision behavior of participants in general 
(i.e., TTB-CCs and WADD-CCs). However, the inhibition findings from Experiment 3 suggest that 
additional, more deliberate processes might also have operated during decision making and, critically, 
that TTB-CCs and WADD-CCs differed in the extent to which they engaged in these processes. The 
assumption of a single mechanism may therefore be too constraint to capture the variability in decision 
makers’ decision pattern.  
We also discussed a potential objection to that conclusion. The idea that information is 
inhibited during decision making may fit with the single-mechanism model PCS, which supposes that 
decision makers strive for coherence when making their decisions and coherence could be achieved by 
means of inhibition. Yet although PCS may provide an explanation for inhibitory processes as 
mechanisms underlying decision making, the model suggests that all decision makers should engage in 
inhibition. This, however, was not the case in our experiment; WADD-CCs showed no signs of 
inhibition. PCS provides no explanation for why some decision makers should be more inclined to 
strive for coherence (TTB-CCs) than others (WADD-CCs). This difference, in our view, could have 
been due to TTB-CCs’ stronger reliance on a deliberate decision rule, which might have been fostered 
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by TTB-CCs’ highly regular choice behavior (see section 1.5). However, irrespective of why TTB-
CCs and WADD-CCs may have differed in the extent of inhibition, the critical point for single-process 
models is that we found a difference between decision makers. We suggest therefore that the processes 
underlying decision making might probably be more complex than assumed by single-process models.  
2.2  TTB-irrelevant information in memory-based decisions—Article 2 
Dummel, S., & Rummel, J. (2015). Take-the-best and the influence of decision-inconsistent attributes 
on decision confidence and choices in memory-based decisions. Memory, advanced online publication. 
doi: 10.1080/09658211.2015.1117642 
Tasks with open information boards have sometimes been considered unfair tests for the TTB 
strategy
11
(Gigerenzer et al., 1999; Newell & Shanks, 2003). Indeed, TTB has originally been 
postulated for memory-based decision making because, so the argument goes, the strategy requires a 
decision maker to retrieve only part of the information and thus reduces retrieval efforts (Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996). In one study, Bröder and Schiffer (2003b) found that the proportion of TTB-CCs 
was higher in a condition where participants had to retrieve cue information from memory compared 
with a condition where cue information was fully shown to participants on screen during decision 
making. This finding was in line with the assumption that TTB might reduce retrieval efforts and 
might thus be preferred for memory-based decisions. However, the assumption underlying TTB, that 
memory retrieval happens sequentially and that TTB-irrelevant information is ignored (i.e., not 
retrieved) has been challenged by recent research. For instance, using a memory-based decision task, 
Khader, Pachur, and Jost, (2013) found that TTB-CCs took longer to make a choice between two 
options the more cue information they had previously learned about these options. The increase in 
decision times with the number of option-associated cues has been suggested to result from an 
automatic retrieval of complete cue information. As we argued in the article, however, from the 
finding that TTB-CCs’ decision times increased proportionally to the number of option-associated 
cues, it remained unclear to what extent TTB-CCs deliberately processed and integrated TTB-
irrelevant cues. We addressed this issue in the study of article 2 by using the same manipulation of 
information consistency as we also used in article 1 (Dummel, Rummel, & Voss, 2016). 
Participants first had to learn the cue patterns of nine options. Similar to previous memory-
based studies (e.g., Bröder and Schiffer, 2003b), we used a murder cover story whereby the nine 
                                                          
11
 This criticism may deserve some clarification. There have indeed been some studies using open information 
boards where only few people were found to make choices in line with TTB at all. That is, in these studies the 
majority of participants were classified as WADD-CCs. The results from our as well as other studies (Bergert & 
Nosofsky, 2007; Dummel et al. 2016; Lee & Cummins, 2004), however, show that even with open information 
boards a considerable proportion of participants make choices in line with TTB. Thus, open information boards 
may not necessarily be unfair tests for TTB. Another reading of the criticism, however, could be that open 
information boards are unfair tests for the ignorance assumption implied by TTB. Although this interpretation of 
the criticism was probably not what the critics originally had in mind, the findings from article 1 (Dummel et al., 
2016) lend support to this reading. That is, when cue information is openly displayed even TTB-CCs do not 
ignore this information.    
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options were the nine murder suspects. Each suspect was described by four binary cues which 
participants were asked to learn; the cues referred to the suspects’ items of clothing and cars. After this 
learning phase, participants received information about the validity hierarchy of the four cues and then 
performed the decision task. Here, participants repeatedly had to choose the more suspicious suspect 
out of two possible suspects. Participants were further asked to indicate their decision confidence, 
which was our main dependent variable. The pairs participants were shown in the decision task varied 
on (1) the validity rank of the best discriminating cue (1st, 2nd, or 3rd rank) and (2) the consistency of 
the TTB-irrelevant next-best cue (whether it was consistent or inconsistent with the best cue, or 
neutral/non-discriminating). Participants were further shown pairs for which TTB and WADD made 
opposing choice predictions and we used the choice-based strategy classification by Bröder (2003) to 
classify them accordingly. Hypotheses regarding TTB-CCs’ confidence ratings were derived from 
TTB and EAMs/PCS. They both predict an effect of the validity rank manipulation on decision 
confidence, such that confidence should decrease with the validity rank of the best discriminating cue 
increasing. According to TTB, decision confidence should remain unaffected by the consistency 
manipulation as TTB-irrelevant information is supposed to be ignored. However, if TTB-CCs retrieve 
TTB-irrelevant information, EAMs/PCS further predict that confidence should decrease with 
information consistency decreasing. In addition to analyzing decision confidence, we also considered 
the extent of participants’ strategy-inconsistent choices, as EAMs predict a higher proportion of 
strategy-inconsistent choices when information is inconsistent rather than consistent.  
The results showed that the validity rank of the best discriminating cue affected TTB-CCs’ 
decision confidence just as predicted by both TTB and EAMs/PCS. Of greater importance, however, 
TTB-CCs were also affected by the consistency of the next-best cue, suggesting therefore that TTB-
CCs retrieved supposedly TTB-irrelevant information. In line with the predictions made by 
EAMs/PCS, TTB-CCs were less confident in their decisions and made more strategy-inconsistent 
decisions, when the next-best cue was inconsistent with the best discriminating cue as compared to 
when it was consistent or neutral. Compared with when the next-best cue was neutral, however, a 
consistent next-best cue did not additionally increase TTB-CCs’ decision confidence, as had been 
predicted by EAMs/PCS. Taken together, the findings showed that, contrary to the TTB-stopping-rule, 
TTB-CCs did not ignore cue information. The results were mostly in line with the predictions made by 
EAMs/PCS, which might suggest that TTB-irrelevant had somehow become integrated.  
In the article, we discussed a possible methodological explanation for why the consistent 
information, compared with the neutral information, did additionally increase TTB-CCs’ decision 
confidence. The pairs with a neutral next-best cue differed on only one cue, whereas the pairs with a 
consistent or inconsistent cue differed on two cues. The higher number of dissimilar cues and the 
memory-based comparison of these cues might thus have led to a general increase in participants’ 
uncertainty (which may have worked against the consistency effect). As we also argued in the article, 
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however, this methodological constraint should not have undermined the general finding that TTB-
CCs retrieved TTB-irrelevant information, because if this information had not been retrieved, the 
consistency manipulation would have had no effect whatsoever. Furthermore, the difference in 
confidence ratings between consistent and inconsistent pairs could not have been attributed to the 
suggested methodological factor, because these pairs had an identical number of dissimilar cues (two). 
We conclude therefore that TTB-CCs did not only retrieve TTB-irrelevant information, but they also 
appeared to have integrated this information somehow.  
We also discussed a possible objection to our conclusion that TTB-CCs retrieved additional, 
TTB-irrelevant information when making their decisions. One could argue, for example, that 
additional cues had probably only been retrieved for the post-decisional confidence ratings. However, 
the finding that TTB-CCs made more strategy-inconsistent decisions when cue information was 
inconsistent rather than consistent speaks against this assumption and suggests that TTB-CCs had 
retrieved TTB-irrelevant information prior to making their decisions.   
Another point we discussed in the article referred to the level of analyses we considered. We 
examined TTB-CCs as a group of decision makers and found that, on average, TTB-CCs did not 
ignore TTB-irrelevant information. This hence allows for the possibility that some TTB-CCs may 
have behaved completely in line with TTB and ignored information. The point we wanted to make 
with our research, however, was not to suggest that TTB-CCs would generally not ignore information; 
but the finding that at least some TTB-CCs appeared to have not behaved in line with TTB requires 
one to rethink the processes supposed to underlie decision making. Of course, whether the processes 
underlying TTB-CCs actually match the processes assumed by EAMs/PCS is another question and 
awaits further research. As for example argued in article 1, even when the decision behavior of 
participants is mostly in line with the predictions made by specific models such as EAMs/PCS, this 
does not necessarily mean that the processes underlying the decision behavior also conforms to the 
model processes (see also the General Discussion section).  
2.3  Ego-depletion and TTB-consistent choices—Article 3 
Dummel, S., & Rummel, J. (2016) Effects of Ego-Depletion on Choice Behavior in a Multi-Attribute 
Decision Task. Journal of Cognitive Psychology. doi: 10.1080/20445911.2015.1135929 
 The main question addressed in the previous articles was whether decision makers who 
consistently made choices in line with TTB ignored information or not. Our main goal in article 3 was 
to further our understanding of the conditions under which decision makers would become more likely 
to make TTB-consistent choices at all. The findings from article 1 suggest that TTB-CCs make non-
compensatory TTB-choices because they perceive the cues as being non-compensatory. This 
complements findings from previous studies on adaptive decision making, where participants in a 
decision environment with high cue dispersion (i.e., non-compensatory) were also found to become 
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more likely to make TTB-consistent choices (e.g., Bröder, 2000). Research on adaptive decision 
making also examined other factors that have been found to increase participants’ likelihood of 
making TTB-consistent choices, such as the redundancy of cues in a decision environment 
(Dieckmann & Rieskamp, 2007) or time pressure (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 
2008). Of importance with regard to article 3, the factors considered in this research were all factors 
directly related to the decision situation itself. The question addressed in article 3, in contrast, was 
whether individuals’ choice behavior in a decision task would also be affected by a situation (task) 
completely unrelated to the choice situation. Research on ego-depletion suggests that engaging in self-
control in one task may reduce one’s cognitive resources available for another subsequent task (e.g., 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). TTB has been suggested to reduce cognitive effort, 
and there has also been some support for this assumption
12
(Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b; Mata, Schooler, 
& Rieskamp, 2007). The study of article 3 therefore examined whether decision makers in a state of 
ego-depletion (induced prior to the decision task) would become more likely to make TTB-consistent 
choices than participants who were not depleted. Before I continue with the outline of the study and 
the results, I want to briefly discuss one point that may need some clarification.   
 In our previous research (Dummel et al., 2016; Experiment 2), we found that participants’ 
choice behavior remained largely unaffected by a time pressure manipulation, and we suggested that 
this may have been due to the routinization of a strategy during validity learning. Indeed, in most 
studies on adaptive decision making where effects on choice behavior had been found, cue validities 
were instructed rather than had to be learned. Therefore, as our interest in article 3 was to study the 
effects of ego-depletion on choice behavior, we told participants the exact validity values in the 
instructions of the decision task rather than having them learn the validities. Furthermore, the validity 
values we provided in the instructions pointed to a compensatory environment; findings from previous 
research suggested that under these conditions, participants generally prefer to make choices in line 
with compensatory strategies like WADD. We deemed this important, because our assumption was 
that ego-depletion might increase participants’ likelihood of making a choice in line with the non-
compensatory TTB strategy. We therefore thought the depletion-effect most likely to occur in a 
compensatory environment. Note that this also meant that we expected depleted participants not to 
consistently make TTB-consistent choices, but rather to become more likely to deviate from the 
preferred, but more effortful compensatory choices. In our previous research, we used a strategy-
classification approach to identify individual strategies. However, as we assumed participants to 
generally prefer to make compensatory choices and to only become more likely to deviate from these 
                                                          
12
 There has been some debate, however, on whether TTB, in comparison to compensatory strategies, indeed 
reduces effort. We discussed this issue in detail in the article. The bottom line of this discussion was that the 
mere execution of a TTB strategy (i.e., the processing of cues as suggested by TTB) indeed seems to be less 
effortful than, for example, the execution of a WADD strategy. However, what seems to be difficult for 
participants is to figure out that in a decision environment, a TTB strategy would be more profitable than a 
WADD strategy. As our focus in article 3 was on participants’ application of a TTB-like strategy and not on the 
learning of strategies, we considered it warranted to suggest that TTB may reduce cognitive effort.   
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choices under ego-depletion (and make TTB-consistent choices) we used a different approach to 
analyze individual choices (see below).  
Figure 1 shows the decision task we used in article 3. Participants were to choose the more 
profitable of two funds and for each fund, the recommendations of six experts (cues) of varying 
validities were shown. Participants were shown 50 pairs of funds for which the non-compensatory 
TTB and compensatory strategies
13
 made opposing choice predictions. Consistent with our previous 
studies, the pairs varied regarding the validity rank of the best discriminating cue (1st, 2nd, or 3rd)
 14
. 
Of greatest importance, however, prior to the decision task, participants performed a completely 
unrelated task (copying a text), where we manipulated ego-depletion in a way it has commonly been 
done in ego-depletion research (simply copying the text vs. copying but skipping specific letters).   
We analyzed participants’ choices with a multi-level logistic regression analysis thereby 
taking into account the dependency among data and the dichotomous nature of the dependent variable 
(TTB-consistent vs. compensatory-consistent). Consistent with our hypothesis, the analysis revealed 
that, for depleted participants, the likelihood of making a TTB-consistent choice was 2.7 times higher 
than for non-depleted (which was significant). The validity rank manipulation also had a significant 
effect on choice behavior, such that the likelihood of making a TTB-consistent choice increased with 
the validity rank of the best cue increasing. This latter finding was somewhat surprising—that 
participants become more likely to rely on the best cue when this cue had a lower rather than a higher 
validity. Our suggestion in the article was that, when the first-rank cue was the best discriminating 
cue, then the evidence provided by the remaining cues may probably have been perceived as stronger 
(favoring compensatory choices) than when the second- or third-rank cue were best cues (favoring 
TTB-consistent choices).   
We further discussed several explanations for why ego-depletion increased participants’ 
likelihood of making TTB-consistent choices. Our initial assumption was that ego-depletion reduces 
cognitive resources. According to this account then, depleted participants more frequently made 
simple TTB-choices because they had less cognitive resources available for the decision task. A 
motivational account, however, might also seem plausible, suggesting that depleted participants were 
less motivated for the decision task. This account, however, would also suggest that depleted decision 
makers may probably have made faster decisions than non-depleted participants (to get the task over 
with). In the article, we also considered participants’ decision times. Yet contrary to the 
‘demotivation’ hypothesis, decision times did not differ between the groups. An interesting 
observation that we made about decision times, however, was that TTB-consistent choices were not 
                                                          
13
 We used the general term compensatory strategies in the article rather than referring to specific strategies 
(WADD or EQW) because the different strategies made identical choice predictions for almost all pairs.  
14
 We did not use the consistency manipulation here. This manipulation was used in previous studies to examine 
whether TTB-CCs ignored information or not. In article 3, however, our interest was to examine the conditions 
under which participants would become more likely to make TTB-consistent choices, irrespective of whether 
information had been ignored or not.  
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made any faster than compensatory choices; the descriptive pattern was even reversed. Although not 
of our primary interest in article 3, this finding indicated that participants probably did not ignore 
information when they made TTB-consistent choices (if information had been ignored, TTB-
consistent would have been expected to be faster). The decision-time findings could be reconciled with 
the previously mentioned cognitive resources account. Specifically, depleted participants may have 
perceived the task of integrating information from the six cues as being more difficult than non-
depleted participants, and when integration attempts became too effortful on a trial, depleted 
participants may finally have resorted to a simple rule-of-thumb and followed the best cue (in the 
sense of ‘take-the-best, if everything else fails’). As we pointed out in the article, however, all the 
explanations considered for why depletion affected participants’ choice behavior remain rather 
speculative and await further research. Yet irrespective of why ego-depletion increased individuals’ 
likelihood of making TTB-consistent choices, the important finding from article 3 is that ego-depletion 
had this effect. The findings suggest, therefore, that the choices we make in our lives can be affected 
by things that actually have nothing to do with the choice situations themselves.  
3.  General Discussion  
The work presented in this thesis aimed to get a better understanding of the cognitive 
processes underlying those choices that (supposedly) rely on only one good cue, so-called TTB-
consistent choices. A common explanation for such a choice behavior has been that decision makers 
stop information search at the discovery of the best cue and ignore additional information. In the 
present work, however, we found converging evidence that TTB-CCs do not ignore cue information 
when this information is fully shown to them or when decision accuracy is of importance (article 1). 
Moreover, even when cues had to be retrieved from memory, TTB-CCs were not completely unaware 
of additional cues (article 2). We further gained first insights into the specific processes underlying the 
choices of TTB-CCs. We found first evidence that TTB-CCs inhibit information that conflicts with 
their decisions. Finally, the present work improved our understanding of the conditions under which 
decision makers become more likely to make TTB-consistent choices. We found that the likelihood of 
making a TTB-consistent choice increased, when decision makers were ego-depleted prior to decision 
making as compared to when they were not depleted.  
Overall, the findings presented here challenge the assumption of a strict TTB-stopping-rule, as 
it is suggested, for example, by the multiple-strategy view on decision making. As outlined in the 
previous sections, our findings were mostly in line with EAMs or PCS. Yet even those models could 
not fully account for the decision behavior we observed. Specifically, EAMs and PCS assume that a 
single process (the automatic integration of information) underlies the decision behavior of all 
decision makers. Our inhibition findings suggest, however, that more deliberate processes also operate 
during decision making, and that decision makers differ in the extent to which they engage in these 
processes. Most of the relevant and critical points of each study have already been discussed in the 
COGNITIVE PROCESSES UNDERLYING HEURISTIC DECISION MAKING 29 
 
previous sections. The following section therefore takes a cross-article perspective by summarizing 
and discussing the results of the three articles in relation to the three questions pointed to at the very 
beginning of this thesis.  
One of these questions asked, when or why do decision makers become more likely to rely on 
only one cue to make their decisions. Our findings point to two answers. First, decision makers 
predominantly based their choices on only one cue, when they perceived this cue as truly strong 
enough to outweigh additional cues—that is, when they perceived the cues as non-compensatory 
(article 1). This finding fits with the notion of ecological rationality (Gigerenzer et al., 1999; 
Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). That is, the application of a non-compensatory strategy like TTB 
seems perfectly rational in a non-compensatory environment
15
. Second, the likelihood of making TTB-
consistent choices in a compensatory environment increased in a state of ego-depletion. This finding 
fits with the notion that TTB reduces cognitive effort and might thus become more likely when 
cognitive resources are sparse (e.g., Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b; Mata et al., 2007).   
The second question addressed with the present work is, what it means, when decision makers 
make choices in line with TTB; concretely, do TTB-CCs ignore information? The findings suggest 
that it depends: Under certain conditions, such as when cues were not that easily available or when 
decision speed was emphasized, TTB-CCs became more likely to ignore information. However, when 
cues were easily available or when decision accuracy was of importance, TTB-CCs tended to process 
cues completely. These findings are in line with the idea of the adaptive decision maker (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011; Payne et al., 1988). However, contrary to previous research (Glöckner & Betsch, 
2008a; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008), suggesting that adaptive decision making is generally reflected 
by both a change in choice behavior and a change in the extent of information search (i.e., adaptive 
strategy selection), the current findings indicate that decision makers may adaptively adjust their 
extent of information search without necessarily changing their choice behavior. In the case of TTB-
CCs who perceive cues as non-compensatory (article 1), this kind of adaptive flexibility also seems 
plausible—that is, the choices of these decision makers should have consistently been driven by the 
best cue, irrespective of the extent of information search. The finding that under accuracy instructions, 
TTB-CCs became less likely to ignore information points to a possible, and important, reason for why 
TTB-CCs may process cue information that, according to TTB, is considered irrelevant. That is, one 
could argue that TTB-CCs actually have no reason to process additional cues, because for their 
choices the one single cue would be sufficient (i.e., their behavior could be considered as irrational or 
inefficient). However, in many daily situations, individuals might probably not only want to make a 
                                                          
15
 In this study (Dummel, et al., 2016), the cue validities of the learning environment pointed to a compensatory 
environment. One could argue therefore that the decision behavior of TTB-CCs was not rational under a 
prescriptive perspective of decision making. However, the cues in the learning environment were also positively 
correlated. Simulation studies showed that under these conditions the predictive power of TTB matches the 
predictive power of compensatory strategies like WADD (Davis-Stober, Dana, & Budescu, 2010). Thus, the 
decision behavior of TTB-CCs in our studies could indeed be considered as ‘ecological rational’.  
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choice, but they also might want to know how accurate their choice is in order to calibrate their 
decision behavior accordingly (see also Hausmann & Läge, 2008; Newell & Shanks, 2003; for a 
similar view). For example, in order to choose the more profitable of two funds, information from a 
single, highly recommended expert might suffice. Yet if one also were to invest some money in that 
fund, information from several experts might be helpful to gauge how good the choice (i.e., the fund) 
actually is and thus how much money one would be willing to invest.  
Finally, the last question concerns the cognitive processes underlying the choices of TTB-CCs. 
More specifically, if TTB-CCs do not ignore information, how do they process this information? I 
have already discussed in more detail that (1) our findings were largely in line with the predictions 
made by EAMs or PCS, indicating that automatic information integration processes may most likely 
have underlain the decision behavior of TTB-CCs (and also WADD-CCs); but that (2) additional 
inhibitory processes apparently also operated during TTB-decision-making but not WADD-decision-
making, indicating that the assumption of a single process underlying the decision behavior of TTB-
CCs and WADD-CCs might probably be too constraint. This discussion mainly concerned the results 
from article 1. In the following, I want to further elaborate on the processes underlying decision 
making by focusing on the results from articles 2 and 3. And I want to specifically concentrate on the 
assumption that information integration is automatic.  
As noted previously, Bröder and Schiffer (2003b) found that the proportion of TTB-CCs was 
higher in a condition where cues had to be retrieved from memory as compared to a condition where 
the same cue information was fully shown on screen during decision making. This finding supported 
the assumption that TTB reduces cognitive effort. However, the findings by Khader et al. (2013), as 
well as our findings (Dummel & Rummel, 2015), provide evidence for a retrieval of complete cue 
information even for TTB-CCs, indicating that the retrieval of cues seems to be less effortful than 
commonly assumed. Provided, however, that cue retrieval is not that effortful, why do decision makers 
nevertheless prefer TTB over WADD in a memory-based decision task? A possible explanation could 
be that, what actually requires cognitive effort in a memory-based decision task is not the retrieval of 
cues but the memory-based combination or integration of cues. This, however, would speak against 
the assumption that cues become automatically integrated at their retrieval (EAMs and PCS). That is, 
if cues were automatically retrieved and integrated (i.e., retrieval and integration without much effort), 
then there would be no reason for decision makers to prefer TTB over WADD—yet this is what 
Bröder and Schiffer found (and indeed, in our own study in article 2, there were only three WADD-
CCs compared to 41 TTB-CCs). One might suggest, therefore, that the retrieval of complete cue 
information is probably not sufficient for a decision maker to also fully integrate the information so 
that an immediate choice could have been made once all cues had been retrieved. It rather seems that 
the memory-based combination of cues in a WADD-like manner requires a certain amount of 
cognitive effort—effort that decision makers may probably circumvent by (simply) focusing on the 
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best cue to make their decisions (TTB), even when additional cues had been retrieved completely. 
Note that this does not mean that integration processes did not play any role at the time cues were 
retrieved (as decision makers of our study were sensitive to the consistency of information); but for a 
choice to be made, these processes might have been insufficient and decision makers may probably 
have relied on more strategic processes instead. Importantly, however, even though the way in which 
decision makers process cues in a memory-based decision task might still not be fully understood, a 
conclusion that one might relatively safely draw from the most current findings (Dummel & Rummel, 
2015; Khader et al., 2013) is that, contrary to the TTB-stopping-rule, cue information is not ignored.  
The assumption of a completely automatic information integration process underlying decision 
making might also be challenged to some extent by the findings from article 3. There, decision makers 
became more likely to make TTB-consistent choices when they had previously been depleted. An 
inspection of individual choice patterns revealed that, decision makers of this study showed a general 
preference for compensatory choices, which seems reasonable given that the instructed validities 
pointed to a compensatory environment. Put differently, an optimal choice in this environment would 
have been a compensatory choice, and a successful combination of cues should have led to this kind of 
choices. But in a state of ego-depletion, decision makers more frequently deviated from the ‘optimal’ 
choices and made TTB-consistent choices. One might suggest therefore that depleted participants had 
less cognitive resources available in order to successfully combine the cues. This, however, would 
suggest that the combination or integration of cues may not be completely automatic but may require 
at least some cognitive or attentional effort—effort that depleted participants seemed not able to 
muster consistently.    
In decision research the MSF has often been directly contrasted with the EAMs framework or 
PCS. This approach implies (and it has often been framed explicitly in that way) that the two views—
different strategies and single process—are mutually exclusive. The findings of the present research, 
however, may suggest that there is probably a truth to both frameworks. Certainly, our findings quite 
consistently showed that the assumption implied by the TTB-stopping-rule is not valid, at least not in 
its strictest meaning (i.e., information is not generally ignored). Yet the TTB-stopping-rule is only one 
specific assumption incorporated into one specific strategy. This therefore should not completely 
invalidate the MSF as a whole; but it may one require to reconsider the basic tenets of the framework. 
A core tenet of the MSF, for example, is the assumption that rule-like processes operate during 
decision making; specific rules are, for instance, search-, stopping-, and decision rules. Our findings 
indicate that decision makers apparently do not adhere to a specific stopping-rule; but this should not 
necessarily mean that rule-like processes play no role at all during decision making. In fact, our 
assumption that TTB-CCs might inhibit conflicting information was particularly inspired by the 
assumption that these decision makers might follow a TTB-decision-rule. The study of decision 
strategies, which are fix configuration of rules, might obscure somehow the view on the rules 
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themselves. Focusing more on the rules or the rule-like processes that may operate during decision 
making might therefore be a more promising approach to the study of decision making than focusing 
on specific strategies.  
Rule-like or strategic processes are not incorporated into decision making models like EAMs 
or PCS (but see Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b; for a first attempt). These models suppose that the 
decisions we make are the result of automatic information integration processes. The results of our 
study were quite well in line with the predictions made by EAMs or PCS. We suggest therefore that 
information integration processes play a prominent role in decision making. Yet the aforementioned 
discussion of our findings might also have demonstrated that the supposed integration processes may 
probably not be completely automatic but may require at least some cognitive effort. Furthermore, the 
finding that TTB-CCs inhibited conflicting information, whereas WADD-CCs showed no signs of 
inhibition, challenge the assumption of a single process. As with the MSF, however, the findings 
suggesting that information integration is probably not completely automatic and that information 
integration is probably not the only process operating during decision making—these findings do not 
invalidate EAMs or PCS as models of decision making per se. But these findings suggest that 
processes other than information integration might also be at work during decision making—processes 
that might probably well be captured by the rule-like processes postulated by the MSF. Therefore, 
EAMs/PCS and the MSF may not necessarily be mutually exclusive, and information integration 
processes might probably operate in parallel to more strategic processes during decision making. 
When full-fledged frameworks of decision making are pitted against each other (macro-level 
perspective), the focus might probably be too much on the differences between, and the exclusiveness 
of, the processes suggested by these frameworks; but the very processes supposed by these 
frameworks (micro-level perspective) might tend to be overlooked. A promising approach to the study 
of decision making might be therefore to focus on, and tap into, the specific processes postulated by 
the different frameworks, such as information integration, rule adherence, or inhibition. I hope the 
work presented here offered some interesting and novel ideas and methods how this endeavor might 
be started and accomplished.     
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Abstract 
Ignoring information when making a decision is at the heart of the take-the-best (TTB) strategy, 
according to which decision makers only consider information about the most valid cue (TTB-
relevant) and ignore less valid cues (TTB-irrelevant). Results of four experiments, however, show that 
participants do not ignore information when cues are easily available (Experiments1a, 1b, and 3) or 
when task instructions emphasize decision accuracy (Experiment 2). In all four experiments we found 
that the consistency between the TTB-relevant cue and a supposedly TTB-irrelevant cue 
systematically affected decision times and confidence ratings of even those participants whose choices 
were consistently driven by only the TTB-relevant cue. In Experiments 1a and 1b, we also found that 
these participants were more likely to ignore information when cues had to be acquired sequentially, 
suggesting that whether or not participants ignore information depends on information availability. 
Experiment 2 further showed that different task instructions (emphasizing decision accuracy vs. speed) 
affect whether or not participants ignore information. Finally, Experiment 3 addressed the question of 
how participants process information that, according to TTB, is considered irrelevant for their choices. 
We find first evidence that participants who consistently make choices in line with TTB inhibit 
information about a TTB-irrelevant cue when this information conflicts with their decisions. Findings 
are considered and discussed in relation to current models of decision making. 
 
Keywords: decision-making; take-the-best heuristic; evidence accumulation; inhibition   
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Additional information is not ignored: New evidence for information integration and inhibition in 
take-the-best decisions  
Introduction  
Choosing between two options is not always easy, especially when the options differ on 
several decision-relevant attributes and neither option is unequivocally favored by all attributes: Some 
attributes are in favor of the first option, others in favor of the second option. To illustrate, consider a 
doctor who needs to decide which of two patients is more severely infected and should be treated first. 
The doctor may have a symptom check-list for each patient where each list indicates the 
presence/absence of four symptoms, referred to as cues. The symptoms differ in their extent to which 
they predict a patient’s level of infection, referred to as cue validity. The symptoms may be: fever, 
dizziness, nausea, and abdominal pain (from high to low validity). The list of Patient 1 indicates the 
presence of fever but no further symptoms, whereas the list of Patient 2 shows the presence of 
dizziness, nausea, and abdominal pain, but not fever (written here as P1: 1-0-0-0, and P2: 0-1-1-1).  
 As illustrated in this example, cue information can be in conflict: a highly valid cue points to 
P1 (fever), whereas three less valid cues point to P2 (dizziness, nausea, abdominal pain). Decision-
making researchers have long been interested in studying how people respond in such situations 
(Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011; Gigerenzer, Tood, & The ABC Research Group, 1999; Payne, 
Bettman, & Johnson, 1988), and there seems to be common agreement that some people resolve the 
conflict by integrating all available information about the options. Other people, in contrast, are 
assumed to not notice the conflicting information because they seem to just look for the most valid cue 
and if it allows them to make a decision (i.e., if it discriminates between the options) they will stop 
collecting further information and base their choice on only parts of the available information (Lee & 
Cummins, 2004; Newell & Lee, 2011). This latter approach is at the heart of the fast-and-frugal-
heuristics framework of decision making (e.g., Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). A key heuristic 
specifically formulated for tasks of multi-cue decision-making, like the one above, is the take-the-best 
(TTB) strategy. 
 Decision makers following TTB are assumed to process cues in descending order of their 
validity. As soon as a cue discriminates between the options, the decision maker will stop looking for 
further information and chooses the option pointed to by the first discriminating cue (the best cue). 
TTB can thus be said to consist of three building blocks (Gigerenzer & Brighton, 2009; Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011): a search rule, a stopping rule, and a decision rule. Following all three rules, a 
decision maker confronted with the two patients from above would start comparing the patients on the 
most relevant symptom, fever (search rule); because this symptom discriminates between the two 
patients, the decision maker would stop looking for further information (stopping rule) and will choose 
the patient with the symptom being present (P1; decision rule). Hence, a decision maker following 
TTB would only inspect one cue for her choice.  
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 In decision-making research, TTB is often contrasted with decision strategies which assume 
that all information is being processed before a choice is made. One such strategy that we considered 
for the present research is the weighted additive rule (WADD; Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). 
Decision makers following WADD are assumed to weight all cues of an option by their validity, sum 
up the weighted evidence for each option, and choose the option with the higher amount of evidence. 
Following WADD, a decision maker confronted with the two patients above would multiply the 
symptoms with their validity and sum up the weighted symptoms for each patient. If the weighted sum 
of the less valid cues exceeds the validity of the most valid cue, the decision maker would choose P2. 
Because WADD allows for the possibility that a highly valid cue can be compensated for by two or 
more less valid cues, WADD is often called compensatory, whereas TTB is called non-compensatory. 
 As illustrated by the introductory example, for some binary decisions (e.g., 1-0-0-0 vs. 0-1-1-
1), TTB and WADD make different choice predictions (provided that the weighted sum of the less 
valid cues exceed the validity of the best discriminating cue): TTB predicts the choice of option (1-0-
0-0), whereas WADD predicts the choice of option (0-1-1-1). The choices participants make in a 
decision experiment are commonly used to classify them as users of TTB, WADD, or any other 
decision strategy under consideration (Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Bröder, 2000; Bröder & Schiffer, 
2003; Lee & Cummins, 2004; Newell & Lee, 2011). Moreover, choice outcomes are often used to 
draw conclusions about the processes underlying participants' choices (Lee & Cummins, 2004; Newell 
& Lee, 2011). It is often─implicitly or explicitly─concluded that participants who show an outcome in 
line with the TTB-decision-rule stopped information search earlier than did participants who made 
choices as predicted by WADD.  
 Importantly, however, the mere analysis of participants' choice outcomes only allows for 
drawing conclusions about which participants most likely did not ignore information, that is, 
participants who made choices in line with WADD. Participants who make choices in line with the 
best discriminating cue (TTB), however, may have done so because they stopped information search 
after discovering this cue─as suggested by the TTB-stopping-rule. Yet it is also possible that these 
participants processed cue information completely and nevertheless chose the option favored by the 
best discriminating cue, because they perceived this cue as important enough to outweigh all less valid 
cues jointly (see also Glöckner, Hilbig, & Jekel, 2014). In the next paragraph(s), we will outline the 
possible implications of a strategy mimicking the outcomes of TTB (i.e., choices) but without 
following the strategy’s stopping rule. To avoid confusion, we will refer to decision makers who show 
a choice outcome in line with TTB as TTB-consistent choosers (TTB-CCs). Note that this term only 
implies that individuals classified as TTB-CCs show a decision outcome in line with TTB; it does not 
make any assumptions about the possible processes underlying these outcomes (i.e., whether a 
stopping-rule is adopted or not).       
One might argue that TTB-CCs do not need to process additional cues because these cues have 
no bearing on their choices. However, in line with other researchers (e.g.,  Hausmann & Läge, 2008; 
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Newell, Weston, & Shanks, 2003), we suggest that, in addition to making choices in a decision task, 
decision makers also want to know how confident they can be with their choices. Especially when cue 
information is easily available, the processing of additional cue information comes with very little 
cognitive costs but it provides decision makers with important information regarding decision 
confidence. One of the questions we therefore want to address in this research is whether TTB-CCs 
actually ignore cue information in decision tasks where information is easily available (i.e., openly 
displayed). As argued, we suggest that TTB-CCs have good reasons to not ignore information when it 
can easily be processed, and the reason for why they finally go with the best discriminating cue may 
be that they consider this cue as most important for their decisions. It should be noted that we do not 
generally question the assumption that decision makers ignore information. The TTB strategy has 
originally been postulated for inferences from memory, that is, decision situations where cues are not 
easily available but have to be retrieved (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, Kleinbölting, 1991; Gigerenzer & 
Goldstein, 1996). The cognitive costs of retrieving and processing cue information can be considered 
relatively high compared with the costs of processing openly displayed information, and here decision 
makers may have good reasons to ignore cues.  Therefore, our assumption that decision makers would 
not ignore information specifically refers to situations where cues are easily available. 
 The strategy we suggest to underlie the decision behavior of TTB-CCs resembles the one 
described by a certain class of decision-making models, the so called evidence accumulation models 
(EAMs, Lee & Cummins, 2004). EAMs assume that, when facing a choice between two options, 
decision makers sequentially sample information about the cue values of the options at hand and 
automatically integrate this information. Information sampling terminates as soon as the amount of 
evidence in favor of one option passes a decision maker's decision threshold and the option favored by 
the evidence is then chosen. Psychologically, a decision threshold can be understood as an individual’s 
desire for decision confidence (Hausmann & Läge, 2008). Lee and Cummins (2004) were the first to 
suggest that the strategies TTB and WADD can be accounted for by a unifying EAM. According to 
this model, TTB-CCs are assumed to set a threshold that is passed by information from any single cue, 
suggesting therefore that TTB-CCs would stop information search in line with the TTB-stopping-rule, 
whereas WADD-CCs are assumed to set a threshold that guarantees the processing of all cue 
information. 
 As just argued, however, we suggest that TTB-CCs will not necessarily stop information 
search in line with the TTB-stopping-rule when information is easily available. In terms of EAMs, the 
decision threshold of TTB-CCs may thus be said to be higher than the information provided by one 
cue alone, even when it is the most valid cue. Yet because TTB-CCs give most weight to the best 
discriminating cue, this cue consistently outweighs less valid cues and therefore drives TTB-CCs' 
choices. WADD-CCs, in contrast, weight the cues more equally, so that a highly valid cue can be 
compensated for by less valid cues. One reason for this difference in cue weighting between TTB-CCs 
(non-compensatory weighting) and WADD-CCs (compensatory weighting) could be that the former 
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perceive relatively high dispersion among cue validities, whereas the latter perceive rather low cue 
dispersion and treat the cues more equally (see Glöckner et al., 2014, or Bröder, 2000, for systematic 
investigations of how differences in validity dispersions between different environments affects 
decision making). To summarize, in line with Lee and Cummins (2004), we consider EAMs as an 
overarching framework for the present research and for explaining the decision behavior of both TTB-
CCs and WADD-CCs. Yet, whereas Lee and Cummins’ unifying model assumes that TTB-CCs 
actually ignore information about cues lower in validity than the best discriminating cue (and therefore 
choose the option favored by this cue), we suggest that TTB-CCs would not ignore this information 
when it is easily available, but that they would integrate the cues in a non-compensatory manner. 
To examine this assumption, we measured participants' decision times (and decision 
confidence) in a task where cue information was directly accessible, and we manipulated the 
consistency between the choice-relevant best cue and the choice-irrelevant next-best cue: The best and 
the next-best cue were either consistent (e.g., 1-1-0-0 vs. 0-0-0-0) or inconsistent (e.g., 1-0-0-0 vs. 0-1-
0-0).  If participants followed the TTB-stopping-rule and thus ignore cues lower in validity than the 
best discriminating cue, information about the next-best cue should not affect decision times or 
confidence. However, if, TTB-CCs did not ignore less valid cues, EAMs would predict slower 
decisions and lower decision confidence when cue information is inconsistent rather than consistent. 
According to EAMs, decision time and decision confidence depend on the difference in evidence 
between the two choice options: The higher the evidence difference is (higher information 
consistency), the faster and the more confident decision makers (both TTB and WADD) are expected 
to be.  
In addition to manipulating the status of the next-best cue (consistent vs. inconsistent with best 
cue), we varied the validity rank of the best discriminating cue, that is, the ordinal position of the 
discriminating cue within the validity hierarchy. The best discriminating cue either was the most valid 
(cue 1), the second-most-valid (cue 2), or the third-most valid cue (cue 3). Previous studies found that 
the decision times of TTB-CCs increased with the validity of the best discriminating cue decreasing 
(Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Bröder & Gaismaier, 2007). It has been reasoned that, when decision 
makers search the cues in descending order of their validity (TTB-search-rule), then they need to 
inspect more cues the later in the validity hierarchy the best discriminating cue occurs (i.e., the lower 
the validity of this cue is). In our view, the number of cues to be inspected until a discriminating cue is 
found, may indeed contribute to an increase in decision times as previously observed. However, the 
original explanation for this effect supposes that TTB-CCs actually stop information sampling after 
discovering a discriminating cue. That is, only when TTB-CCs did not continue information sampling 
once a discriminating cue had been found, they would have had to inspect only one cue when cue 1 
was the best discriminating cue, and three cues, when cue 3 was the best discriminating cue. Our 
assumption, however, is that TTB-CCs would not stop information sampling at the discovering of the 
discriminating cue, but that they would process cue information completely. Yet even though we 
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expect TTB-CCs to process cue information completely, we nevertheless expect their decision times to 
increase with the validity rank of the best discriminating cue decreasing, not only because of the cue’s 
ordinal position in the validity hierarchy and thus the number of cues inspected until the 
discriminating cue is found; but also because of the cue’s validity itself. According to EAMs, decision 
time is a function of the amount of evidence in favor of a certain decision option, and the amount of 
evidence depends on the validity of the provided information. Assuming  that, as outlined previously, 
TTB-CCs perceive high dispersion among cue validities, they may perceive stronger evidence in favor 
of an option when this option is favored by cue 1 (1-0-0-0 vs. 0-0-0-0) than when it is favored by cue 2 
(1-1-0-0 vs. 1-0-0-0). The perceived stronger evidence, in turn, may then accelerate the decision. 
Therefore, we expect the validity rank of the best discriminating cue to influence decision times of 
those participants perceiving high dispersion among cue validities (TTB). For participants perceiving 
only few differences among cue validities (WADD), the validity rank of the best cue should have less 
influence on decision times. 
The assumption that TTB-CCs may be sensitive to cue information considered to be irrelevant 
according to the TTB-stopping-rule recently received first support. In a study by Söllner, Bröder, 
Glöckner, and Betsch (2014), participants learned to use a TTB strategy in a decision task where 
participants had to pay virtual money to purchase cue information and where the payoff function of the 
decision environment favored the use of a TTB strategy. On some trials of the task, however, TTB-
irrelevant information popped up for free. This information was either consistent or inconsistent with 
the best cue. Contrary to the ignorance assumption implied by the TTB-stopping-rule, however, the 
TTB-irrelevant information affected participants' decision behavior as predicted by EAMs: 
Participants continued information purchase more frequently and they were less confident in their 
decisions, when the up-popping information was inconsistent rather than consistent with the best cue. 
Söllner and Bröder (2015) recently extended these findings by showing that TTB-CCs continue 
information search more frequently in the presence of inconsistent information when this information 
was acquired by participants themselves rather than being experimenter-provided, ruling out that the 
aforementioned finding was due to mere cue saliency (Platzer & Bröder, 2012). In sum, using decision 
tasks with sequential information search, Söllner and colleagues found converging evidence that TTB-
CCs do not consistently stop their information search as predicted by the TTB-stopping-rule, 
especially when cues are inconsistent.  
The present experiments aimed to extend the findings—that TTB-CCs are not completely 
ignorant of additional information—to a decision task with cue information directly accessible to 
participants. Information search behavior has been found to vary systematically as a function of 
whether cue information has to be acquired sequentially or is openly displayed (e.g., Lohse & 
Johnson, 1996). It is not clear, therefore, whether the findings by Söllner and colleagues directly 
translate to a decision task with cues directly accessible. Recent findings by Glöckner et al. (2014; see 
also Glöckner & Betsch, 2012) suggest that this may be the case. In their decision task, cue 
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information was directly accessible during decision making and they showed that decision times and 
decision confidence of TTB-CCs were affected by the overall consistency of the information. 
Although this finding suggests that TTB-CCs are not ignorant of directly accessible cues, there may 
have been some specific task settings in the studies by Glöckner and colleagues that may have 
encouraged participants to process more information than considered necessary for their choices. 
Specifically, in their decision tasks, the arrangement of cues, and hence the position of the TTB-
relevant best cue, changed from trial to trial (but see Glöckner et al., 2014, Experiment 2); thus, by 
searching for the best cue on a decision trial, participants may have processed irrelevant cues 
inadvertently. Furthermore, participants of the studies by Glöckner and colleagues were asked to 
indicate their decision confidence after each decision they made. It is possible that these consistent 
confidence prompts heightened participants’ desire for confidence (and thus their decision thresholds), 
thereby prompting them to look for more cues than just the TTB-relevant cue. Finally, for their 
decision task, Glöckner et al. (2014) used a set of six decision pairs, and for five of the six pairs, the 
TTB-relevant cue was always the cue with the highest validity (cue 1). Thus, the cue on which TTB-
CCs based their choices was almost always the same one, which might have further encouraged TTB-
CCs to not stop information search at the discovery of this cue but to process additional cues in order 
to counteract the otherwise rather monotonous task routine.   
A first goal of the present research was therefore to demonstrate that, even when information 
about single cues could easily be ignored in a task with directly accessible information, and when 
participants are not consistently prompted for decision confidence, TTB-CCs would still not ignore 
additional cues. Furthermore, by systematically varying both the validity-rank of the best 
discriminating cue and the status of the next-best cue, we aimed to examine how participants' decision 
behavior is affected by both factors.  
Our assumption that TTB-CCs would not ignore cue information specifically refers to decision 
situations where cues are directly accessible. However, there may be situations, both in real-life and in 
the laboratory, where cues are not that easily available but have to be acquired sequentially, as in the 
study by Söllner and Bröder (2015). Their findings suggest that even under these conditions, TTB-CCs 
do not consistently ignore information, though other research found relatively strong support for the 
TTB-stopping-rule when information search was sequential (e.g., Newell & Shanks, 2003, Experiment 
3). A second goal of our research was to examine whether TTB-CCs would adjust their decision 
thresholds as a function of information availability. That is, we tested whether TTB-CCs would not 
ignore information when cues are directly accessible, but that they would be more likely to ignore 
information when cues have to be acquired sequentially (Experiments 1a and 1b). We also examined 
how different task instructions, rather than information availability, affect participants’ decision 
thresholds, and whether focusing participants on decision confidence would make them more likely to 
look for TTB-irrelevant cues (Experiment 2). Finally, in addition to further our understanding of the 
conditions under which TTB-CCs may most likely not ignore information, we aimed to get a better 
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understanding of what TTB-CCs are doing with the information they processed. Concretely, we tested 
whether TTB-CCs inhibit irrelevant cue information when it is conflicting with their choices 
(Experiment 3).  
The Present Paradigm 
In all four experiments presented here we used a decision-task paradigm introduced by Bergert 
and Nosofsky (2007). Participants of this task had to decide which of two bugs, described by four 
binary cues (body, legs, antennae, and fangs) of varying validities, was more poisonous. All 
experiments consisted of a validity learning phase and two test phases. In the learning phase, 
participants performed the bug decision task and received feedback on their decisions; the feedback 
allowed participants to figure out the cue validities, which were .94, .83, .79, and .71 (to facilitate 
learning, participants received a hint regarding the correct validity ranking halfway through the 
learning phase; cf. Newell & Shanks, 2003). In the subsequent test phase, participants performed the 
same decision task without feedback. In the first part of the test phase (Test Phase 1) cue information 
was directly accessible, whereas in the second part (Test Phase 2) information about single cues had to 
be acquired sequentially.  
There were two types of bug pairs we used for the test phase. The diagnostic pairs were those 
pairs for which TTB and WADD make different choice predictions (see Table 2). Diagnostic pairs 
enabled us to classify participants as TTB and WADD, respectively. For the classification, we also 
considered the possibility that participants used an equal-weight strategy (EQW), meaning that they 
considered all cues and weighted them equally. The experimental pairs of the test phase were those 
pairs we obtained by crossing the two experimental factors introduced above: validity-rank of the best 
discriminating cue (cue 1, cue 2, cue 3), and status of the next-best cue (consistent vs. inconsistent). 
Experiments 1a and 1b 
In Experiments 1a and 1b we tested the hypothesis that TTB-CCs would not ignore cue 
information when cues are directly accessible. Cues in our task were presented in a way that cues of 
certain validities always occurred at the same positions. Participants therefore knew where to look for 
the TTB-relevant best discriminating cue and could easily ignore other cues if they wanted. In 
Experiment 1a we used holistic pictures of bugs (cf. Figure 1, top panel). In all other experiments, 
pictures of the single features of the bugs were presented in a list-wise format and cues were presented 
in descending order of their validities (cf. Figure 1, bottom panel). This format should make it 
especially easy for TTB-CCs to ignore TTB-irrelevant cues. Our main dependent variable for Test 
Phase 1 was decision times. In Experiment 1b, we further asked participants to bet on their decisions 
in a separate, final block of the task. Previous studies found that information consistency affects 
participants’ decision confidence (Söllner et al., 2014; Glöckner et al., 2014, Glöckner & Betsch, 
2012). Assuming that decision confidence plays an important role when participants bet on their 
decisions, Experiment 1b examined whether information consistency would likewise affect 
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participants' betting behavior. Finally, Experiments 1a and 1b addressed the question of whether TTB-
CCs would behave more in line the TTB-stopping-rule when information has to be acquired 
sequentially rather than being directly accessible, which may suggest that TTB-CCs adjust their 
decision thresholds as a function of information availability.   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Example of a pair of bugs that differ on all features. In Experiment 
1a, bugs were presented holistically (a). In all other Experiments, bugs were 
presented as lists of their features (b).  
Method 
Participants. Heidelberg University students participated for partial course credit or monetary 
compensation (8€). In addition to receiving either course credit or monetary compensation, all 
participants could earn a bonus of up to 6.45 € contingent on task performance (Experiment 1a: N = 
50, 39 female, mean age = 21.82; Experiment 1b, N = 74, 55 female, mean age = 22.5).  
Materials and design. Our stimulus set comprised sixteen pictures of bugs taken from the 
stimulus set by Bergert and Nosofsky (2007). The bugs were described by four binary cues, 
represented as physical features, and each cue could take on two different physical appearances (cue 
values; e.g., short vs. long legs). Figure 1 depicts two bugs that differ on all cues. Fully combining the 
four cues resulted in our set of 16 different bugs. Table 1 shows the cue patterns for the 16 bugs (the 
value “1” denotes the cue value indicative of poisonousness). The 10 cue patterns displayed in the 
upper part of Table 1 were used to create the learning environment. A complete pairing of the 10 
patterns yielded 45 learning pairs.  
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Table 1 
Abstract Cue Patterns Used in Experiments 1 – 3  
Cue patterns for the learning phase 
Stimulus 
Number 
Cue 1 
(.94) 
Cue 2  
(.83) 
Cue 3  
(.79) 
Cue 4 
 (.71) 
Criterion Variable 
(poison index rank) 
1 1 1 1 1 10 
2 1 1 1 0 9 
3 1 0 1 1 8 
4 1 1 0 1 7 
5 0 1 0 1 6 
6 1 0 1 0 5 
7 0 1 0 0 4 
8 0 0 1 0 3 
9 0 0 0 1 2 
10 0 0 0 0 1 
Cue patterns to create diagnostic pairs 
11 1 0 0 0  
12 1 1 0 0  
13 1 0 0 1  
14 0 1 1 1  
15 0 1 1 0  
16 0 0 1 1  
Note. The cue values 1 and 0 were realized as physical appearances of a bug’s different features. In 
the learning phase only the ten patterns on top were presented.   
 
 
The learning phase consisted of two blocks, each consisting of the 45 learning pairs. The cue 
patterns in Table 1 (top) are ranked by their level of poisonousness, and cue validities were calculated 
as suggested by Bergert and Nosofsky (2007; see also Lee & Cummins, 2004): 
 
𝑣(𝑖) =
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑑𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑢𝑒(𝑖)  +  1
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑚𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑏𝑦 𝑐𝑢𝑒(𝑖)  +  2
 
 
This formula takes into account both the number of times a cue discriminates between a pair 
and the number of times a correct choice can be made based on this cue. Cue validities were randomly 
assigned to the four cues for each participant anew, and for each cue, the cue value associated with 
poisonousness was randomly chosen. Note that as in previous studies (Bergert & Nosofsky, 2007; Lee 
& Cummins, 2004) only pairs for which TTB and WADD make identical choice predictions were 
presented during validity learning. Therefore, participants should not have been biased toward TTB- 
or WADD-decision-making, respectively.  
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The cue patterns not shown during the learning phase were used to create the diagnostic pairs 
for the test phases (Table 2). For the diagnostic pairs, TTB predicts the choice of option A, whereas 
WADD and EQW predict the choice of option B. The 12 consistent and 12 inconsistent pairs shown in 
Table 3 were the test pairs obtained when crossing the factor validity-rank of the best discriminating 
cue (cue 1, cue 2, cue 3) with the factor status of the next-best cue (consistent vs. inconsistent). Both 
factors were manipulated within subjects.  
 
 
Table 2 
Pairs for Which the Strategies 
Predict Opposing Choices 
Diagnostic pairs 
Option A Option B 
1000 0111 
1000 0110 
1000 0101 
1000 0011 
1001 0111 
1010 0111 
1100 0111 
0100 0011 
 
 
The test phase was further subdivided in two phases: In Test Phase 1, cue information was 
directly accessible; in Test Phase 2, cue information had to be acquired sequentially. In Test Phase 1, 
individual choices were used for the strategy classification and decision time was our main dependent 
variable. To attain both reliable decision time estimates for each within-subjects condition (cf. cells in 
Table 3) and a reliable strategy classification, we presented all 24 consistent and inconsistent pairs as 
well as all eight diagnostic pairs four times each, yielding 128 decision trials. Presentation order of 
pairs was randomly determined with the constraint that each of the 32 pairs had to be presented once 
before a pair was repeated.  
In Experiment 1b, Test Phase 1 was extended by an additional block where the consistent, 
inconsistent, and diagnostic pairs were presented only once and where participants were asked to bet 
on each decision (betting block).  
In Test Phase 2 (both experiments), the consistent, inconsistent, and diagnostic pairs were also 
presented only once. In this phase, cues were not directly accessible but participants could uncover the 
cues sequentially (see Procedure section).  
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Table 3 
Pairs Used in the Decision Tasks of Experiments 1 - 3   
  
Status of the next-best cue 
Validity-rank of the best 
discriminating cue 
 
Consistent pairs  Inconsistent pairs  
Non-discriminating 
(Experiment 3 only) 
  
Option A Option B  Option A Option B  Option A Option B 
Cue 1 
 
 1111 
1110 
1101 
1100 
0011 
0010 
0001 
0000 
 1011 
1010 
1001 
1000 
0111 
0110 
0101 
0100 
 
 1111 
1110 
1101 
1100 
0111 
0110 
0101 
0100 
Cue 2 
 
 1111 
1110 
0111 
0110 
1001 
1000 
0001 
0000 
 1101 
1100 
0101 
0100 
1011 
1010 
0011 
0010 
 
 1111 
1110 
0111 
0110 
1011 
1010 
0011 
0010 
Cue 3 
 
 1111 
1011 
0111 
0011 
1100 
1000 
0100 
0000 
 1110 
1010 
0110 
0010 
1101 
1001 
0101 
0001 
 1111 
1010 
0110 
0010 
1101 
1001 
0101 
0001 
 
 
Procedure. We used a cover story to enhance plausibility of the task. Participants were told 
that they were doctors and would soon travel in a tropical country to take up employment at the 
hospital there. The country was said to be known for its poisonous bugs and participants should learn 
about some specific cues of these bugs.  
 The experiment started with the learning phase which was identical for all experiments. On 
each trial, participants were shown a bug pair and had to choose the more poisonous bug, using the left 
and right arrow keys. After each choice, the German words for correct or incorrect appeared on the 
screen and the correct (i.e., more poisonous) bug was additionally highlighted by a red frame. 
Participants could study the feedback as long as they liked and started the next trial by pressing the 
space bar. At the end of the first learning block, participants received feedback about their overall 
accuracy. They were next told that the cues varied in their usefulness to predict poisonousness and 
they were given the validity hierarchy (ranking) of the cues (they were not given the cue directions 
though). Participants were also told that they would receive 2 cent for each correct decision in a 
second learning block. The procedure of the second block was identical to that of the first block.  
Afterwards, participants received instructions for Test Phase 1. They were told that they had 
arrived at the tropical country and started their work as doctors. They were now confronted with the 
following situation: Two Patients A and B had been bitten by differently poisonous bugs. As doctors, 
participants had to decide which of the two patients needed to be treated first and thus which bug was 
more poisonous. Participants were also told that they would receive a bonus of 2 € if accuracy in the 
following task was above 80%. In the test phase, participants no longer received feedback. Instead, 
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bug pairs remained on the screen for another 500 ms after a response was given, and the next trial 
started after an inter-stimulus-interval of 1000 ms.  
After Test Phase 1, the procedure continued with instructions for Test Phase 2 in Experiment 
1a (see below). In Experiment 1b, participants were told that another 32 trials of the same task would 
follow and that subsequent to each decision, they would be asked to bet on their choice (betting 
block). To this end, the screen depicting the bug pair turned to a screen prompting participants' bets 
once a choice had been made. Participants could bet between 1ct and 10ct, using the keys F1 (1ct) to 
F10 (10ct). They were told that their bet, and hence the money they would get, would double if their 
choice was correct, but they would lose their bet if their choice was false. Participants did not receive 
direct feedback on their decisions but were informed that the computer kept track of their decisions 
and their bets and would update their earnings.  
For Test Phase 2, which was identical for both experiments, participants were informed that 
they were now required to make inquiries about the bugs' cues before making their decisions, and that 
they could ask the two to-be-compared patients up to four questions—one question for each cue (What 
did the legs/antennae/body/fang of the bugs look like?). The questions were presented in a fixed order, 
one below the other. Each question was associated with a key (F1 to F4) which participants were 
required to press to ask a question. Having asked a question, the corresponding features of the bugs 
(shown as pictures of the single cues; cf. Figure 1, bottom) appeared on the screen for both patients. 
Participants were free to ask as many questions as they wanted without order restrictions.  
 Following Test Phase 2, participants received feedback about their accuracy in the decision 
task and were told their bonus. Next, they were asked to indicate for each of the four cues the 
predictive utility it had for them in the learning phase (on a scale ranging from 1 = not useful to 9 = 
very useful). Predictive utility ratings were used to check (1) whether participants were aware of the 
cue validity ranking and (2) whether TTB-CCs perceived higher dispersion among cue validities than 
did WADD-CCs. Finally, participants were shown the eight cue values and were to indicate those cue 
values pointing to poisonousness. This cue-knowledge test was used to assess whether participants had 
correctly learned which of the two cue values was indicative of poisonousness. 
Results  
 The alpha-level for each test was set at 0.05. The reported effect size is generalized eta 
square (η2G). When sphericity was violated Greenhouse-Geisser corrected results are reported. All 
analyses were conducted in R (R Core Team, 2013); for planned contrasts analyses the R-package 
nlme was used (Pinheiro, Bates, DebRoy, Sarkar, & the R Development Core Team, 2013).  
Learning phase and cue-knowledge test. Data from the learning phase showed that accuracy 
was good in both experiments and increased from block 1 (Experiment 1a: 80.76%, SD = 7.29; 
Experiment 1b: 80.36%, SD = 9.01) to block 2 (Experiment 1a: 93.20%, SD = 3.85; Experiment 1b: 
92.6%, SD = 3.42), F1a(1, 49) = 145.02, p < .001, η
2
G = 0.54; F1b(1,74) = 147.55, p < 0.001, η
2
G = 
0.45. Data from the final cue-knowledge test revealed that all but one participant of Experiment 1a 
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(98%) and all but four participants of Experiment 1b (95%) learned the eight cue values correctly. 
Non-learners were omitted from subsequent analyses. 
Test Phase 1: Strategy classification. We used the strategy-classification method by Bröder 
and Schiffer (2003) to classify participants into TTB-CCs, WADD-CCs, or EQW-CCs, respectively
1
. 
For the classification, choices to all pairs were considered. As noted above, TTB and WADD/EQW 
make opposing choice predictions for the diagnostic pairs. For consistent pairs, all strategies make 
identical choice predictions (option A in Table 3). For the inconsistent pairs, TTB and WADD predict 
identical choices, whereas EQW assumes guessing. In a nutshell, the idea of the classification method 
is to estimate the likelihood of a participant's observed choice pattern, given each of the strategies 
predicted choice patterns, plus a constant error term ε (estimated from the data).  
 This way, participants were classified according to the strategy with the highest likelihood 
provided that ε was smaller than .40. If ε was greater than .40, a guessing strategy (guess) was 
assumed. If two strategies had identical likelihoods, the participant remained unclassified. Table 4 
depicts the obtained strategy proportions for all experiments. In Experiment 1a, the majority of 
participants were classified as TTB-CCs; in Experiment 1b, the proportion of TTB-CCs and WADD-
CCs was roughly equal. 
  
Table 4 
Number of Participants Classified According to the Best-Fitting Strategy in the Test-Phases of Experiments 1 – 3  
 Strategy   
Test-phase TTB ε WADD ε EQW ε unclassifed Total 
Experiment 1a 
Test Phase 1 
Test Phase 2 
 
31 (62%) 
29 (60%) 
 
0.04 
0.04 
 
11 (20%) 
14 (28%) 
 
0.06 
0.05 
 
7 (14%) 
5 (10%) 
 
0.06 
0.06 
 
-  
1 (2%) 
 
49 
49 
Experiment 1b 
Test Phase 1 
Betting Block 
Test Phase 2 
 
30 (43%) 
30 (43%) 
31 (44%) 
 
0.04 
0.03 
0.05 
 
30 (43%) 
32 (46%) 
27 (39%) 
 
0.07 
0.04 
0.05 
 
8 (11%) 
7 (10%) 
10 (14%) 
 
0.04 
0.03 
0.05 
 
2 (3%) 
1 (1%) 
2 (3%) 
 
70 
70 
70 
Experiment 2 
Test Phase 1 
Accuracy Block  
Speed Block 
 
23 (50%) 
22 (48%) 
23 (50%)  
 
0.07 
0.04 
0.04 
 
18 (39%) 
16 (35%) 
16 (35%) 
 
0.08 
0.07 
0.06 
 
5 (11%) 
8 (17%) 
5 (11%) 
 
0.02 
0.04 
0.03 
 
- 
- 
2 (4%) 
 
46 
46 
46 
Experiment 3 
Test Phase 1 
Confidence Block 
 
37 (54%) 
34 (49%) 
 
0.05 
0.03 
 
24 (35%) 
29 (41%) 
 
0.04 
0.04 
 
5 (7%) 
3 (4%) 
 
0.01 
0.00 
 
3(4%) 
3 (4%) 
 
69 
69 
Note. TTB = take the best; WADD = weighted additive; EQW = equal weights; ε = error term. Proportions in 
brackets. 
 
Test Phase 1: Decision times. For the statistical analysis of decision times, responses 
inconsistent with a participant’s strategy were removed (Experiment 1a: 4.21%; Experiment 1b: 
4.29%) as were outliers, defined as RTs smaller than 300ms or RTs greater than individual mean plus 
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2.5 standard deviations (Experiment 1a: 0.36%; Experiment 1b: 0.19%). Decision times were analyzed 
separately for each of the three strategy groups.
2
 For each group, data were submitted to a 3 (validity-
rank of the best discriminating cue: cue 1, cue 2, cue 3) × 2 (status of the next-best cue: consistent, 
inconsistent) within-subjects ANOVA. The decision times of participants of both experiments are 
depicted in Figure 2.  
The TTB-stopping-rule predicts that the decision times of TTB-CCs should not be affected by 
the next-best cue. Contrary to this prediction, the status of the next-best cue had a significant effect on 
TTB-CCs’ decision times in both experiments, Experiment 1a: F(1, 30) = 12.35, p = 0.001, η2G = 
0.024, and Experiment 1b: F(1, 29) = 18.32, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.027.  Furthermore, in both experiments 
the decision times of TTB-CCs were significantly affected by the validity-rank of the best 
discriminating cue, Experiment 1a: F(2, 60) = 50.61, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.12; Experiment 1b: F(2, 58) = 
8.83, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.017. The interaction was not significant in Experiment 1a, F < 1; but it was 
significant in Experiment 1b, F(1.5, 43.5) = 3.83, p = 0.027, η2G = 0.005. As evident from Figure 2 
(bottom), TTB-CCs' decision times were most strongly affected by the status of the next-best cue 
when the most valid cue was the best discriminating cue. Follow-up analyses revealed, however, that 
the status of the next-best cue significantly affected participants' decision times on all levels of the 
validity-rank factor, ps < 0.04.  
In Experiment 1a, decision times of both WADD-CCs and EQW-CCs were only affected by 
the status the next-best cue, FWADD(1, 10) = 54.91, p < 0.001, η
2
G = 0.395, and FEQW(1, 6) = 10.21, p = 
0.019, η2G = 0.101. WADD- and EQW-CCs were slower when the next-best cue was inconsistent with 
the best cue (MWADD = 5055.7, SE = 233.6; MEQW = 4562.0, SE = 471.4), than when both cues were 
consistent (MWADD = 3150.5 SE = 131.6; MEQW = 2853.6 SE = 251.9). In both groups, neither the 
effect of the validity-rank of the best discriminating cue nor the interaction was significant, Fs < 1.63, 
ps > 0.236.  
In Experiment 1b, decision times of WADD-CCs were significantly affected by both the 
validity rank of the best discriminating cue, F (1.56, 45.24) = 15.26, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.04, and the 
status of the next-best cue, F(1, 29) = 115.59, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.21. Furthermore, the interaction was 
significant, F(2, 58) = 8.45, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.02. As evident from Figure 2, when cue 3 was the best 
discriminating cue, the status of the next-best cue had a less pronounced effect on participants' 
decision times than when cue 1 or cue 2 were best discriminating cues. Follow-up analyses revealed 
that the effect of the next-best cue was significant on all levels of the validity-rank factor, ps < 0.001. 
The decision times of EQW-CCs of Experiment 1b were also affected by both the validity rank of best 
discriminating cue, F(2, 14) = 4.90, p < 0.05, η2G = 0.018, and the status of the next-best cue, F(1, 7) = 
8.66, p < 0.05, η2G = 0.25. The interaction approached significance, F(2, 14) = 3.72, p = 0.051, η
2
G = 
0.04. 
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Figure 2. Mean decision times in milliseconds as a function of participants’ 
strategy, the validity-rank of the best discriminating cue and the status of the next-
best cue. Top panel: Experiment 1a; bottom panel: Experiment 1 b. TTB = take the 
best; WADD = weighted additive; EQW = equal weights. Error bars represent ±1 
standard error of the mean. 
 
Betting block results (Experiment 1b). Strategy-classification was done anew (as described 
previously) with the choices participants of Experiment 1b made in the betting block. Strategy 
proportions are depicted in Table 4. As can be seen, strategy proportions differed only slightly across 
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test phases and inspection of the individual strategies revealed high consistency of participants’ 
strategy use across test phases. Two participants previously classified as TTB were re-classified as 
WADD-CCs as did one EQW-CCs and one unclassified participant. Two WADD-CCs were re-
classified as TTB-CCs.    
 For the analyses of bets, trials on which participants’ decisions were inconsistent with their 
strategy were removed (3.54%). Bets of each group of participants were submitted to a 3 (validity-rank 
of the best discriminating cue; cue 1, cue 2, cue 3) × 2 (status of the next-best cue: consistent, 
inconsistent) within-subjects ANOVA. 
 The analysis of TTB-CCs’ bets revealed that they bet less on their decisions, when 
information about the best and next-best cue was inconsistent (M = 8.42, SE = 0.15) than when cue 
information was consistent (M = 9.45, SE = 0.12), F(1, 29) = 25.29, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.10. No other 
effects were significant, Fs < 1.46, ps > 0.239. 
 The status of the next-best cue also had an effect on WADD-CCs’ bets, F(1, 30) = 14.45, p < 
0.001, η2G = 0.087. The interaction was also significant, F(1, 60) = 3.35, p < 0.042, η
2
G = 0.01. 
Follow-up analyses revealed that the next-best cue affected WADD-CCs’ bets on all levels of the 
validity-rank factor, all ps < 0.043. Overall, WADD-CCs bet less when cue information was 
inconsistent (M = 8.76, SE = 0.16) than when it was consistent (M = 9.67, SE = 0.10). 
 For EQW-CCs, the main effect of the status of the next-best cue was also significant, F(1, 6) = 
6.41, p = 0.044, η2G = 0.25. For this group, no other effects were significant, Fs < 1.4, ps > 0.284. 
EQW-CCs bet less on their decisions when cue information was inconsistent (M = 7.74, SE = 0.44) 
than when it was consistent (M = 9.63, SE = 0.33).   
 In brief, the decision-time results of both experiments as well as the betting behavior of 
participants of Experiment 1b provide evidence that TTB-CCs do not ignore information about 
(supposedly) TTB-irrelevant cues when cues are directly accessible. We will next consider whether 
TTB-CCs would be more likely to ignore TTB-irrelevant cues, when information about single cues 
has to be acquired sequentially.  
Test Phase 2: Strategy classification. Strategy classification was achieved as in Test Phase 1. 
Strategy proportions are depicted in Table 4. Again, participants were highly consistent in their 
strategy use across test phases.  
Test Phase 2: Process-tracing measures. In Test Phase 2, cue information was no longer 
directly accessible but participants could sequentially uncover as much cues as they wanted without 
order restrictions. We were specifically interested in participants’ search- and, most importantly, their 
stopping-behavior. To examine participants’ search behavior, the computer recorded which cue was 
acquired first, second, third, and last, on each trial. For each participant search orders on each trial 
were averaged across all trials. The mean individual search orders for both experiments can be found 
in Tables A.1 and B.1 of the Appendix. The majority of participants (77% in Experiment 1a and 76% 
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in Experiment 1b) searched the cues in descending order of their validity. This finding is well in line 
with the TTB-search-rule.  
We next considered the average amount of cues a participant acquired before making a 
decision as an indicator of the participant’s decision threshold (cf. Newell & Lee, 2011). A maximum 
of four cues could be acquired on each trial. In both experiments, TTB-CCs acquired less cues per trial 
than did both WADD- and EQW-CCs (Experiment 1a: MTTB = 1.84, SETTB = 0.07, MWADD = 3.57, 
SEWADD = 0.05, MEQW = 3.01, SEEQW = 0.42; Experiment 1b: MTTB = 2.5, SETTB = 0.63, MWADD = 3.44, 
SEWADD = 0.06, MEQW = 3.54, SEEQW = 0.13). A one-way ANOVA with decision strategy as between-
subjects factor showed a significant effect in both experiments, F1a(2, 45) = 82.12, η
2
 = 0.78, p < 
0.001; F1b(2, 65) = 33.09, η
2
 = 0.50, p < 0.001.  
These results indicate that TTB-CCs stopped information search sooner than WADD- and 
EQW-CCs. To get a more direct test of whether TTB-CCs behaved in line with the TTB-stopping-
rule, we finally considered the frequency of trials on which participants continued information search 
after discovering a discriminating cue for the first time. The TTB-stopping-rule predicts that 
information search would terminate as soon as a cue discriminates between options.  
In Experiment 1a, the average frequency of continued search was 12% (SE = 4.2) for TTB, 
85% (SE = 1.8) for WADD, and 72% (SE = 18.1) EQW. In Experiment 1b, the average frequency of 
continued search was 41% (SE = 6) for TTB, 79% (SE = 12) for WADD, and 93% (SE = 8) for EQW.  
Utility ratings of the four cues. At the end of the experiment participants rated the predictive 
utility of each of the four cues. We used these ratings to check (1) whether participants learned the 
correct validity hierarchy and (2) whether TTB-CCs perceived higher dispersion among cue validities 
than WADD-CCs. Utility ratings are shown in Table 5 separately for each strategy group. As can be 
seen, with the exception of EQW-CCs of Experiment 1b, the utility ratings of the four cues decreased 
significantly with the objective cue validities, suggesting that participants learned the correct validity 
hierarchy. Theoretically, the lack of a significant trend for EQW-CCs is consistent with the 
assumption that EQW-CCs perceive cues as equally useful. However, the ratings of EQW-CCs of 
Experiment 1b may also suggest that some of them may have learned a different validity hierarchy and 
therefore only appeared to rely on an EQW strategy. Conclusions about this group should thus be 
drawn with caution.   
To further examine whether TTB-CCs perceived higher cue dispersion than did WADD-CCs 
and EQW-CCs, for each participant the standard deviation across the four ratings was calculated (cf. 
Pachur & Marinello, 2013). In Experiment 1a, the average standard deviation of TTB-CCs’ ratings 
was significantly higher (M = 2.74, SE = 0.17) than that of WADD-CCs (M = 2.01, SE = 0.21) and 
EQW-CCs (M = 2.14, SE = 0.29), F(2, 45) = 3.729, p = 0.038. In Experiment 1b, there was a non-
significant trend, F(2, 65) = 2.691, p = 0.075 (MTTB = 2.56, SETTB = 0.17; MWADD = 2.00, SEWADD= 
0.19; MEQW = 2.16, SEEQW= 0.26). A planned contrast between TTB-CCs and WADD-/EQW-CCs 
approached significance, t(45), 1.99, p = 0.051. 
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Table 5 
Utility Ratings for the Different Cues in Experiments 1 – 3 for the Different Strategy Groups and the Corresponding 
Statistical Test Results 
  Mean utility ratings (SE)  Trend statistics 
Experiment Strategy Cue 1 Cue 2 Cue 3 Cue 4  t (linear)  t (quadratic) 
 
TTB 
(n = 31) 
8.61 
(0.29) 
7.29 
(0.21) 
5.61 
(0.21)  
3.10 
(0.37) 
 
t(90) = -14.4***  t(90) = -2.2*  
1a 
WADD 
(n = 11) 
8.64 
(0.31) 
7.18 
(0.14) 
5.91 
(0.12) 
4.18 
(0.33) 
 
t(30) = -11.9*** t(30) = -0.5 
 
EQW  
(n = 7) 
8.0 
(0.61) 
7.57 
(0.58) 
6.14 
(0.53) 
4.14 
(0.52) 
 t(18) = -4.1*** 
 
t(18) = -1.3 
 
 
TTB 
(n = 30) 
8.83 
(0.18) 
7.30 
(0.16) 
5.63 
(0.18) 
3.67 
(0.28) 
 
t(87) = -17.6*** t(87) = -1.6 
1b 
WADD 
(n = 30) 
8.57 
(0.26) 
7.30 
(0.22) 
5.87 
(0.20) 
4.60 
(0.30) 
 
t(87) = -10.1*** t(87) = 0.0 
 
EQW 
(n = 8) 
4.63 
(1.08) 
7.63 
(0.59) 
6.38 
(0.54) 
6.50 
(0.74) 
 
t(21) = 1.2 t(21) = -1.8 
 
TTB 
(n = 23) 
8.57 
(0.35) 
7.61 
(0.16) 
6.09 
(0.31) 
4.83 
(0.34) 
 t(66) = -9.4*** t(66) = -0.5 
2 
WADD 
(n = 18) 
8.83 
(0.31) 
7.78 
(0.22) 
6.78 
(0.19) 
4.83 
(0.36) 
 t(51) = -10.5*** t(51) = -1.6 
 
EQW 
(n = 5) 
6.4 
(1.59) 
7.0 
(0.77) 
6.6 
(0.29) 
5.4 
(1.14) 
 t(12) =  -0.8 t(12) = -1.0 
 
TTB 
(n = 37) 
8.70 
(0.27) 
7.65 
(0.23) 
6.57 
(0.79) 
4.78 
(0.35)  
 t(108) = -10.7*** t(108) = -1.4 
3 
WADD 
(n = 24) 
8.54 
(0.25) 
7.88 
(0.28) 
7.17 
(0.19) 
6.21 
(0.39) 
 t(69) = -6.0*** t(69) = -0.5 
 
EQW 
(n = 5) 
6.6 
(1.39) 
6.4 
(0.91) 
6.4 
(0.41) 
5.2 
(1.75) 
 t(12) = -0.8 t(12) = -0.4 
Note. TTB = take the best; WADD = weighted additive; EQW = equal weights. Standard errors in brackets. 
*** p < 0.001 (two-tailed) 
* p < 0.05 (two-tailed) 
 
Discussion 
Experiments 1a and 1b yielded unequivocal evidence that TTB-CCs do not ignore cue 
information when cues are directly accessible, even when single cues could be easily ignored. The 
decision-time results of both experiments generally replicated the findings by Glöckner and Betsch 
(2012; Glöckner et al., 2014) and Söllner et al. (2014; Söllner & Bröder, 2015), and show that even 
TTB-CCs consider supposedly decision-irrelevant cue information. However, in the Glöckner studies 
the cue screen-positions in the decision task changed from trial to trial, which may have encouraged an 
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inadvertent processing of complete cue information. In the Söllner studies, the cue information had to 
be acquired sequentially. In the present experiments, cue information was directly accessible and cue 
positions were held constant. In Experiment 1b cue positions on the screen even matched the cue-
validity hierarchy. For these reasons, single cues could have been ignored easily in our experiments. 
Our results therefore suggest that TTB-CCs purposely look for more cues than just the best 
discriminating cue. This is nicely in line with Söllner and Bröder’s (2015) findings that decision 
makers more frequently search for additional cues on purpose when the information they previously 
acquired was inconsistent rather than consistent. Furthermore, participants' betting behavior in 
Experiment 1b shows that the processing of additional cue information is consequential for both TTB-
CCs and WADD-/EQW-CCs. Participants bet less on their choices when cue information was 
inconsistent than when it was consistent. This finding is in line with previous research showing that 
information consistency affects participants' decision confidence (Glöckner et al., 2014; Söllner et al., 
2014). However, whereas decision confidence assesses the consequences of information consistency 
on a meta-cognitive level, the present finding points to a direct behavioral consequence (bets) of 
information consistency.  
In terms of EAMs, the finding that TTB-CCs are sensitive to the consistency of cue 
information may be interpreted as evidence that, when cues are directly accessible, the decision 
threshold of (at least some of the) TTB-CCs is higher than the threshold implied by the TTB-stopping-
rule. Overall, the decision behavior of TTB-, WADD-, and EQW-CCs can be accounted for by EAMs. 
According to this account, TTB- and WADD-/EQW-CCs differ specifically regarding their cue 
weightings: TTB-CCs weight the cues in a non-compensatory manner, whereas WADD- and EQW-
CCs weight the cues in a compensatory manner. The finding that TTB-CCs of our experiments 
perceived stronger variability in the cues’ predictive utilities than did WADD- and EQW-CCs lends 
support to the assumption of different cue weightings for TTB-CCs and WADD-/EQW-CCs, 
respectively.  
In our experiments, objective cue validities were identical for all participants but participants 
nevertheless appeared to differ in their subjective estimates of cue validities. Glöckner et al. (2014) 
manipulated the objective cue validities of two decision environments and found that participants 
weight cue information in a non-compensatory (compensatory) manner when objective validities of 
the environments were non-compensatory (compensatory). Our results extend this finding by showing 
that not only objective validities of a decision environment but also participants’ subjective perception 
of the cue validities affect decision behavior.  
Results of Test Phase 2 provided somewhat mixed evidence regarding our assumption that 
TTB-CCs would behave more in line with the TTB-stopping-rule when cue information is no longer 
directly accessible but has to be acquired sequentially. TTB-CCs of both experiments stopped 
information search sooner than did WADD- and EQW-CCs, which is consistent with the assumption 
that TTB-CCs have lower decision thresholds than WADD- and EQW-CCs (Lee & Cummins, 2004; 
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Söllner & Bröder, 2015). However, only in Experiment 1a was the decision behavior of TTB-CCs 
considerably in line (in 88% of all trials) with the TTB-stopping-rule. In Experiment 1b, in contrast, 
TTB-CCs still looked for more cues than just the best discriminating cue on a relatively large 
proportion of trials (41%). The main differences between Experiments 1a and 1b were the presentation 
format of the stimuli (i.e., holistic pictures vs. pictures of single cues in a list-wise format) and the 
additional betting block in Experiment 1b. It may be that the betting in Experiment 1b, which preceded 
Test Phase 2, generally increased participants’ desire for decision confidence—that is, their desire to 
know how certain they could be with their decisions in order to adjust their bets accordingly. This 
heightened desire for confidence (increased decision threshold) may then have transferred to Test 
Phase 2. Experiment 2 will more directly examine how focusing participants on decision confidence 
may affect participants’ decision thresholds.  
The central conclusion to be drawn from Experiments 1a and 1b is that TTB-CCs do not 
strictly follow a TTB-stopping-rule, even when cues have to be acquired sequentially (see also Söllner 
& Bröder, 2015). The next experiment aimed to further our understanding of the conditions under 
which TTB-CCs will look for more cues than just the best discriminating cue. 
Experiment 2 
Experiment 2 tests whether focusing participants on decision confidence via accuracy task 
instructions, would encourage TTB-CCs to look for more cues than focusing them on decision speed, 
which may suggest that participants adaptively adjust their decision thresholds to different situational 
demands (accuracy vs. speed). Initial evidence that participants increase their decision thresholds 
when task instructions stress accuracy comes from studies investigating the cognitive processes 
underlying simple response tasks (Voss, Rothermund, & Voss, 2004; Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, Gomez, 
& McKoon, 2008). Voss et al. (2004; Experiment 1) had participants perform two blocks of a color 
discrimination task. For the first block, participants read common task instructions which did not 
specifically refer to accuracy. For the second block, participants were explicitly instructed to be 
accurate. The researchers found that participants increased their decision thresholds from the first to 
the second block. We similarly hypothesize that in our more complex decision task, TTB-CCs would 
also increase their decision thresholds (i.e., acquire more cues) when accuracy is stressed compared to 
when speed is stressed. Indeed, under speed instructions the decision threshold of TTB-CCs might 
correspond closely to the TTB-stopping-rule (e.g., Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a, Experiment 2). 
The different instructional foci may also affect the decision thresholds of WADD-/EQW-CCs, 
who previously (Experiments 1a and b) showed a tendency to acquire the maximum of four cues. 
Although a focus on accuracy may thus not result in an additional increase in WADD-/EQW-CCs’ 
decision thresholds, a focus on decision speed might make these decision makers look for fewer cues. 
The interesting question is, however, how strongly WADD-/EQW-CCs may restrict their information 
search (decision threshold) under speed instructions. One possibility is that WADD-/EQW-CCs 
acquire fewer cues under speed than under accuracy instructions; but that they still acquire enough 
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cues to figure out whether a highly-valid cue can be compensated for by less valid cues. If so, we 
expect WADD-/EQW-CCs to remain classified as WADD-/EQW-CCs even under speed instructions.  
Evidence for an alternative hypothesis, however, comes from a study by Glöckner and Betsch 
(2008a, Experiment 2; see also Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999) in which time pressure was manipulated. 
The authors found a higher proportion of TTB-classifications under high time pressure and a higher 
proportion of WADD-classifications under low time pressure indicating that participants switched 
from WADD to TTB when time was constraint. Or in terms of EAMs, participants classified as 
WADD, lowered their decision thresholds to the level of the TTB-stopping-rule under time 
constraints. Accordingly, one could also expect participants of Experiment 2 to generally adjust their 
decision thresholds to the level of the TTB-stopping-rule under time pressure. If so, a large proportion 
of WADD-/EQW-CCs in Experiment 2 would be re-classified as TTB-CCs under speed instructions.  
Method 
Participants. Forty-nine Heidelberg University students participated for partial course credit 
and monetary compensation (39 were female). Mean age was 22.74, ranging from 18 to 35. 
Materials, design, and procedure. Participants performed the same validity-learning phase 
as in the previous experiments. They then performed a shortened version of the decision task with cue 
information completely given (i.e., Test Phase 1, where cues were presented list-wise as in Experiment 
1b). The main purpose of this phase was to familiarize participants with the decision task and to 
identify a reference strategy for each participant. The subsequent Test Phase 2 (sequential search) was 
divided into (a) a block where instructions stressed accuracy (accuracy block) and (b) a block where 
instructions stressed speed (speed block). Block order was counterbalanced.  
The instructions and the cover story for the learning phase and the subsequent test phase with 
cues directly accessible (Test Phase 1) were identical to that previously used. In Test Phase 1, the 24 
experimental pairs (cf. cells in Table 3, except for the last column), and the 8 diagnostic pairs (Table 
2) were presented only once.  The design of Test Phase 1 was a 3 (validity-rank of the best 
discriminating cue: cue 1, cue 2, cue 3) × 2 (status of the next-best cue: consistent, inconsistent) 
within-subjects design. 
 After Test Phase 1, participants received instructions for Test Phase 2. As in the previous 
experiments, participants were told that they were now required to make inquiries about the bugs' 
features before making their decisions. Test Phase 2 comprised two blocks: an accuracy and a speed 
block (order counterbalanced). For the accuracy block, participants were instructed that the hospital 
was currently undergoing a quality assessment, the aim of which was to reduce false diagnoses. To 
further stress the importance of decision accuracy, participants were asked to rate their confidence 
after each decision (from 1 = rather uncertain to 12 = absolutely certain). For the speed block, 
participants were instructed that they had to help out the staff in the emergency room. In order to save 
as many lives as possible, decision speed was said to be of particular importance in the emergency 
room. To make the instructions and the procedure of the two blocks most comparable, participants 
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were further asked to estimate the time it took them to come up with their decisions (from 1 to 12 
seconds). Note that the confidence and estimated-time ratings were only meant to stress the 
instructions and to maintain the accuracy/speed focus throughout the blocks; the ratings were not 
analyzed.    
Each block consisted of 20 trials. The decision pairs used for these trials were the eight 
diagnostic pairs and 12 pairs from the experimental pairs (i.e., two randomly drawn from each cell of 
Table 3). As in the previous experiments, participants could ask the patients up to four questions per 
trial before making a decision. Furthermore, after each decision a confidence-rating-scale (accuracy 
block) or a time-scale (speed block) popped up. To make the task more user friendly and to allow for 
making quick decisions, all inputs could be made via the computer mouse in this experiment. At the 
end of the experiment, participants were asked to rate the predictive utility of each of the four cues, 
and they had to indicate for each cue which of the two cue values was associated with poisonousness 
(cue-knowledge test). 
Our main dependent variable in this experiment was the average amount of cues participants 
acquired on a decision trial. The research design was a 2 (instructional focus: accuracy, speed) × 2 
(strategy: TTB, WADD, EQW) × 2 (order: speed first, accuracy first) design, with the first factor 
measured within subjects.  
Results  
Learning phase and cue-knowledge test. Data from the learning phase showed that accuracy 
was good and increased from 80.22% (SD = 9.25) in block 1 to 91.57% (SD = 6.14) in block 2, F(1, 
48) = 101.27, p < .001, η2G = 0.35. Data from the final cue-knowledge test revealed that all but three 
participants (omitted from all analyses) learned the eight cue values correctly (i.e., 92%).  
Test Phase 1: Strategy classification. The main purpose of this phase was to get a baseline 
strategy for each participant, which we used as between-subjects factor for the subsequent analyses. 
As shown in Table 4, the majority of participants were classified as TTB-CCs, followed by WADD-
CCs and EQW-CCs. 
Test Phase 1: Decision times. For the analysis of decision times, strategy-inconsistent 
decisions were removed (7%); according to our criteria, there were no outliers. Decision times were 
analyzed separately for the three strategy groups and are depicted in Figure 3. The decision times of 
TTB-CCs were significantly affected by both the validity of the best discriminating cue, F(2, 46) = 
6.25, p = 0.004, η2G = 0.042, and the consistency of the next-best cue, F(1, 23) = 4.96, p = 0.036, η
2
G = 
0.023. The interaction was also significant, F(2, 46) = 3.85, p = 0.029, η2G = 0.012. Follow-up 
analyses revealed that, as shown in Figure 3, consistency of the next-best cue had no effect when cue 3 
was best discriminating cue, F < 1, but it had an effect when the best discriminating cue was cue 1, 
F(1, 23) = 15.57, p < 0.001, η2G  = 0.040, or cue2, F(1, 23) = 4.24, p = 0.051, η
2
G = 0.06.  
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For both WADD-CCs and EQW-CCs, only the consistency of the next-best cue had a 
significant effect, FWADD(1, 17) = 65.00, p < 0.001,  η
2
G = 0.27, FEQW(1, 4) = 30.00, p = 0.005, η
2
G = 
0.31. No other effects were significant, all ps > 0.189.  
 
 
 
Test Phase 2: Strategy classification. The diagnostic pairs presented in each of the two 
experimental blocks (accuracy, speed) were used to repeat the classification procedure for each block. 
This allowed us to examine whether the proportion of TTB-CCs increased under speed instructions. 
As can be seen in Table 4, however, the strategy proportions hardly changed. Inspection of the 
individual strategies obtained for Test Phase 1 (baseline) and the two experimental blocks of Test 
Phase 2 revealed high consistency of strategy classifications across test phases: All but two TTB-CCs 
of Test Phase 1 remained classified as TTB-CCs in both experimental blocks. Only two of the 
WADD-/EQW-CCs of Test Phase 1 were re-classified as TTB-CCs in one of the experimental blocks. 
Classification of the majority of WADD-/EQW-CCs of Test Phase 1 did not change in Test Phase 2 or 
switched from WADD to EQW and vice versa. This finding suggests that, under speed instructions, 
WADD-/EQW-CCs did not adjust their decision thresholds to the level of the TTB-stopping-rule. It 
does not necessarily suggest, however, that these participants were generally insensitive to the speed 
instruction.  
 
Figure 3. Mean decision times (in milliseconds) of Experiment 2 as a function of 
participants’ strategy, the validity-rank of the best discriminating cue and the 
status of the next-best cue. Error bars represent ±1 standard error of the mean. 
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Because there were only few EQW-CCs overall in this experiment, and because some 
participants (four) switched between WADD and EQW across blocks, WADD- and EQW-CCs were 
combined to one strategy group for the following analyses.  
Test Phase 2: Average amount of evidence. To examine whether TTB-CCs and WADD-
/EQW-CCs adjusted their decision thresholds in response to the different instructions, we analyzed the 
average amount of cues participants acquired in the different experimental blocks with a 2 
(instructional focus: accuracy, speed) × 2 (strategy: TTB vs. WADD-/EQW-CCs) × 2 (order: speed 
first vs. accuracy first) mixed-design ANOVA. As the order of blocks had no significant effect and did 
not interact with any of the other factors (ps > 0.193), this factor was not considered for the following 
analysis. The average amount of cues participants of the different groups acquired within the accuracy 
and the speed block, respectively, is depicted in Figure 4.  
 
Figure 4. Average amount of information that participants of Experiment 2 
acquired on a trial as a function of participants’ strategy and the different 
instructional foci. TTB = take the best; COMP = compensatory strategy. Error bars 
represent ±1 standard error of the mean 
 
The analysis revealed a significant effect of decision strategy, F(1, 44) = 33.20, p < 0.001, η2G 
= 0.41. As illustrated in Figure 4, TTB-CCs acquired less cues (M = 2.57, SE = 0.14) than did WADD-
/EQW-CCs (M = 3.68, SE = 0.04). Furthermore, the instructional focus also had a significant effect, 
F(1, 44) = 12.81, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.03. As shown in Figure 4, when instructions emphasized speed, 
participants acquired less information (M = 3.01, SE = 0.14) than when instructions emphasized 
accuracy (M = 3.24, SE = 0.13). The interaction term approached significance, p = 0.074. However, 
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separate analyses for the two groups revealed that instructional focus significantly affected both TTB-
CCs, F(1, 22) = 8.20, p = 0.009, η2G = 0.03, and WADD-/EQW-CCs, F(1, 22) = 7.07, p = 0.014, η
2
G = 
0.04.  
Utility ratings of the four cues. As in the previous experiments, we also analyzed the utility 
ratings participants gave at the end of the experiment. Table 5 shows the utility ratings for the different 
strategy groups. The significant decrease of TTB- and WADD-CCs’ ratings suggests that they had 
learned the validity hierarchy correctly. As in Experiment 1b, the rating pattern of EQW-CCs was less 
conclusive. It may be that these participants perceived the cues as equally useful or that some EQW-
CCs learned a different order.  
We next examined whether TTB-CCs perceived higher dispersion among cues than did 
WADD- and EQW-CCs, measured as in the previous experiments. Unlike in Experiments 1a and 1b, 
the average standard deviation of the four cues in this experiment was only slightly higher for TTB-
CCs (M = 2.02, SE = 0.17) than for WADD-CCs (M = 1.79, SE = 0.17) or EQW-CCs (M = 2.05, SE = 
0.45), F < 1. It is possible that through the explicit accuracy instructions in Test Phase 2 of this 
experiment even the less valid cues may have become relatively important for TTB-CCs thereby 
reducing the dispersion of TTB-CCs’ utility ratings.   
Discussion 
Results of Experiment 2 provide evidence that decision makers adapt their decision thresholds 
in response to different situational demands: When instructions emphasized decision speed, both TTB-
CCs and WADD-/EQW-CCs acquired less information than when instructions emphasized decision 
accuracy. Regarding TTB-CCs, this finding suggests that a focus on decision accuracy motivates 
participants to increase their decision thresholds relative to a focus on decision speed. The finding that 
WADD-/EQW-CCs also showed an adaption of their decision thresholds has at least two additional 
important theoretical implications. It demonstrates that WADD-/EQW-CCs are not insensitive to 
different situational demands—they acquired less information under speed than under accuracy 
instructions. Interestingly, however, and contrary to the findings by Glöckner and Betsch (2008), their 
adaptive behavior did not manifest itself in a shift in decision strategies. Rather, the finding that 
participants were highly consistent in their strategy use across blocks suggests that, even under time 
pressure, WADD-/EQW-CCs acquire still enough information to figure out whether a highly valid cue 
can be compensated for by less valid cues (otherwise they would not be classified as WADD-/EQW-
CCs any more).  
One possible explanation for why we found no evidence for a strategy shift, whereas Glöckner 
and Betsch (2008) found such a shift, may be that the latter imposed an explicit external time limit on 
participants’ information search. Specifically, under severe time constraints, where Glöckner and 
Betsch found the highest proportion of TTB-classifications, participants had only 1.5 seconds to 
search for information. In the present experiment, in contrast, participants were told that decision 
speed was of particular importance, but they were free to decide how much time they would devote to 
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each decision. It may well be that we would have found an increase in TTB-classifications with a strict 
external time limit, simply because participants may no longer have had sufficient time to look for 
enough cues. Under such conditions, relying on the best cue to make a decision may be the best 
strategy, even for participants actually preferring a WADD or EQW strategy.  
Another reason for why WADD-/EQW-CCs in the present study stick to their strategy even 
under speed instructions could be that they simply did not believe that information about a single cue 
would be sufficient to make a correct decision. During validity learning, where participants received 
feedback on their decisions, WADD-/EQW-CCS may have learned that information about any cue 
was important to make a correct choice, and they may have routinized this decision strategy 
throughout learning (e.g., Rieskamp & Otto, 2006) and stick to it during the subsequent test phases (cf. 
Bröder & Schiffer, 2006 for routine effects in decision making). In the study by Glöckner and Betsch 
(2008) or Rieskamp and Hoffrage (1999), cue validities were instructed and, more importantly, 
participants received no feedback on their decisions. Receiving no choice feedback may therefore have 
prevented participants from routinizing a certain strategy and this may have enabled participants to 
switch more flexibly between strategies. Future studies should investigate how cue-validity learning 
(i.e., via instructions vs. via feedback learning) affects strategy selection in subsequent test phases.     
To summarize, results of Experiment 2 demonstrate that participants adjust their information 
search behavior—and thus their decision thresholds—to different situational demands: Under speed 
instructions, TTB-CCs and WADD-/EQW-CCs acquired less information than under accuracy 
instructions. Importantly, whereas a pure outcome-based analysis would have yielded no evidence for 
an adaptive decision behavior, a closer look at their information-search behavior revealed that decision 
behavior was adjusted to situational requirements (see also Lee, Newell, & Vanderkerckhove, 2014; 
Newell & Leee, 2009).   
Experiment 3 
In the three experiments reported so far we found converging evidence that TTB-CCs acquire 
information that is supposed to be irrelevant according to the TTB-stopping-rule. With the third 
experiment we aimed to get a better understanding of how TTB-CCs process additional cue 
information when it is directly accessible. As in Experiment 1a and 1b we used a decision time 
approach to tackle this question. In the first two experiments we found that TTB-CCs’ decision times 
were slower when cue information from the next-best cue conflicted with the best cue as compared to 
when there was no conflict. EAMs can explain this finding by assuming that decision makers 
automatically integrate information about the processed cues and that the resulting overall evidence in 
favor of the to-be-chosen option—which is lower when cues are conflicting than when they are 
consistent—determines decision time.  
We theorize, however, that in addition to automatic integration processes, a more deliberate 
process may also be at work when TTB-CCs are confronted with conflicting cue information. 
Specifically, we hypothesize that TTB-CCs inhibit conflicting cue information, which is based on the 
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following reasoning. For TTB-CCs it is always the best discriminating cue that finally drives the 
decision (even when additional cues have been considered). The best discriminating cue therefore has 
rule-like features, and we suggest that TTB-CCs, being aware of the simplicity and regularity inherent 
in their choice pattern, follow a TTB-decision rule rather deliberately (cf. Glöckner et al. 2014, for a 
different view). When this decision-rule is challenged by conflicting information from other cues, 
TTB-CCs may experience a cognitive conflict, and they may want to reduce this conflict by inhibiting 
the conflicting information. As inhibition is cognitively demanding (cf. Kane & Engle, 2003) this 
process may take time and may thus contribute to the previously observed slowing in decision speed. 
The main goal of Experiment 3 was to test this inhibition hypothesis. Note that for WADD-/ and 
EQW-CCs, the best discriminating cue has no such rule-like feature as it has for TTB-CCs (WADD-
/EQW-CCs only choose the option pointed to by the best cue when this cue cannot be compensated for 
by less valid cues). The inhibition of conflicting information may therefore be of less or no importance 
for WADD-/EQW-CCs. 
In Experiment 3, we used a decision task similar to the ones of the previous experiments 
comprising a learning phase and a test phase with cues being directly accessible. In addition to using 
pairs with a consistent and an inconsistent next-best cue in the test phase, we also used pairs for which 
the next-best cue did not discriminate between options (e.g., 1-0-0-0 vs. 0-0-0-0). Most importantly, to 
examine whether TTB-CCs inhibit conflicting cue information, we changed the test phase in the 
following way. Participants were still presented with bug pairs and were to choose the more poisonous 
one (pair trials). These pair trials, however, were interspersed with single-cue trials on which 
participants were shown only a single cue value. Their task on these trials was to decide whether the 
depicted cue value indicated poisonousness or not. Crucially, the cue value depicted on a single-cue 
trial was always a cue value of the next-best cue from the preceding pair trial. We assumed a 
participant’s response to a single cue value to be impaired when this cue value had been inhibited on 
the preceding pair trial. Specifically, we hypothesized that the poisonous cue value of an inconsistent 
next-best cue would be inhibited on a pair trial by TTB-CCs, because this cue value interferes most 
with TTB-CCs’ decisions (it points to the non-TTB option). The poisonous cue values of consistent or 
non-discriminating next-best cues, in contrast, were not assumed to be inhibited, because they do not 
conflict with TTB-CCs’ choices. To examine the inhibition hypothesis, we therefore considered 
participants' decision times from single-cue trials depicting a poisonous cue value, and we compared 
those trials preceded by an inconsistent pair trial (assumed inhibition of the poisonous cue value) with 
those trials preceded by either a consistent or a non-discriminating pair-trial (no inhibition assumed).  
The inclusion of pairs with a non-discriminating next-best cue further allowed us to test the 
following hypothesis. Relative to a non-discriminating next-best cue, a consistent next-best cue 
increases the overall consistency of information which, according to EAMs, should lead to a speedup 
in decisions. An inconsistent next-best cue, in contrast, decreases the overall consistency and should 
lead to a slowdown in decisions (see Glöckner & Betsch, 2012). Finally, in Experiment 3 we also 
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examined how information consistency affects participants’ decision confidence. Unlike in 
Experiment 1b, we used explicit confidence judgments rather than bets to assess confidence, in order 
to replicate our findings with a different confidence indicator.  
Method 
Participants. Seventy-three Heidelberg University students (49 female) participated in 
Experiment 3. Mean age was 22.3, ranging from 18 to 31. Participants either received 8€ for their 
participation or partial course credit. All participants could earn an additional bonus of up to 2.90€, 
contingent on their task performance. 
Materials, design, and procedure. The learning phase was identical to the learning phase 
of the previous experiments. The test phase of Experiment 3 differed from the test phases of the first 
two experiments. Most importantly, the decision task also contained single-cue trials and pairs with a 
non-discriminating next-best cue. Furthermore, instead of Test Phase 2, participants performed an 
additional block of the decision task with directly accessible information where they had to indicate 
their decision confidence on half of the trials. 
Test Phase 1 consisted of four successive sub-blocks, each consisting of 36 test pairs and eight 
diagnostic pairs. The 36 test pairs for the pair trials are shown in Table 3, the eight diagnostic pairs are 
shown in Table 2. Presentation order of the 44 pair-trials within each sub-block was randomly 
determined (the block structure was used for reasons of randomization only). The design of the pair 
trials was a 3 (validity-rank of the best discriminating cue: cue 1, cue 2, cue 3) × 3 (status of the next-
best cue: consistent, inconsistent, non-discriminating) within-subjects design. 
Within each sub-block, half of the 36 test pairs (Table 1) were followed by a single-cue trial. 
The single cue value on these trials was always of the same validity rank as the next-best cue of the 
preceding pair (e.g., when the next-best cue on a pair trial was antennae, the cue value shown on a 
subsequent single-cue trial would have been one of the two physical appearances—large or small—of 
antennae). The pairs preceding a single-cue trial were selected from the body of the 36 test pairs by 
randomly choosing two pairs from each combination of the factors validity-rank of the best 
discriminating cue and status of the next-best cue (cf. cells of Table 3). One of the chosen pairs from 
each cell was followed by a single-cue trial depicting the poisonous cue value of the pair’s next-best 
cue—these were the critical trials to test our inhibition hypothesis. The other pair was followed by a 
single-cue trial depicting the non-poisonous cue value. These trials were used for methodological 
reasons only, because otherwise participants’ responses on single-cue trials would always have been 
‘poisonous.’ As responses to non-poisonous trials have no theoretical implications, they were not 
analyzed. 
 The design of the single-cue-trial analysis was a 3 × 3 within-subjects design, with the first 
factor being the cue to which the single cue value belonged (cue 2, cue 3, cue 4), and the second factor 
being the preceding status of the depicted cue, that is, whether it was part of a consistent, inconsistent, 
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or non-discriminating next-best cue on the preceding pair trial (note that, because single-cue values 
always belonged to a next-best cue, cue 1 values did not occur on single-cue trials). 
Instructions for Test Phase 1 were similar to those of the previous experiments, but 
participants were additionally told that on some trials of the task they would be presented with only a 
single cue value of a bug. Their task would then be to indicate whether the depicted cue value 
indicated poisonousness or not, using the up and down arrow keys (up = poisonous). To familiarize 
participants with this new task, they performed eight successive single-cue practice trials before the 
beginning of Test Phase 1. Furthermore, halfway through the decision task of Test Phase 1, there was 
an obligatory one-minute break (to reduce fatigue effects).   
Following Test Phase 1, participants performed an additional block of the decision task which 
also consisted of 36 test-pair trials and eight diagnostic-pair trials but no single-cue trials. Half of the 
test pairs were randomly selected for the additional confidence ratings with the constraint that each 
factor combination (status of next best cue by validity rank of best discriminating cue; cf. cells in 
Table 3) occurred equally often (i.e., two times). For the confidence ratings, participants were asked to 
indicate how likely they considered the bug they chose to be actually more poisonous. To this end, 
they were presented with a scale running from 50% (indicating guessing) to 100% (indicating absolute 
certainty)  in steps of five, and they used the keys F1 (50%) - F12 (100%) for their responses. The 
design for the confidence-rating analyses was a 3 (validity-rank of the best discriminating cue) × 3 
(status of the next-best cue) within-subjects design. At the end of the study, participants were asked to 
estimate the predictive utility of each of the four cues. 
Results  
Learning phase. Mean accuracy increased from block 1 (M = 81.19%, SD = 7.88) to block 2 
(M = 92.42%; SD = 4.29), F(1, 72) = 147.6, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.44. Unlike in the previous experiments, 
there was no cue-knowledge test in this experiment. Instead we used participants’ error rates on the 
single-cue trials in Test Phase 1 to assess their cue-knowledge. On the single-cue trials, participants 
were to indicate whether a cue value was indicative of poisonousness or not. Overall, participants 
made very few errors on these trials (2.32%). However, four participants showed error rates higher 
than 40%, indicating that they did not learn the cue values correctly. These participants were omitted 
from all subsequent analyses.   
Test Phase 1: Strategy classification. Strategy proportions obtained for Test Phase 1 are 
shown in Table 4. The majority of participants were classified as TTB, followed by WADD, and 
EQW. 
Test Phase 1: Decision times. For the analysis of decision times, decisions inconsistent with a 
participant’s strategy were removed (3.75%) as were outliers (0.27%). Decision times were analyzed 
separately for the three strategy groups.  
There was a significant effect of the best discriminating cue on the decision times of TTB-
CCs, F(1.2, 42) = 17.43, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.06. As illustrated in Figure 5, decision times increased 
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with the validity of the best discriminating cue decreasing (MCue1 = 1.93, SE = 0.08; MCue2 = 2.21, SE = 
0.04; MCue3 = 2.47, SE = 0.07). Furthermore, the next-best cue affected TTB users’ decision times, 
F(1.2, 42) = 33.80, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.06. The interaction was not significant, F(4, 140) = 1.41, p = 
0.233. Two orthogonal contrasts revealed that TTB-CCs were slower when the next-best cue was 
inconsistent (M = 2.53, SE = 0.08) than when it was non-discriminating (M = 2.06, SE = 0.49) or 
consistent (M = 2.03, SE = 0.05), t(210) = 10.38, p < 0.001. However, there was no significant 
difference between the consistent and the non-discriminating conditions, t < 1.  
 
 
Figure 5. Mean decision times of Experiment 3, as a function of participants’ strategy, the 
validity-rank of the best discriminating cue and the status of the next-best cue. TTB = take the 
best; WADD = weighted additive; EQW = equal weights. Error bars represent ±1 standard 
error of the mean. 
For WADD-CCs, both the best discriminating cue, F(2, 46) = 10.40, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.02, 
and the next-best cue, F(1.3, 29.4) = 185.68, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.32, affected decision times 
significantly. The interaction term was also significant, F(1.3, 30.8) = 8.13, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.03. As 
evident from Figure 5, the next-best cue had a less pronounced effect for cue 3. Follow-up analyses 
revealed, that the next-best cue had a significant effect on all levels of the validity-rank factor: FCue1(2, 
46) = 80.70, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.35; FCue2(2, 46) = 88.31, p < 0.001, η
2
G = 0.40; FCue3(2, 46) = 66.25, p 
< 0.001, η2G = 0.21.  
Finally, the next-best cue affected the decision times of EQW-CCs, F(2, 8) = 13.91, p = 0.002, 
η2G = 0.18. No other effects were significant, Fs < 1, ps > 0.463. As shown in Figure 5, EQW-CCs 
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were significantly slower when the best discriminating cue was followed by an inconsistent cue (M = 
3.62, SE = 0.14) than when it was followed by a consistent (M = 2.56, SE = 0.11) or non-
discriminating cue (M = 2.72, SE = 0.42). Tukey post-hoc tests revealed significant differences 
between the inconsistent and consistent condition as well as the inconsistent and non-discriminating 
condition, both ps < 0.001. The difference between the consistent and the non-discriminating condition 
was not significant, p = 0.460. 
In brief, the results replicated the previous effect that TTB-CCs were slower in making their 
decisions when information about the best and the next-best cue was inconsistent rather than 
consistent, indicating once again that TTB-CCs do not ignore cue information when cues are directly 
accessible. Importantly, the results showed that, in comparison to a non-discriminating cue as baseline, 
an inconsistent next-best cue led to slower decisions. We will next consider whether TTB-CCs inhibit 
information inconsistent with their decisions.  
Test Phase 1: Single-cue trials. For the analyses of participants’ decision times on single-cue 
trials, incorrect responses on these trials (1.63%) were removed. According to our criteria there were 
no outliers. A 3 (validity-rank of the cue: cue2, cue3, cue4) × 3 (preceding status: inconsistent, 
consistent, non-discriminating) within-subject ANOVA for single-cue trial decision times showed that 
decision times of TTB-CCs were significantly affected by the preceding status of the cue, F(2, 68) = 
4.39, p = 0.016, η2G = 0.014. The main effect of validity-rank of the cue and the interaction were not 
significant, Fs < 1.49, ps > 0.233. The main effect of preceding status was further explored with two 
orthogonal contrasts reflecting our hypothesis regarding the inhibition of conflicting information. The 
first contrast compared the inconsistent condition with the other two conditions. This contrast directly 
tested our hypothesis that an inconsistent next-best cue but not a non-discriminating or consistent cue 
requires inhibition. This contrast revealed a significant effect, t(204) = 2.60, p = 0.010. TTB-CCs were 
slower in indicating that the depicted cue value was poisonous, when the cue value had been 
inconsistent with the best discriminating cue on the preceding trial (M = 1284, SE = 24.96) as 
compared to when it had been consistent (M = 1205, SE = 42.37) or non-discriminating (M = 1251, SE 
= 57.23). The second contrast, comparing the consistent with the non-discriminating condition, 
approached significance, t(204) = 1.81, p = 0.071.  
For WADD-CCs, the type of cue had no significant effect on participants' decision times, F(2, 
46) = 1.51, p = 0.231. The preceding status of the cue had a marginally significant effect, F(2, 46) = 
2.96, p = 0.062, η2G = 0.01. When the single cue value had been consistent with the best cue on the 
preceding trial, WADD-CCs tended to respond faster (M = 1208, SE = 26.19) than when the cue value 
had previously been inconsistent (M = 1288, SE = 41.30) or non-discriminating (M = 1261, SE = 
62.63). For EQW-CCs, no significant effects were obtained, ps > 0.124. 
In sum, the results from the single-cue trials provide support for our assumption that 
information about a cue that conflicts with the decisions of TTB-CCs is inhibited.  
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Confidence block: Strategy classification. Strategy proportions obtained for this phase are 
shown in Table 4. The observable increase in WADD was mainly due to two switching EQW-CCs, 
and three switching TTB-CCs.  
Confidence block: Confidence ratings. Because there were only three participants classified 
as EQW-CCs for this block, data of these participants were not analyzed. Confidence ratings of TTB-
CCs and those of WADD were each submitted to a 3 (validity-rank of the best discriminating cue) × 3 
(status of the next-best cue) within subjects ANOVA.  
 There was only a significant effect of the next-best cue on TTB users' confidence ratings, F(2, 
66) = 5.44, p < 0.007, η2G = 0.03. No other effects were significant, Fs < 1.08, ps > 0.367. TTB users 
were most confident in their decisions when cue information was consistent (M = 98.19, SE = 0.38), 
and they were least confident when information was inconsistent (M = 95.29, SE = 0.79), with the 
non-discriminating condition in-between (M = 96.99, SE = 0.85). Tukey post-hoc tests revealed a 
significant difference between the consistent and the inconsistent condition, p = 0.001. The non-
discriminating condition did not differ from either the consistent or the inconsistent condition, ps > 
0.099. 
 There was also only a significant effect of the next-best cue on the confidence ratings of 
WADD-CCs, F(1.08, 30.184) = 19.11, p < 0.001, η2G = 0.16. No other effects were significant, Fs < 
2.90, ps > 0.063. Participants were less confident in their decisions when cue information was 
inconsistent (M = 93.94, SE = 0.84) as compared to both when cue information was consistent (M = 
98.82, SE = 0.33) and when the next-best cue did not discriminate (M = 98.71, SE = 0.35). Tukey post-
hoc tests revealed that the inconsistent condition differed significantly from both the consistent and the 
non-discriminating condition, ps < 0.001. The consistent and the non-discriminating condition did not 
differ significantly, p = 0.984.  
Utility ratings of the four cues. The cue ratings are shown separately for each strategy group 
in Table 5. We generally replicated our previous findings. The ratings show a significant decrease with 
the objective cue validities for TTB-/ and WADD-CCs but not for EQW-CCs.    
We again examined the dispersion of each participant’s cue-utility ratings measured by the 
standard deviation. For TTB-CCs, the average standard deviation of ratings was M = 2.07 (SE = 0.17), 
for WADD-CCs M = 1.44 (SE = 0.19), and for EQW-CCs M = 2.17 (SE = 0.64). A one-way ANOVA 
with decision strategy as between-subjects factor revealed a non-significant trend, F(2, 63) = 2.98, p = 
0.058, η2 = 0.09.  
Discussion 
In Experiment 3, we again found that TTB-CCs were sensitive to the consistency of the next-
best cue. This provides further evidence that TTB-CCs do not ignore easily available cue information. 
Moreover, compared with a non-discriminating next-best cue, it was specifically the information 
provided by an inconsistent next-best cue that slowed down TTB-CCs' decisions. The interesting novel 
finding of Experiment 3 is that on single-cue trials, TTB-CCs required more time to indicate that a cue 
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value pointed to poisonousness, when this cue value had previously been part of an inconsistent next-
best cue compared to when it had been part of a consistent or non-discriminating next-best cue. In line 
with research showing that previous engagement in inhibition of certain information slows down 
subsequent processing of this information (e.g., Mari-Beffa, Estévez, & Danziger, 2000), this finding 
suggests that TTB-CCs inhibit information that conflicts with their implicit or explicit decision rule 
(‘go with the best cue’), and this inhibition slows the decision process. The decision time pattern of 
WADD-CCs was less conclusive though. They showed a tendency to respond faster after a consistent 
next-best cue compared to an inconsistent or a non-discriminating next-best cue (which points to a 
facilitation effect after processing consistent information). Overall, the findings suggest that inhibitory 
processes are one mechanism TTB-CCs recruit to deal with conflicting information. Whether, or to 
what extent, inhibitory processes are also at work during WADD decision making needs to be 
addressed in future studies. Our findings suggest that inhibition may be less important for WADD-
CCs.   
The integration of cue information is one of the assumptions underlying EAMs. The results 
from Experiment 3 partially supported the predictions by EAMs. We found evidence for a slowdown 
in decisions when information consistency was decreased. However, we found no speedup in 
decisions when consistency was increased. This latter finding is at odds with EAMs and the findings 
by Glöckner and Betsch (2012) who found that an increase in consistency was associated with faster 
decisions. A possible reason for why we found no evidence that a consistent next-best cue would 
speed participants’ decisions in comparison to a non-discriminating next-best cue, may be due to our 
materials: The bugs of non-discriminating pairs differed on only one cue (the best discriminating cue), 
whereas the bugs of consistent and inconsistent pairs differed on two cues (best and next-best cue; cf. 
Table 3). When only one cue discriminates between bugs, participants may figure out relatively 
quickly, which of the two bugs had the critical cue value. When two cues discriminate between the 
bugs, however, participants may require more time for figuring out the critical values of either cue 
(even when information about the two cues is consistent). Note, however, that for consistent and 
inconsistent pairs the number of cues on which the bugs differed was always identical, so that the 
decision time difference between consistent and inconsistent pairs cannot be accounted for by varying 
amounts of to-be-processed information.  
Participants’ confidence ratings in Experiment 3 closely mirrored the betting behavior of 
participants of Experiment 1b, and they replicate findings by Glöckner and Betsch (2012). The finding 
that decision confidence increased with information consistency is well in line with EAMs and 
suggests that participants integrate cue information when reflecting on their decision confidence.  
General Discussion  
 Decision makers often need to evaluate how much information they consider for their 
decisions and how important they consider each piece of information. In the present research, we were 
specifically interested in the decision behavior of decision makers who rely on the best discriminating 
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cue when making their choices, even when less valid cues contradict this cue. A common explanation 
for the choice-behavior of these TTB-CCs is that they stop information search at the discovery of the 
best cue and ignore other cues completely.  
 The present results demonstrate, however, that TTB-CCs do not ignore cue information when 
cues are directly accessible (Experiments 1–3), or when task instructions focus on decision accuracy 
(Experiment 2). In the present experiments, information about a supposedly TTB-irrelevant cue, the 
next-best cue, affected the decision behavior of TTB-CCs in several ways: TTB-CCs took more time 
for their decisions (Experiments 1a, 1b, and 3), they bet less on their decisions (Experiment 1b), and 
they showed lower decision confidence (Experiment 3), when information from the best and the next-
best cue conflicted than when it converged. In addition to finding that TTB-CCs do not ignore easily 
available cue information, Experiment 3 yielded novel insights into how TTB-CCs process available 
information. We found first evidence that TTB-CCs inhibit conflicting information from a less valid 
cue. Although inhibition has garnered a lot of attention within the field of cognitive psychology, and 
evidence for inhibitory processes has been reported for tasks involving selective attention (research on 
negative priming; Tipper, 2001) or memory (Veling & van Knippenberg, 2004), the present 
experiment, to our knowledge, is the first to demonstrate inhibitory processes in the context of TTB-
decision-making. 
 Regarding the question of when TTB-CCs do or do not ignore information, Experiments 1a 
and 1b revealed that information availability plays an important role: When information about cues 
was directly accessible, TTB-CCs did not ignore it; yet, when information about single cues had to be 
acquired sequentially, TTB-CCs behaved more in line with the TTB-stopping-rule, that is, they often 
ignored TTB-irrelevant cues. This observation—that the same TTB-CCs do not ignore information 
when it is directly accessible, but become more likely to ignore information when information search 
is sequential—suggests that TTB-CCs adaptively adjust their information-search behavior as a 
function of information availability. As the sequential search for information may require more time 
and may thus be considered more effortful than the processing of openly displayed information (e.g., 
Lohse & Johnson, 1996), this finding also fits nicely with the notion of an effort-accuracy trade-off in 
decision making (e.g., Payne et al., 1988). In this regard then the amount of information accumulated 
by a decision maker is a function of the effort required to accumulate the information. 
Results of Experiment 2 further support the adaptive nature of TTB-CCs’ information-search 
behavior and point to another condition under which TTB-CCs become more likely to not ignore 
information. When the focus of the task was on decision accuracy, TTB-CCs acquired more cues than 
when the focus was on decision speed. 
Relation to Previous Research 
 The finding that TTB-CCs do not ignore information when cues are directly accessible is 
consistent with previous research demonstrating that TTB-CCs are sensitive to the consistency of 
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easily available cue information (Glöckner & Betsch, 2012; Glöckner et al., 2014; Söllner et al., 
2014).  
Furthermore, in addition to showing that TTB-CCs do not ignore information when it is easily 
available, we also showed that, when cue information access is more effortful (sequential search), 
TTB-CCs become somewhat more likely to ignore information. In line with findings by Söllner and 
Bröder (2015), however, our TTB-CCs did not consistently stop their sequential information search 
after acquiring the best cue. Importantly, whereas in previous research either a task format with 
simultaneous cue presentation or a task format with sequential search was used (Glöckner & Betsch, 
2008a), in the present research we varied the task format within participants. This enabled us to 
explore the decision behavior of decision makers under varying conditions of information availability 
(or processing effort) and, in this regard, to explore the adaptive nature of their behavior.  
 The finding that decision makers of Experiment 2 acquired less cue information under speed 
than under accuracy instructions mirrors the results of previous studies on adaptive decision making 
(Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a; Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999). In these studies, however, the restriction of 
information search under time pressure was accompanied by a shift in strategies—that is, a shift from 
WADD to TTB. In the present research, we found no evidence that WADD-/EQW-CCs switched to a 
TTB strategy under speed instructions. Rather, decision makers of our experiments (irrespective of 
their strategies) were highly consistent in their strategy use across different conditions—an 
observation more in line with findings of routine effects in decision making (Bröder & Schiffer, 2006). 
As already mentioned, an important difference between our time pressure manipulation and the one 
used in previous research is that the latter imposed an explicit time limit on participants’ decisions 
whereas no time limits were set in our study. It seems reasonable that the explicit time limit in 
previous research required participants to restrict their information search to a minimum so that a 
TTB-like strategy became preferable to the majority of participants (even those participants who 
otherwise would have preferred a WADD-like strategy). Without explicit time limit, however, as in 
our study, there was no objective constraint that would have terminated the decision process 
automatically. Although our findings showed that WADD-CCs restricted their information search 
under time pressure, they nevertheless searched for enough cues to figure out whether a highly valid 
cue could have been compensated for by less valid cues.  
Another difference between our experiment and previous research that might explain the 
discrepancies between the findings relates to the different ways in which participants learned the cue 
validities. In previous research, cue validities were conveyed via instructions and participants received 
no choice feedback. In the present experiments, participants learned the validities in a feedback 
learning phase. It seems likely that already during the learning phase, participants adopted a certain 
decision strategy. That is, some participants (TTB-CCs) may have paid particular attention to only one 
cue and specifically relied on this cue to make their decisions; others may have divided their attention 
more equally among cues and took into account information from all cues (WADD-/EQW-CCs). This 
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could also explain why the cue utility ratings showed larger dispersions for TTB-CCs than for 
WADD-/EQW-CCs. That is, paying particular attention to, and relying on only one cue during 
learning (TTB) may have distorted the perception of the actual cue validities (i.e., perceiving higher 
dispersion among cue validities than there actually were in the environment). In the learning phase of 
our experiment, the WADD- and the TTB-strategy performed equally well (i.e., they made identical 
choice predictions) and the choice feedback participants received during learning therefore should not 
have favored one strategy over the other. However, it should be noted that there was a positive 
correlation among cues in our learning environment, and it has been shown that, under these 
conditions, a single-cue strategy like TTB fares quite well in predicting choices (Davis-Stober, Dana, 
& Bodescu, 2010). It is therefore possible, that the positive correlation among the cues in the learning 
phase may have biased some participants toward using a TTB-like learning strategy.
3
 More research is 
necessary, to examine how participants learn cue validities, and whether participants adopt different 
learning strategies.
4
 
Theoretical Implications 
 For the present research, we considered EAMs as an overarching framework to account for the 
decision behavior of TTB-CCs and WADD-/EQW-CCs under varying conditions. The finding that 
TTB-CCs and WADD-CCs are sensitive to the consistency of easily available cue information is 
consistent with an EAM account assuming that participants process cue information completely; but 
whereas TTB-CCs weight the cues in a non-compensatory way, WADD-CCs weight the cues in a 
compensatory way. This finding is also consistent with the neural network model proposed by 
Glöckner et al. (2014; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a, 2012), which likewise supposes that TTB-CCs and 
WADD-CCs differ in their cue weightings (non-compensatory vs. compensatory). Like EAMs, the 
parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) model predicts that decision time and confidence depend on the 
consistency of cue information. Unlike EAMs, however, which assume that information processing is 
sequential, PCS assumes that information is processed holistically and in parallel. PCS is thus 
specifically suited for decision tasks where cue information is simultaneously presented. When 
information search happens sequentially, as was also the case in the present experiments, it is less 
clear which predictions can be derived from the PCS model.  
In the task with sequential search, we found that TTB-CCs acquired less cue information than 
did WADD-/EQW-CCs. This observation is consistent with the unifying EAM proposed by Lee and 
Cummins (2004; Newell & Lee, 2011), which assumes that TTB-CCs have lower decision thresholds 
than WADD-/EQW-CCs and therefore stop information search sooner than WADD-/EQW-CCs (see 
also Söllner & Bröder, 2015). Although the unifying model can explain the present findings from the 
sequential search task, it has difficulties to explain the findings from the task with directly accessible 
cue information—where our findings suggest that TTB-CCs do not stop information search at the 
discovery of the best cue. Specifically, the unifying model is based on the assumption that all 
participants weight the cues by their objective validities; that is, the model does not suppose any 
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differences in cue weightings. Given that the objective validities of a decision environment are 
compensatory (as it was the case in our experiments), the unifying model predicts that participants 
who process cue information completely integrate the cues in a compensatory manner which 
necessarily leads to choices as predicted by WADD. Our results suggest, however, that some 
participants (which we termed TTB-CCs) process cue information completely and nevertheless go 
with the best cue. In our view, the unifying model could be reconciled with our findings by allowing 
for differences in the way in which participants weight cues (i.e., by taking into account subjective cue 
weights). Indeed, although TTB-CCs and WADD-CCs did not differ in their cue-utility rankings, the 
observation that TTB-CCs and WADD-/EQW-CCs showed a consistent tendency to perceive higher 
cue dispersion corroborates our assumption of individual differences in cue weightings, at least in 
terms of the dispersion of the weightings. It should be noted, however, that TTB-CCs’ sensitivity to 
information consistency only suggests that their decision threshold (or at least the decision threshold 
of some of the TTB-CCs) is higher than the threshold implied by the TTB-stopping-rule. This does not 
necessarily imply that the decision thresholds of TTB-CCs and WADD-CCs are equal. It could be, for 
example, that in case of conflicting information, WADD-CCs try to solve the conflict by deliberately 
re-considering and re-evaluating the information (i.e., high threshold), whereas TTB-CCs may solve 
the conflict by quickly relying on the best cue instead of re-evaluating the information (i.e., lower 
threshold). When information is openly presented to decision makers (compared to when it is 
sequentially acquired), it is difficult to say how decision makers actually process the information (e.g., 
information search and amount). That said, it is safe to conclude from the present findings that TTB-
CCs did not ignore information and this suggests higher decision thresholds for TTB-CCs than implied 
by the TTB-stopping-rule.  
Different Strategies, Single Process, or Both? 
There is an ongoing debate on whether decision making is better reflected by different 
strategies, such as TTB, WADD or EQW, or a single process such as evidence accumulation or 
parallel constraint satisfaction (Glöckner et al., 2014; Lee & Cummins, 2004; Söllner et al., 2014; 
Söllner & Bröder, 2015). Our research suggests that the two views need not necessarily be mutually 
exclusive. The finding that decision makers are generally sensitive to the consistency of easily 
available cue information suggests that information integration, as suggested by EAMs or PCS, is one 
process underlying the decision behavior of decision makers in general.  
Despite this commonality, however, we also found an interesting difference between the 
decision behavior of TTB-CCs on one hand and WADD-/EQW-CCs on the other hand. Specifically, 
we found that TTB-CCs inhibit cue information that conflicts with their decisions, whereas no 
evidence of an inhibition process was found for WADD-/EQW-CCs. The idea that decision-
inconsistent information is inhibited is closely related to the idea proposed by PCS that decision 
makers strive for coherence during decision making (Glöckner, Betsch, & Schindler, 2010). This 
coherence-striving process supposes a reciprocal relation between the evaluation of the cues (their 
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perceived utilities) and the final choice: The evaluation of the cues affects the final choice, but the 
choice also affects the final evaluation of the cues in a way that information inconsistent with the 
chosen option will be “devalued”. In this regard, PCS could explain the inhibition findings of our 
TTB-CCs. That is, in order to make a coherent choice and to maximize the difference between the two 
choice options, TTB-CCs inhibit the inconsistent information about the non-chosen option. 
Importantly, however, PCS would suggest that this coherence-striving process should be present in all 
decision makers, that is, TTB-CCs and WADD-/EQW-CCs alike. Note that for the pairs we 
considered for our inhibition hypothesis both TTB-CCs and WADD-CCs finally chose the option 
favored by the best cue. Thus, according to PCS both TTB-CCs and WADD-CCs should have 
inhibited information about the inconsistent next-best cue, because this information conflicted with 
their choices. Our findings suggest, however, that inhibition is of less importance for WADD-/EQW-
CCs. We suggested that for TTB-CCs, the best discriminating cue has a rule-like function, as it 
consistently drives the choices of these decision makers. It seems reasonable to us, therefore, to 
assume that TTB-CCs consciously follow a TTB-decision-rule. For WADD-/EQW-CCs, the best 
discriminating cue is not tied to a certain rule. TTB-CCs are therefore supposed to experience a 
cognitive conflict when the next-best cue is inconsistent with the best discriminating cue; and they 
may want to reduce this conflict by suppressing the decision-inconsistent information. For WADD-
/EQW-CCs, an inconsistent next-best cue may be perceived as less conflicting, because WADD-
/EQW-CCs have no decision rule related to the best cue with which the next-best cue might conflict. 
WADD-/EQW-CCs may therefore not necessarily need to inhibit decision-inconsistent information, at 
least not to the extent that TTB-CCs do.  
The assumption of deliberate or rule-like processes, which we suggest may differ between 
TTB-CCs and WADD-CCs and could therefore account for the difference in inhibition, is not taken 
into account by PCS. Rather, PCS argues for a single, automatic coherence-striving process. We think 
that striving for coherence is indeed an important mechanism underlying the decision behavior of 
decision makers in general, as suggested by PCS. But the single coherence-striving process alone 
cannot explain why for some decision makers, inconsistent information is perceived as more 
conflicting (TTB-CCs) and therefore requires more inhibition than it is for others (WADD-CCs). In 
our view, the additional consideration of more deliberate processes during decision making could 
provide such an explanation. Moreover, it can also explain why it was particularly the inconsistent 
information that affected decision times (slowdown) whereas the consistent information—contrary to 
the coherence-striving assumption—did not: there was no speedup when coherence was increased. 
Specifically, only when the rule ‘to go with the best cue’ is conflicted by additional information, an 
additional time consuming process (inhibition) seems to be required, whereas no additional processes 
seem to be necessary when additional information is neutral or confirming. Although more research is 
certainly necessary to deepen our understanding of the specific nature of decision processes, we think 
that taking into account more deliberate or rule-like processes when investigating decision making 
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may provide a fruitful avenue for future research. Importantly, however, the idea of deliberate and 
inhibitory processes during decision making does not contradict the assumption that information is 
accumulated and integrated until a certain threshold is reached (EAM) or that information is 
automatically integrated in parallel on the basis of a coherence-striving process (PCS) (see also 
Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b, for another view on how deliberate and automatic processes might co-exist 
during decision making). Yet the decision processes might probably be more complex than assumed 
by these models. Specifically, in addition to automatic information integration processes, more 
deliberate and post-integrational processes (inhibition) also seem to be at work during decision making 
and contribute to the specific decision patterns observed in groups of decision makers whose decisions 
are consistent with different decision strategies.   
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Footnotes 
1
The strategy-classification approach requires a decision researcher to determine a set of 
decision strategies that participants might potentially apply and that are of interest for the research 
question. We focused on TTB, WADD, and EQW here, because they are commonly considered in 
decision research and because they were of most interest for our research question. Another class of 
decision strategies that has received some attention in decision research is the class of exemplar-based 
strategies. However, recent research using similar or identical stimulus material as we did, similar 
decision environments (linear), and similar decision tasks (paired comparison task) found only little 
support for exemplar-based decision strategies (Nosofsky & Bergert, 2007; Pachur & Olsson, 2013). 
Thus, assuming that exemplar-based strategies may probably only have played a minor for the type of 
decision task we used, we did not additionally test for these strategies.  
2
For all experiments, an initial overall ANOVA was conducted with decision strategy as 
between-subjects factor. In all experiments, the three-way interaction between decision strategy, best 
discriminating cue, and next-best cue was significant, ps < 0.026. For the sake of conciseness, 
however, only the follow-up analyses for the separate groups are reported in this paper. 
 
3
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this careful observation and interpretation 
4An analysis of participants’ decision times of the validity learning phase provides initial 
support for our assumption that participants used different strategies already during learning. 
Specifically, participants later classified as TTB-CCs were found to make faster decisions on a 
learning trial (M = 4.63, SE = 2.27) than participants later classified as WADD-/EQW-CCs (M = 5.74, 
SE = 2.51), F(1, 44) = 6.017, p = 0.018, η2 = 0.11.  
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Appendix A 
Table A.1 
Individual Orders of Cue Acquisition and Decision Strategies in Test Phase 2 of Experiment 
1a. 
 
 
Order of acquired cues 
Participant 
Decision 
strategy 
First Second Third Last 
1 TTB 1.00 2.10 2.89 - 
2 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 - 
3 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 - 
4 WADD 1.20 1.95 3.72 3.06 
5 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.25 3.25 
6 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 - 
7 WADD 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
8 TTB 1.07 2.00 3.00 - 
9 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 - 
10 WADD 1.05 1.98 2.97 4.00 
11 WADD 1.00 2.00 3.09 3.82 
12 WADD 1.00 2.05 3.10 3.84 
13 EQW 1.98 1.25 2.82 4.00 
14 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.12 3.00 
15 WADD 1.00 2.08 2.92 4.00 
16 EQW 1.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 
17 TTB 1.02 1.95 3.00 - 
18 EQW 1.00 2.88 2.13 4.00 
19 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 - 
20 WADD 1.32 1.90 3.11 3.56 
21 TTB 1.07 1.95 2.88 3.00 
22 EQW 2.15 3.85 1.00 3.00 
23 TTB 1.02 1.95 3.00 - 
24 TTB 1.07 2.27 2.92 3.89 
25 TTB 1.02 1.95 3.00 - 
26 TTB 1.07 2.03 2.82 3.86 
27 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
28 TTB 1.20 1.90 2.87 3.80 
29 TTB 1.00 3.00 - - 
30 WADD 1.00 2.00 3.02 3.96 
31 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 - 
32 TTB 1.07 1.97 3.07 3.67 
33 TTB 1.00 3.00 2.00 - 
34 TTB 1.68 2.09 3.00 - 
35 WADD 1.07 1.92 3.08 3.89 
36 TTB 1.00 2.16 3.09 2.00 
37 WADD 1.00 2.10 2.94 3.92 
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38 TTB 1.07 2.00 2.75 - 
39 EQW 1.98 1.11 3.00 - 
40 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 - 
41 TTB 1.00 2.05 2.89 - 
42 WADD 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
43 WADD 1.00 2.10 2.89 4.00 
44 WADD 1.05 2.00 2.94 4.00 
45 TTB 1.05 2.00 3.00 - 
46 WADD 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
47 TTB 1.02 1.95 3.12 3.00 
48 unclassified 1.00 2.00 3.05 3.94 
49 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 - 
Note. TTB = take the best; WADD = weighted additive; EQW = equal weights. 
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Appendix B 
Table B.1 
Individual Orders of Cue Acquisition and Decision Strategies in Test Phase 2 of Experiment 1b 
  Order of acquired cues 
Participant 
Decision 
strategy 
First Second Third Fourth 
1 WADD 1.00 2.06 2.96 3.92 
2 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
3 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 - 
4 WADD 1.00 2.06 3.00 3.88 
5 EQW 3.94 2.09 2.96 1.00 
6 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 - 
7 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
8 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 - 
9 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.12 3.00 
10 WADD 1.00 2.07 3.06 3.89 
11 TTB 1.00 3.00 2.23 3.20 
12 WADD 1.00 2.09 3.00 3.86 
13 WADD 1.00 2.00 3.13 3.73 
14 WADD 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
15 WADD 1.00 2.03 2.96 4.00 
16 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 - 
17 TTB 1.09 2.03 2.91 4.00 
18 WADD 2.00 2.14 3.14 2.58 
19 TTB 1.00 2.12 2.78 - 
20 EQW 1.78 2.03 2.81 3.35 
21 WADD 1.12 1.97 2.9 4.00 
22 EQW 1.09 2.03 3.03 3.90 
23 TTB 1.06 1.94 3.17 3.69 
24 WADD 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
25 TTB 1.16 1.85 3.00 4.00 
26 WADD 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
27 EQW 1.00 3.91 3.03 2.20 
28 WADD 1.25 1.97 2.88 3.91 
29 WADD 1.09 2.03 2.93 3.89 
30 TTB 1.03 1.97 3.00 4.00 
31 EQW 2.41 2.22 2.00 3.38 
32 WADD 1.00 3.94 2.03 3.03 
33 WADD 1.00 2.03 3.00 3.95 
34 EQW 1.00 3.00 4.00 2.00 
35 unclassified 1.16 2.06 2.76 4.00 
36 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 - 
37 WADD 1.44 2.12 3.10 3.20 
38 TTB 1.00 3.19 2.54 3.00 
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39 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
40 WADD 1.00 2.03 2.96 4.00 
41 WADD 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
42 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
43 WADD 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
44 WADD 1.00 2.00 3.07 3.94 
45 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 - 
46 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
47 TTB 1.12 1.94 2.90 4.00 
48 TTB 1.00 2.10 2.86 4.00 
49 EQW 1.19 3.72 2.19 2.91 
50 WADD 1.03 1.97 3.00 4.00 
51 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
52 TTB 1.00 2.13 3.08 3.33 
53 TTB 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
54 EQW 3.41 2.47 2.56 1.72 
55 EQW 2.06 3.69 3.13 - 
56 WADD 1.03 2.03 3.06 3.82 
57 TTB 1.00 2.14 3.00 4.00 
58 WADD 1.00 2.09 2.93 4.00 
59 TTB 1.09 3.56 2.71 2.6 
60 TTB 1.06 2.09 3.15 3.67 
61 EQW 1.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 
62 WADD 1.12 2.03 2.9 4.00 
63 WADD 1.03 3.03 1.97 3.97 
64 unclassified 1.03 1.97 3.04 4.00 
65 TTB 1.00 2.07 3.07 4.00 
66 TTB 1.03 1.94 3.00 - 
67 TTB 3.72 3.00 1.22 2.06 
68 TTB 1.00 2.06 2.94 3.75 
69 WADD 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
70 WADD 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 
Note. TTB = take the best; WADD = weighted additive; EQW = equal weights. 
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Abstract 
Take-the-best (TTB) is a decision strategy according to which attributes about choice options are 
sequentially processed in descending order of validity, and attribute processing is stopped once an attribute 
discriminates between options. Consequently, TTB-decisions rely on only one, the best discriminating, 
attribute, and lower-valid attributes need not be processed because they are TTB-irrelevant. Recent 
research suggests, however, that when attribute information is visually present during decision-making, 
TTB-irrelevant attributes are processed and integrated into decisions nonetheless. To examine whether 
TTB-irrelevant attributes are retrieved and integrated when decisions are made memory-based, we tested 
whether the consistency of a TTB-irrelevant attribute affects TTB users’ decision behavior in a memory-
based decision-task. Participants first learned attribute configurations of several options. Afterwards, they 
made several decisions between two of the options, and we manipulated conflict between the second-best 
attribute and the TTB-decision. We assessed participants’ decision confidence and the proportion of TTB-
inconsistent choices. According to TTB, TTB-irrelevant attributes should not affect confidence and 
choices, because these attributes should not be retrieved. Results showed, however, that TTB-users were 
less confident and made more TTB-inconsistent choices when TTB-irrelevant information was in conflict 
with the TTB-decision than when it was not, suggesting that TTB-users retrieved and integrated TTB-
irrelevant information.  
Keywords: Decision making, Memory-based decisions, Take-the-best strategy, Evidence accumulation, 
Parallel constraint satisfaction 
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Take-the-best and the Influence of Decision-inconsistent Attributes on Decision Confidence and Choices 
in Memory-based Decisions  
 
Facing a choice between two options, decision makers often have knowledge about decision-
relevant attributes associated with the options, which they may retrieve from memory. For example, being 
asked whether Berlin or Frankfurt has the larger population, one might know that Berlin is the capital of 
Germany and has an airport (coded as 1-1), whereas Frankfurt is not the capital, but also has an airport (0-
1). Information about these attributes can be used to make a decision, and decision-making researchers 
suggested different decision strategies as to how this information may be used (Payne, Bettman, & 
Johnson, 1988). According to the take-the-best heuristic (TTB; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 1999), decision 
makers search their memories for information about the most valid attribute first—that is, the attribute 
most predictive of the criterion (e.g., the attribute ‘being the capital’ in case of the criterion ‘population 
size’). The options are compared on this attribute and if it discriminates (Berlin is the capital, Frankfurt 
not), memory search is stopped (stopping-rule). At this point, so the assumption, no further attributes are 
retrieved and the option with the critical attribute value is chosen (decision-rule). If the most valid 
attribute had not discriminated, memory would have been searched for information about the second-most 
valid attribute (e.g., having an airport) and so on, until a discriminating attribute was found (search-rule).   
 Due to the stopping rule, TTB considers only part of the options’ attributes. In decision-making 
research, TTB is often contrasted with decision strategies that take into account all attributes, such as the 
weighted-additive strategy (WADD). Using WADD, decision makers would retrieve all decision-relevant 
attributes associated with the options, weight (multiply) each attribute by its validity and sum up the 
products for each option. The option with the higher weighted sum would then be chosen. With regard to 
the Berlin-Frankfurt example, decision makers would thus have to retrieve all four attribute values for 
WADD but only two for TTB. If people consider all attributes but weight them equally they use an equal-
weight strategy (EQW). Differences between TTB and other strategies have been investigated in decision 
contexts where attribute information had to be retrieved from memory (i.e., memory-based inferences; 
e.g., Bröder, Newell, & Platzer, 2010; Platzer & Bröder 2012; Khader, Pachur, & Jost, 2013; Renkewitz & 
Jahn, 2012), but also in contexts where attribute information was visually presented to participants 
throughout decision making (i.e., inferences from given information; e.g., Lee & Cummins, 2004; Newell 
& Shanks, 2003; Söllner, Bröder, Glöckner, & Betsch, 2014). Bröder and Schiffer (2003b) compared the 
two types of contexts and found that participants are more likely to use a TTB strategy when attributes 
have to be retrieved from memory than when the same attributes are visually present while participants 
make their decisions.  They therefore suggest that TTB reduces the costs of information search (i.e., it 
reduces memory retrieval) and may thus be preferred for memory-based decisions.  
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 However, recent research on memory-based decision making found evidence for an automatic 
retrieval of complete attribute information even during TTB-decision-making (Khaderet al.,  2013). For 
example, Khader et al. (2013) asked participants to learn several items (companies) each of which was 
described by a distinct attribute-value pattern (e.g., company location, company manager, etc.). 
Importantly, the companies differed regarding the number of to-be-associated attributes, with the number 
ranging from one to three. After learning, participants were presented with company pairs and were asked 
to choose the prospectively more successful company on the basis of their acquired attribute knowledge. 
For their decisions, participants were instructed to follow a TTB strategy. The analysis of decision times 
revealed that, the more attributes were associated with the to-be-compared companies the longer it took 
participants to decide. For instance, in cases where, according to TTB, participants had to inspect only one 
attribute, participants made faster decisions when the to-be-compared companies were associated with 
only one attribute than when the companies were associated with two or three attributes. The authors 
interpreted these results as evidence for an automatic retrieval of complete attribute information even 
when participants were instructed to use a TTB strategy and thus to stop information search.   
From Khader et al.’s (2013) findings that decisions take longer when the number of attributes per 
option increase, it becomes evident that TTB-irrelevant attributes are (automatically) retrieved even during 
TTB-decision-making. It remains unclear, however, how deeply this supposedly irrelevant attribute 
information is processed. It could be, for instance, that TTB-irrelevant attributes become activated but are 
then completely ignored while making the decision. In line with this idea, one could assume that the 
prolonged decision times reflect participants’ attempt to ignore the irrelevant information. Ignoring easily 
available but irrelevant information requires inhibitory effort (e.g., Platzer & Bröder, 2012) which may 
come with decision-time costs. Alternatively, participants may not ignore automatically retrieved 
attributes but integrate them into their decisions. If so, the retrieved TTB-irrelevant attributes, though they 
may not necessarily alter a participants’ decisions, they may affect decision-related processing, such as the 
confidence with which a decision is made. In line with this idea, the present study investigated how the 
consistency of attribute information will affect higher-order processing of participants who consistently 
make choices in line with TTB (referred to as TTB-consistent choosers, TTB-CCs). Because we were 
interested in effects of information quality and not information quantity, unlike Khader et al. (2013) we 
held the number of attributes associated with each decision option constant across all options and 
examined how the consistency of a supposedly TTB-irrelevant attribute—the next-best attribute—affects 
participants' decision confidence. In detail, the decision options of our task were all described on four 
attributes, and the next-best attribute was either consistent with the best discriminating attribute (e.g., 1-1-
0-0 vs. 0-0-0-0) or inconsistent (1-0-0-0 vs. 0-1-0-0), or did not discriminate any further (e.g., 1-0-0-0 vs. 
0-0-0-0). We further manipulated the validity rank of the best discriminating attribute, that is, whether it 
was the most valid, the second-most valid or the third-most valid attribute. Further, rather than instructing 
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participants to use a specific strategy (as in Khader et al., 2013), we classified participants on the basis of 
their individual choice patterns into those who consistently make choices in line with TTB (TTB-CCs) and 
those who consistently make choices in line with WADD (WADD-CCs) or EQW (EQW-CCs). To this 
end, our decision task further included pairs for which TTB and WADD/EQW make opposing choice 
predictions, such as (1-0-0-0 vs. 0-1-1-1), and we used a well-established strategy-classification  method 
(Bröder & Schiffer, 2003a, 2003b; Bröder & Gaissmaier, 2007; Bröder, Newell, & Platzer, 2010), which 
is described in detail in the Results section. Note however, that we use the terms TTB-CCs and WADD- 
/EQW-CCs only to refer to the outcomes (i.e., choices) associated with the different strategies and not to 
the specific processes suggested by these strategies (i.e., the TTB-stopping-rule). That is, participants 
classified as TTB-CCs made choices consistent with TTB; but this classification does not necessarily 
imply that TTB-CCs ignored TTB-irrelevant information, as implied by the TTB-stopping-rule. Our 
interpretation of the classification outcomes thus involves fewer assumptions than the assumptions 
imposed in previous research—where it has commonly been assumed that TTB-CCs ignored information 
(e.g., Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b).  Our main dependent variable was the confidence with which decisions 
were made. 
The theory of Probabilistic Mental Models (PMM; Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbölting, 1991) 
predicts that the confidence with which TTB-CCs make decisions solely depends on the validity rank of 
the best discriminating attribute: The higher the validity of the best discriminating attribute is the more 
confident TTB-CCs should be. TTB-irrelevant attributes, in contrast, should not affect decision confidence 
because they are assumed not to be retrieved (as implied by the TTB-stopping-rule). However, the finding 
of a complete attribute retrieval (Khader et al., 2013) suggests that the confidence of TTB-CCs may 
additionally be affected by the supposedly irrelevant next-best attribute. For example, evidence 
accumulation models (EAMs; e.g., Busemeyer & Johnson, 2004; Lee & Cummins, 2004) or Parallel 
Constraint Satisfaction models (PCS; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008; Glöckner & Hodges, 2011) assume that 
information available to a decision maker (e.g., when being retrieved) becomes automatically integrated 
during decision making. In this regard, TTB-CCs who retrieve attributes completely may be assumed to 
integrate the attributes by using non-compensatory weights, whereas WADD-CCs may be assumed to 
integrate the attributes by using compensatory weights.  Decision confidence, according to EAMs or PCS, 
is said to be a function of the difference in evidence between the two choice options. Thus, relative to a 
non-discriminating next-best attribute, a consistent next-best attribute should increase decision confidence 
(higher evidence difference), whereas an inconsistent next-best attribute should decrease decision 
confidence (lower evidence difference; Glöckner & Betsch, 2012). Moreover, assuming that TTB-CCs 
weight the attributes in a non-compensatory manner and thus perceive relatively large differences among 
the attributes' validities, EAMs and PCS also predict that TTB-CCs' decision confidence would increase 
with the validity of the best discriminating attribute (as suggested by PMM).  
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Söllner, et al. (2014; see also Glöckner & Betsch, 2012; Glöckner, Hilbig, & Jekel, 2014) recently 
found evidence that TTB-CCs are affected by TTB-irrelevant information as predicted by EAMs. In their 
task, attribute information had to be purchased by participants and was visually presented to them 
throughout decision making on an information board (i.e., inferences from given information). On some 
trials, however, information about TTB-irrelevant attributes popped up for free. This information was 
either consistent or inconsistent with the best attribute. In line with EAMs/PCS, TTB-CCs were found to 
be less confident with their decisions when cue information was inconsistent than when it was consistent. 
Furthermore, participants were found to make more TTB-inconsistent choices when cue information was 
inconsistent rather than consistent, indicating that supposedly choice-irrelevant information became 
integrated not only for post-choice confidence judgments but also for the choices themselves (i.e., pre-
choice integration). This latter finding is also in line with EAMs assuming a probabilistic choice-rule. That 
is, the probability for making a TTB-consistent choice depends on the evidence difference between two 
decision options: The lower the evidence difference is, the lower is the probability for making a TTB-
consistent choice.  
In sum, the results from the aforementioned studies suggest that, at least when decisions are made 
from given information, TTB-CCs do not ignore TTB-irrelevant information. In the present study, we 
examined whether the findings by Söllner et al. (2014) extend to memory-based decisions—i.e., where the 
options’ attributes have to be retrieved from memory rather than being visually present during decision 
making.  Specifically, we examined whether decision confidence of TTB-CCs as well as their choices 
would be affected by the consistency of information considered to be irrelevant by TTB, which would 
indicate that those decision makers retrieved and, more importantly, that they integrated attribute 
information. Using a memory-based decision task, Glöckner and Hodges (2011) found that a large 
proportion of their participants integrated attribute information as suggested by PCS. In this study, 
however, participants were predominantly classified as WADD on the basis of their choices. Note that the 
choices of WADD-CCs indicate already that those participants retrieved attribute information completely. 
This is not the case for TTB-CCs though. TTB-CCs may have made their choices either because they 
ignored attributes lower in validity than the best discriminating attribute (as implied by the TTB-stopping-
rule) or because they retrieved attribute information completely and integrated it in a non-compensatory 
way (which may suggest that the decision behavior of TTB-CCs are probably better be described by some 
kind of evidence accumulation strategy). Therefore, the main goal of this study was to examine the 
decision behavior of TTB-CCs in order to get a better understanding of the cognitive processes underling 
their decisions. 
Method 
Participants 
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Seventy-four students (62 female) participated for either partial course credit or monetary 
compensation (10€). An additional bonus up to 4€ could be earned, contingent on task performance. Mean 
age was 21.16 (18–33).  
Materials and Design 
 The general setup and cover story was similar to that of Bröder and Schiffer (2003b). Participants 
were told that a murder had been committed and that there were nine male suspects. Participants initially 
learned to associate each of the nine suspects with a distinct attribute-value pattern, consisting of three 
clothing articles and a car (attributes and possible attribute values were headpiece: hat or beret, coat: 
jacket or blouson, shoes: loafers or leather shoes, and car: Mini Cooper or Beetle). They then received 
information about the ranking of the attributes’ validities which, as in previous studies (e.g., Platzer & 
Bröder, 2012), was determined by the level of agreement among eyewitnesses
1
. Finally, participants 
performed a decision phase, in which they were presented with pairs of suspects and had to choose the 
more suspicious one, given their knowledge about the suspects' attributes and the attributes' validities. 
Because we wanted to investigate how participants behave when they use the decision strategies that most 
naturally occur to them, we did not instruct participants to use a specific strategy, as Khader et al. (2013) 
did. Instead, as in previous decision-making studies (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003b; Bröder & Gaissmaier, 
2007; Platzer & Bröder, 2012), we had participants spontaneously adopt their decision strategies and then 
classified them based on whether they relied on only the best attribute to make their choices—TTB—, or 
considered all attributes—WADD/EQW.  
Table 1 depicts the attribute patterns of the nine suspects. The attributes differed regarding their 
validity, with Attribute 1 being the most valid attribute, Attribute 2 the second-most valid, and so on. The 
value “1” in Table 1 denotes the critical attribute value, that is, the specific item indicative of 
suspiciousness. Assignment of the validities to the clothing articles and cars was randomly determined for 
each participant anew, as was assignment of the critical attribute values to the specific items.  
For the decision phase, the nine suspects were combined to pairs that differed with regard to (1) 
whether Attribute 1, Attribute 2, or Attribute 3 was the best discriminating attribute and (2) whether the 
next-best attribute was inconsistent or consistent with the best one, or did not discriminate. This resulted 
in the nine pairs listed in Table 2, which represent a full two-factorial design with the factors rank of the 
best discriminating attribute and status of the next-best attribute orthogonally crossed. Furthermore, 
another six pairs were created and only for whose so called diagnostic pairs the different decision 
                                                          
1
 Specifically, participants were told that 20 eyewitnesses had been interrogated and consensus was highest for 
Attribute 1 (e.g., shoes), second-highest for Attribute 2 (e.g.., coat), and so on. We provided participants only with 
the ranking of validities and not with numerical validities (e.g., 0.8, 0.7, etc.), because the latter may have biased 
participants towards either a compensatory or a non-compensatory interpretation of the attribute weights. The 
validity ranking, in contrast, allowed for the possibility that some participants would give most weight to the best 
discriminating attribute (TTB) whereas others would weigh the attributes more equally (WADD or EQW). 
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strategies made opposing choice predictions. The strategies we considered were TTB, WADD, and EQW. 
Table 3 shows the diagnostic pairs for our decision task. For these pairs, TTB predicts selection of Suspect 
A whereas WADD and EQW predict selection of Suspect B. Diagnostic pairs were critical for classifying 
participants into TTB-CCs, WADD-CCs, or EQW-CCs, respectively. For the classification, however, 
participants' choices to all pairs were considered (which further allowed for distinguishing between 
WADD- and EQW-CCs; see Results sections).  
 
Table 1 
Abstract Attribute Patterns Used in the Study 
Attribute patterns Attribute 1 Attribute 2 Attribute 3 Attribute 4 
1 1 1 0 1 
2 1 0 0 1 
3 1 0 0 0 
4 0 1 1 1 
5 0 1 1 0 
6 0 1 0 1 
7 0 1 0 0 
8 0 0 1 1 
9 0 0 0 1 
Note. Attributes 1–4 were the different clothing articles (i.e., headpiece, coat, and shoes) and cars. The values 1 
and 0 were realized as different clothing articles (e.g., hat and beret for headpiece) and cars (Mini Cooper and 
Beetle).  
 
 
Table 2 
Test Pairs Used in the Decision Phase  
  
Next-best attribute 
Best discriminating attribute 
 
Consistent pairs  Inconsistent pairs  Non-discriminating 
  
Option A Option B  Option A Option B  Option A Option B 
Attribute 1  1101 0001  1001 0101  1001 0001 
Attribute 2  0111 0001  0101 0011  1101 1001 
Attribute 3  0111 0100  0110 0101  0110 0100 
Note. Options A and B were the two suspects participants had to choose between. Attributes 1, 2, 3 were the different 
clothing articles and cars associated with the suspect. 
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Table 3 
Diagnostic Pairs Used in the 
Decision Phase 
Diagnostic pairs 
Option A Option B 
1000 0111 
1000 0110 
1000 0101 
1000 0011 
1001 0111 
0100 0011 
 
Our main dependent variable for the decision phase was participants’ decision confidence. 
Therefore, each of the nine test pairs (cf. cells in Table 2) was presented four times in the decision phase, 
and participants were asked to indicate their confidence for two out of the four presentations. Furthermore, 
to increase the reliability of the choice-based strategy classification, the six diagnostic pairs were repeated 
once. Thus, the decision phase consisted of 48 trials (4 × 9 test pairs + 2 ×  6 diagnostic pairs). 
Presentation order of the 48 pairs was determined randomly for each participant with the following 
constraints. (1) Each time a test pair was repeated all other test pairs had to be presented once. (2) A 
diagnostic pair was not repeated until all diagnostic pairs had been presented once. (3) Between a pair and 
its repetition had to be at least six other pairs, hence reducing the likelihood that participants recalled an 
earlier decision to a pair to make their actual decision. (4) Pairs that had one attribute pattern in common 
(e.g., 0-1-1-0 vs. 0-1-0-1 and 0-1-1-0 vs. 0-1-0-0) could not directly follow each other.  
Furthermore, as in Söllner et al. (2014), we also considered the proportion of TTB-inconsistent 
choices as a dependent variable, and we examined whether/how the choice-behavior of TTB-CCs is 
influenced by the consistency of the next-best attribute.  
Procedure 
 First, participants learned which clothing articles and car was associated with each suspect. On 
each trial, participants were presented with the name and portrait of one suspect. Below the portrait, the 
category labels of the four attributes were presented one below the other. Next to each attribute, the two 
attribute values possible for this attribute were presented as response buttons (see Figure 1; note, attribute 
order on screen matched attribute validities). For each attribute, participants were to select the correct 
attribute value associated with the suspect (by clicking the button) – on initial trials by guessing, later by 
recalling. Upon selection of an attribute value, participants received feedback: the correct attribute value 
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was revealed to them (verbally and pictorially). Once all attribute values had been correctly recalled for a 
suspect, the next suspect was presented. Having learned the attribute values of all suspects this way, there 
was a test in which all suspects were presented once and participants had to indicate the correct attribute 
values of each suspect. The learning-plus-test cycles were repeated until memory performance in the test 
was above 89%. Participants not achieving this criterion within one hour were automatically forwarded to 
the subsequent decision phase. In the tests, participants received 1 Cent for each correct attribute value. 
Participants achieving the learning criterion within less than 8 learning-plus-test cycles received an 
additional bonus of 1€. 
 
 
Figure 1. Example trial of the learning phase. On the left side the four attributes were listed (labels were originally in 
German and are translated here). On the right side, participants could select one out of two possible values for the 
respective attributes. Once an attribute value was selected (e.g., beret), the correct attribute value was shown for this 
attribute in the middle of the screen, both verbally and pictorially (e.g., hat). 
  
After the learning phase, participants received information about the attribute validities. They 
were told that the level of agreement among eyewitnesses was highest with regard to Attribute 1 (e.g., 
Shoes), and witnesses reported to have seen a specific attribute value (e.g., loafers); and that level of 
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agreement was second-highest for Attribute 2 (e.g., Headpiece), with a specific attribute value (e.g., hat); 
and so on (see Footnote 1). 
 Participants then performed the decision phase. On each trial, they were presented with the names 
and portraits of two suspects and were to decide which of the suspects was more likely to have committed 
the crime. On half of the decision trials, participants were further asked to indicate their decision 
confidence. Confidence ratings were made on a scale ranging from 1 (very uncertain) to 100 (absolutely 
certain).  
 The decision phase was followed by a final memory test where participants were to recall the 
attribute patterns of all suspects.  
Results 
Attribute Pattern Learning  
Five participants failed to learn the attribute patterns within one hour. They were excluded from 
subsequent analyses leaving N = 69. Mean performance in the final memory test was 87%, indicating that 
attribute patterns were learned reasonably well.    
Decision Phase 
Strategy classification. The classification method by Bröder and Schiffer (2003a) was used to 
identify individual decision strategies. For the classification, a participant's choices on all 48 pairs were 
considered. For the consistent, inconsistent, non-discriminating, and diagnostic pairs (Tables 2 and 3), 
each strategy makes specific choice predictions: For the consistent and non-discriminating pairs, all 
strategies predict selection of Suspect A. For the diagnostic pairs, TTB predicts selection of Suspect A, 
whereas WADD and EQW predict selection of Suspect B. For the inconsistent pairs TTB and WADD 
predict selection of Suspect A; EQW predicts guessing, because both suspects have the same number of 
favorable attributes. In essence, the classification method is a comparative test of the different strategies, 
where each strategy is considered as a multinomial model with the consistent, inconsistent, non-
discriminating and diagnostic pairs as different response categories (i.e., the different response categories 
imply a multinomial distribution of participants' choice patterns). Based on a maximum likelihood 
estimation, for each strategy a strategy-parameter (or its complementary error term), indicating a given 
participant’s probability of applying that strategy, is estimated from the data (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003a). 
In doing so, one can estimate the likelihood of each strategy given a participant’s data, and a participant is 
classified as a user of the strategy with the highest likelihood. Participants for whom two strategies had 
identical likelihoods remained unclassified; furthermore, participants with an error term > 0.4 are 
classified as guessers. 
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The classification analysis revealed a clear preference for TTB, with 60% (n = 41) of participants 
being classified as TTB-CCs, 20% (n = 14) as EQW-CCs, 12% (n = 8) as guessers, 4% (n = 3) as WADD-
CCs, and 4% (n = 3) remained unclassified.
2
 The subsequent analyses of participants’ confidence ratings 
were run separately for the different strategy groups
3
. As there were only three WADD-CCs, EQW and 
WADD were combined into a compensatory strategy group (COMP). Data from unclassified and guessing 
participants were not analyzed.    
Decision confidence. For the analysis of confidence ratings, decisions inconsistent with a 
participant’s strategy were removed (on average, 17%, SD = 9.12). For each of the nine test pairs (cf. 
Table 2), participants gave two confidence ratings. The two ratings were averaged for each pair
4
. The 
design of the confidence ratings was thus a 3 (rank of the best discriminating attribute: Attribute 1, 
Attribute 2, Attribute 3) × 3 (status of the next-best attribute: inconsistent, non-discriminating, consistent) 
within-subjects design. Due to the removal of strategy-inconsistent decisions, however, the full design 
contained missing values (for TTB 12%, SD = 10.06; for COMP 3.27%, SD = 5.22).  
To overcome the problem of missing values, we used a multilevel modelling approach to analyze 
participants’ confidence ratings. Multilevel models (MLM) are extensions of regression models (also 
called hierarchical regressions), and hypothesis testing in MLM follows the same rationale as hypothesis 
testing in regression analyses. The advantage of MLM is that they can be applied to incomplete data sets 
without losing the remaining information from participants with incomplete data. Further, they can 
account for dependencies within a data set and are thus well suited to analyze data from repeated-
measures designs. Dependency in our data was modelled by treating the two experimental factors as being 
nested within the variable participant. The participant variable was treated as a random (Level 2) factor.  
As stated above, hypothesis testing in MLM is done similarly as in regression. That is, our 
outcome variable confidence was regressed on the predictors best discriminating attribute, next-best 
                                                          
2
 Because the classification method is comparative, the classification of a participant as TTB-CC only indicates that 
the choices of this participant were more likely to be produced by a TTB- rather than a WADD-/EQW-strategy. It 
does not tell, however, whether the proportion of TTB-inconsistent choices of a participant classified as TTB-CCs 
significantly deviated from zero. A more conservative approach for classifying a participant as TTB-CC would be to 
only consider choices to the 12 diagnostic pairs (6 different pairs, each presented twice) and to conduct a binomial 
test. The binomial test becomes significant when a participant makes TTB-inconsistent choices in three or more 
cases (p < 0.05). When applying this more conservative classification criterion, of the 41 participants classified as 
TTB-CCs with the Bröder-and-Schiffer method, 27 also had a non-significant binomial test, indicating that they 
chose the non-TTB option by (non-systematic) mistake. As analyzing only these 27 TTB-CCs rather than the 41 
TTB-CCs did not change the present results, we decided to report the analysis of TTB-CCs including all 41 
participants because this classification method is widely used in this research area. The average proportion of TTB-
inconsistent choices was 17% for the 41 TTB-CCs (i.e., 2 out of 12 pairs, which corresponds to a probability of p < 
0.05 using the binomial criterion).  
3
 Separate analyses were conducted because our primary research goal was to specifically examine the effects of 
TTB-irrelevant attributes on the decision-behavior of TTB-CCs. Considering strategy group as between-subjects 
factor would have yielded significant interactions with both within-subject factors. For sake of clarity, therefore, only 
results from the separate analyses are reported.  
4
 The correlation between the two confidence ratings was .70, suggesting that participants were quite consistent in 
their confidence judgments. 
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attribute, and the interaction of both. We tested the significance of the predictors using a stepwise 
procedure.  A Maximum-Likelihood algorithm was used to assess the fit of the model. Changes in model 
fit due to the inclusion of additional factors were assessed with a likelihood ratio test.  
 The confidence ratings of TTB-CCs and COMP-CCs are depicted in Figure 2. Confidence ratings 
of TTB-CCs were significantly affected by both the best attribute, χ2(2) = 20.90, p < 0.001, and the next-
best attribute, χ2(2) = 11.03, p = 0.004. The interaction effect was not significant, χ2(4) = 4.62, p = 0.328. 
The effect of the best attribute was further explored with planned contrasts. Both PMM theory and 
EAMs/PCS predict that decision confidence of TTB-CCs would decrease with the validity of the best 
attribute. A monotonic trend analysis revealed a significant linear trend, b = 9.08, t(79) = 4.82, p < 0.001. 
The quadratic trend was not significant, p = 0.716. Decision confidence of TTB-CCs was highest for 
Attribute 1 as best discriminating attribute (M = 70.94, SE = 1.76) second highest for Attribute 2 (M = 
63.82, SE = 2.00), and lowest for Attribute 3 (M = 57.89, SE = 1.85)
5
.   
 
 
Figure 2. Mean decision confidence for TTB-CCs and COMP-CCs as a function of the validity of best discriminating 
attribute and the consistency of the next-best attribute. Note: TTB = take-the-best; COMP = compensatory strategies. 
 
                                                          
5
 All single comparisons were significant, ps < 0.042. 
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EAMs and PCS predict that relative to a non-discriminating attribute, an inconsistent next-best 
attribute should decrease confidence, and a consistent next-best attribute should increase decision 
confidence. Two contrasts were conducted to test this hypothesis. The first contrast compared the non-
discriminating with the inconsistent condition and revealed a significant effect, b = 7.33, t(201) = 3.33, p = 
0.001. Confidence of TTB-CCs was lower when the next-best attribute was inconsistent (M = 60.69, SE = 
2.22) than when it was non-discriminating (M = 68.22, SE = 1.70). The second contrast compared the non-
discriminating with the consistent condition and revealed no significant effect, b = 3.10, t(201) = 1.46, p = 
0.145. Descriptively, confidence ratings even showed a reverse pattern: Confidence was lower when the 
next-best attribute was consistent (M = 64.701, SE = 1.90) than when it was non-discriminating (M = 
68.22, SE = 1.70).  
Confidence ratings of COMP-CCs were significantly affected by the next-best attribute, χ2(2) = 
15.68, p < 0.001. No other effects were significant, ps > 0.404. The effect of the next-best attribute was 
explored with the same two contrasts that were conducted for TTB-CCs. The first contrast revealed that 
COMP-CCs were less confident when the next-best attribute was inconsistent with the best attribute (M = 
54.62, SE = 2.89) than when it was non-discriminating (M = 64.22, SE = 3.66), b = -9.54, t(95) = – 2.44,  
p = 0.017. The second contrast revealed no significant difference between the consistent and the non-
discriminating condition, b = 5.83, t(95) = 1.50, p = 0.137. Descriptively, however, there was a trend in 
the right direction: Confidence ratings were higher when the next-best attribute was consistent (M = 70.08, 
SE = 3.04) than when it was non-discriminating.  
TTB-inconsistent choices. We also examined the proportion of TTB-inconsistent choices for 
TTB-CCs. EAMs predict higher proportions of TTB-inconsistent choices the lower the consistency of the 
attribute information is. In line with this hypothesis, the proportion of TTB-inconsistent choices was 
highest when the next-best attribute was inconsistent (M = 0.28, SE = 0.02) and lowest when it was 
consistent (M = 0.13, SE = 0.02), with the non-discriminating condition lying in-between (M = 0.19, SE = 
0.02), F(2, 80) = 12.23, p < 0.001, η2= 0.15.  
Discussion 
The present results demonstrated that participants who made choices in line with TTB were 
affected by attribute information considered to be irrelevant according to the TTB-stopping-rule. TTB-
CCs were less confident with their decisions when the supposedly irrelevant next-best attribute was 
inconsistent with the best discriminating attribute than when it was non-discriminating or consistent. 
Furthermore, TTB-CCs made more TTB-inconsistent choices when the consistency of attribute 
information was low rather than high. The findings indicate that TTB-irrelevant information had been 
retrieved during TTB-decision-making and hence support the findings by Khader et al. (2013). These 
authors found evidence for a retrieval of complete attribute information by showing that the amount of 
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attributes associated with the decision options affects participants who follow a TTB strategy. In the 
present study, we showed that it is not only the amount of information that has a bearing on TTB-CCs but 
also the consistency of the information. As all of our decision options were associated with the same 
amount of information (i.e., four attributes), the present findings demonstrate that not only the quantity of 
the supposedly irrelevant information but also its quality (consistency) affects TTB-CCs’ decisions. This 
is first evidence that, in memory-based decision making TTB-irrelevant attributes, in addition to being 
retrieved, also become integrated during the decision process, as suggested for example by theoretical 
information-integration models like EAMs or PCS.  
Support for the assumption that TTB-CCs would integrate attribute information in a PCS-/EAMs-
manner has specifically been found in studies using an inferences-from-given-information paradigm, 
where attribute information is visually present throughout decision making and thus must not be retrieved 
from memory (Söllner et al., 2014, Glöckner & Betsch, 2012. Glöckner et al., 2014). The present study 
extends those findings to memory-based decision making. Overall, the decision behavior of both TTB-
CCs and COMP-CCs is generally in line with EAMs/PCS, assuming that the former weight the attributes 
in a non-compensatory manner whereas the latter weight the attributes in a compensatory manner 
(Glöckner, Hilbig, & Jekel, 2014). Glöckner and Hodges (2011), in their memory-based study, report 
evidence that participants classified as WADD and EQW integrate attributes as suggested by EAMs/PCS. 
The present findings further suggest that even TTB-CCs may integrate attributes in a EAMs-/PCS-
manner. Thus, although the choices of TTB-CCs were generally in line with the TTB strategy, and we 
therefore classified those participants as TTB-CCs, the present results suggest that the decision behavior 
of TTB-CCs may probably better be described by an evidence accumulation strategy rather than a TTB-
strategy.  
It is important to note, however that, as in other studies (Khader et al., 2013, Söllner et al., 2014), 
the decision behavior of participants was analyzed at the group-level. That is, on average, TTB-CCs seem 
to behave in a EAMs-/PCS-manner, which does not rule out that some TTB-CCs may have behaved in 
line with the TTB strategy. Moreover, the present findings could also be reconciled with a TTB strategy 
that relaxes the assumption of a strict stopping-rule. That is, it is possible that TTB-CCs may initially have 
retrieved attribute information in a rather automatic way and then compared the attributes in a TTB-
manner; and to come up with a decision, TTB-CCs may have followed a TTB-decision-rule (for a similar 
interpretation, see Khader et al., 2013). Future research is necessary to disentangle these candidate 
processes potentially underlying the decision patterns observed in the present study.   
Although the confidence ratings of TTB-CCs suggest that these participants retrieved TTB-
irrelevant information, our results are not completely in line with EAMs/PCS models. Specifically, we 
found no evidence for an increase in decision confidence due to an increase in information consistency. 
TTB-CCs’ confidence ratings were even somewhat lower when the next-best attribute was consistent 
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compared to when it was non-discriminating (see Figure 2).
6
 This unexpected finding might be due to our 
materials: The non-discriminating option pairs differed on only one, the best discriminating, attribute. The 
option pairs with a next-best consistent (and inconsistent) attribute, in contrast, differed on both the best 
and the next-best attribute (cf. Table 2). Therefore, on non-discriminating trials, there is no need to 
evaluate which of the retrieved values of the next-best attribute was the critical one and which was not. 
However, on consistent and inconsistent trials, participants had to recall which of the two attribute values 
was critical. Assuming that participants' memory for the cue hierarchy and the critical attribute values was 
less than perfect, the additional recall of the critical attribute values might have increased participants' 
uncertainty. Thus, even when the next-best attribute was consistent, the possible uncertainty related to the 
recall of the critical attribute values might have generally decreased participants' confidence relative to 
pairs with non-discriminating attributes. From a methodological point of view, this means that decision 
confidence assessed in memory-based decision studies may not only reflect decision-related uncertainty 
but also memory-related uncertainty. Future studies are necessary to investigate this assumption 
systematically in order to disentangle both types of uncertainty in a memory-based decision task. 
Whereas participants’ confidence ratings may have been subjected to processes beyond retrieval 
and integration, such as meta-cognition or meta-memory (cf. Nelson, 1990), participants’ choices may 
have been less influenced by such meta- processes. In line with this reasoning, the choices of TTB-CCs, or 
better the proportion of their TTB-inconsistent choices, fully support the predictions made by EAMs/PCS. 
That is, compared with when the next-best attribute was non-discriminating, TTB-CCs made more TTB-
inconsistent choices when the next-best attribute was inconsistent, and they made less TTB-inconsistent 
choices when the next-best attribute was consistent with the best attribute. This finding is important 
because it rules out the alternative explanation that the information on which our participants based their 
choices differed from the information on which they based their confidence ratings. In detail, it could be 
argued that TTB-CCs only retrieved information about the best discriminating attribute to make their 
decisions, and they subsequently retrieved additional information for their confidence judgments (Pleskac 
& Busemeyer, 2010). Yet, the finding that participants’ choices themselves were affected by attribute 
consistency provides strong evidence for a retrieval and integration of the complete attribute information 
before participants made their decisions.  
TTB is a decision strategy that decision makers can only apply if they have knowledge about 
either of the decision options at hand. If decision makers have knowledge about only one option but they 
do not know the other options at all, Goldstein and Gigerenzer (2002) showed that decision makers use a 
recognition heuristic, that is, decision makers choose the recognized object. The recognition heuristic 
                                                          
6
 Note, however, that neither the interaction between the two predictors nor the contrast between the consistent and 
the non-discriminating condition was significant. The contrast between inconsistent and consistent pairs approached 
significance, p = 0.053  
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works best when knowledge about options is medium (i.e., some options are known others not). Thus, the 
recognition heuristic puts forward the somewhat paradoxical notion that knowledge may become 
detrimental for decisions. Although somewhat differently, the present results also point to the possible 
downside that knowledge may have for decision makers. That is, when knowledge is automatically 
retrieved and integrated, and when this knowledge is inconsistent (i.e., attributes are in conflict), decision 
makers make more strategy-inconsistent choices, which objectively are also wrong decisions. Importantly, 
however, participants’ confidence ratings suggest that decision makers make such erroneous decisions not 
without awareness. Rather, when information consistency decreases and thus the likelihood of an error 
increases, decision makers seem to become more cautious. Thus, the possible downside of (too much) 
knowledge is counteracted by the upside of one's meta-cognitive awareness.  
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Abstract 
When a choice has to be made between two options and decision-relevant information about the 
options is completely available, the Take-The-Best (TTB) heuristic only considers the most important 
information that discriminates between the options and bases its choice on it. Choices in line with TTB 
thus allow a decision maker to save time and effort, and they may become more likely therefore under 
conditions of limited self-control strength (ego-depletion). Ego-depletion was manipulated prior to 
making a series of choices in a multi-attribute decision task. Choices could have been in line with 
either TTB or more effortful compensatory decision strategies. As predicted, compared with non-
depleted participants, ego-depleted participants were more likely to make TTB-consistent choices.   
Keywords: decision-making; heuristics; self-control strength; ego depletion 
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Effects of Ego-Depletion on Choice Behavior in a Multi-Attribute Decision Task 
The decisions we make in our daily lives differ, among others, in the amount of information 
on which they are based. For some decisions, we may rely on only a single piece of information, even 
when additional information is easily available. For other decisions, in contrast, we may consider all 
information available and integrate it in a rather sophisticated manner. The former approach to 
decision making is often called heuristic, whereas the latter integrative approach is referred to as 
rational (Lee & Cummins, 2004). A prominent framework of decision making assumes that decision 
makers have a repertoire of different strategies among which they choose adaptively (Gigerenzer & 
Gaissmaier, 2011). Some of the strategies belong to the “fast-and-frugal” heuristic category, whereas 
others belong to the more effortful rational-integration category. Because heuristic decisions rely on 
only part of the information and do not require a decision maker to trade-off information, we 
hypothesize that they should be preferred under conditions of limited cognitive resources. That is, 
from an adaptive point of view, a decision maker may be assumed to more frequently make choices in 
line with a simple decision heuristic when her cognitive resources are sparse. In the present research, 
we sought to examine the effects of ego-depletion—a state of diminished self-control and cognitive 
resources—on decision makers’ reliance on a simple decision heuristic. 
The term ego-depletion was originally conceptualized as a state of limited self-control 
resources. The assumption underlying ego-depletion research is that acts of self-control, such as 
resisting temptations or inhibiting pre-potent responses, all draw upon a general willpower resource 
(Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998). As this resource is limited, engaging in acts of 
self-control in one task may reduce self-control available for a subsequent unrelated task. Support for 
the assumption that decision making indeed draws on limited self-control resources, comes from a 
study by Vohs, Baumeister, Schmeichel, Twenge, Nelson, and Tice (2008). Those participants of this 
study who had to make choices in an initial depleting task phase showed impairments in a variety of 
subsequent self-control tasks (e.g., pain tolerance, solving puzzles) compared to participants who were 
not ego-depleted.  This finding suggests that decision making draws upon a limited self-control 
resource thereby affecting subsequent tasks involving self-control. A study by Pocheptsova, Amir, 
Dhar, and Baumeister (2009) further showed that participants who were experimentally depleted in an 
initial task phase relied more strongly on intuitive rather than deliberative reasoning in subsequent 
preferential-choice tasks. This finding suggests that, in a state of ego-depletion, individuals switch to a 
more heuristic mode of information processing compared to non-depleted individuals. Whereas there 
is strong evidence that states of ego-depletion affect performance in various tasks (see Hagger, Wood, 
Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010; for a meta-analysis), it is not clear which processes drive these effects. 
Some researchers argue that ego-depletion effects are due to temporarily hampered executive control 
(Schmeichel, 2007). Others argue, however, that ego-depletion effects rather reflect a state of a lack of 
motivation to engage in effortful processing (Muraven & Slessareva, 2003).  In the present study, we 
were interested in whether and how temporary ego-depletion due to performing a self-control task 
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would affect individuals’ choice behavior in an unrelated multi-attribute decision task. The present 
study was not designed to investigate the processes underlying the ego-depletion effect though. Thus 
any observed effect could be due to temporary reductions in executive control abilities, reduced 
motivation to engage in demanding processing, or both (cf. Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012). We will 
further discuss this issue in the Discussion section.  
In multi-attribute decision tasks decision makers have to choose between two options the one 
that scores higher on a certain criterion value (e.g., choosing the more profitable of two shares). The 
options are described on several attributes or cues, each of which is predictive of the criterion to a 
certain degree (cue validity), and decision makers have access to each option’s cue values (e.g., 
whether a share is noted or not; whether the company is established or not; and so on). Most 
interesting for the present research are situations with conflicting cue information such as when a 
highly valid cue points to one option, whereas several less valid cues point to the other option. 
Decision researchers suggested that decision makers might resolve this conflict in different ways. For 
instance, a decision maker may focus mainly on the one single cue for her choice that is of most 
importance (i.e., has the highest validity) and that discriminates between the two options. Such a 
choice behavior is in line with the so-called take-the-best strategy (TTB), according to which a 
decision maker searches the cues in descending order of their validities and stops information search 
as soon as a cue discriminates between the options. The option favored by this ‘best’ cue will then be 
chosen. Basing one’s choice on the best cue may reduce cognitive effort because additional cues need 
no longer be integrated. An alternative way of resolving conflicting information might be to consider 
all cues and integrate information about these cues. Integration might be done, for example, by 
summing up the validity-weighted cues for each option, as suggested by the weighted-additive 
strategy, or by counting the critical cue values per option, as suggested by the equal-weight strategy. 
In either case, the option with the higher sum will be chosen. Thus, both the weighted-additive and the 
equal-weight strategy allow for the possibility that a highly valid cue, which guides the TTB-decision, 
can be compensated for by less valid cues, which is why we refer to these strategies as compensatory 
strategies (COMP). In cases where the (weighted) sum of less valid cues exceed the validity of the best 
discriminating cue, TTB and COMP make opposing choice predictions. Compared with the 
straightforward process underlying TTB, the processes underlying COMP can be considered more 
complex as they involve the consideration and integration of several cues. Therefore, when being in a 
state of ego-depletion, decision makers may be assumed to more frequently make choices in line with 
TTB rather than compensatory strategies.
1
 
                                                          
1
 Lee and Cummins (2004) proposed an alternative framework of decision making suggesting that TTB and the 
weighted-additive strategy are not qualitatively different strategies but represent the two ends of a continuous 
information search process. According to this view, information search proceeds continuously until the decision 
maker has gathered enough evidence. The stopping point is assumed to be variable (inter- and intra-individually) 
and decision makers are assumed to set their stopping points or evidence thresholds adaptively. Note that our 
research question applies to both frameworks in the same way as we examine how ego-depletion affects the 
selection process (selection of strategies or evidence thresholds). We used the strategy-selection terminology 
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Support for the assumption that TTB may be less effortful than COMP and may thus be 
preferred in a state of ego-depletion, comes from studies in which participants’ cognitive resources 
were manipulated via time pressure (Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999; 2008). Putting participants under 
time pressure was found to increase their reliance on the TTB strategy, that is, participants were more 
likely to search the cues by their validity and to base their choice on the best cue. Unlike the time 
pressure manipulation used in previous studies, however, the ego-depletion paradigm considered here 
does not affect individuals’ processing capacities at the time of decision making. Rather, the ego-
depletion task, which precedes the decision task, is assumed to affect individuals’ decision making by 
depleting individuals' self-control resources prior to any decision making. This distinction is 
important, as it may demonstrate that some (depleting) activities can impinge on one’s decisions, even 
when the activities themselves are completely unrelated to the decision situation (cf. Pocheptsova, 
Amir, Dhar, & Baumeister, 2009). 
Also in line with the assumption that TTB may reduce cognitive effort, is the finding that 
older adults, who show a decline in cognitive functioning, behave more in line with a TTB strategy in 
a decision task than younger adults (Mata, Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007). Furthermore, Bröder and 
Schiffer (2003) found that, when cue information has to be retrieved rather than being openly 
presented during decision making, participants are more likely to make choices in line with TTB 
suggesting that TTB may reduce retrieval and integration effort. These findings suggest that TTB may 
be less effortful than COMP strategies and may thus be preferred under ego-depletion. However, 
findings from other research challenge the assumption that COMP strategies are actually as effortful as 
commonly assumed. 
For example, participants of a study by Bröder (2003) made a series of choices where cue 
information was available on screen. One group of participants made their choices under working-
memory load, the other group made their choices without load. Memory load had no effect on 
participants’ decision behavior, that is, it did not lead to an increase in TTB-consistent behavior. The 
finding that participants of the Bröder study showed compensatory decision making even under 
memory load challenges the assumption that information integration is effortful and depends on 
cognitive resources (see also Glöckner & Betsch, 2008).  
Furthermore, a study with children (Mata, von Helversen, Rieskamp, 2011) showed that 9-10 
year olds, but not older children, have difficulties to learn a TTB strategy in a decision environment 
where this strategy would be most successful (i.e., non-compensatory environment). The finding that 
the decision behavior of these children was more in line with compensatory strategies further suggests 
that compensatory strategies may not necessarily be more complex than TTB, which is consistent with 
the findings by Bröder (2003). This finding also shows that the adaptive learning of a TTB strategy in 
a non-compensatory environment seems to require cognitive capacities (see also Bröder, 2003), and 
these capacities may be less developed in younger than in older children. It should be noted, however, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
here because previous similar research also used this terminology (e.g., Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008; 
Scheibehenne & van Helversen, 2015) 
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that these findings do not necessarily imply that the execution of TTB is more difficult than the 
execution of COMP
2
. What seems to be difficult is to figure out that TTB is more successful in a non-
compensatory environment, that is, the adaptive learning or selection of a strategy (see Bröder & 
Newell, 2008, for a similar argument).
3
 In sum, the aforementioned findings suggest that 
compensatory decision making may actually not be that effortful as commonly assumed and may thus 
be less dependent on cognitive resources. Nevertheless, there is also some support for the assumption 
that the execution of a TTB strategy (though not the learning of this strategy) could reduce effort and 
may thus be applied under ego-depletion.  
In line with the latter reasoning, there is some initial support for our assumption that ego-
depletion may foster participants’ reliance on simple heuristics. Pohl, Erdfelder, Hilbig, Liebke, and 
Stahlberg (2013) examined the effects of ego-depletion on participants’ use of the recognition heuristic 
(RH; Goldstein & Gigerenzer, 2002) Participants of their decision task made a series of binary choices 
(choosing the larger of two American cities); one group of participants were to perform an ego-
depleting act prior to each decision whereas another group performed a non-depleting act. Compared 
with non-depleted participants, depleted participants were found to more frequently rely on the RH, 
that is, they chose the one of the two cities they recognized (irrespective of further knowledge). The 
finding suggests that states of ego-depletion may foster the reliance on simple decision heuristics such 
as RH when the decision immediately follows the depleting act. As discussed by the authors 
themselves, however, it remains unclear how long-lasting the effects of ego-depletion may be. Ego-
depletion researchers generally assume the effects of ego-depletion to be relatively persistent. 
However, as participants of the study by Pohl et al. performed a depleting act prior to each decision, so 
that the depletion and the decision task were closely intertwined, it is not possible to disentangle the 
short-lived effects of the depleting intervention from its possible longer-lasting effects. Furthermore, it 
may be that cognitive load from switching between the decision task and the depletion task rather than 
actual ego-depletion caused these findings. 
In the present research we sought to find evidence for longer-lasting effects of ego-depletion 
on choice behavior. To this end, an ego-depletion task was completed prior to an unrelated decision 
task. Furthermore, our decision task was specifically designed to examine participants’ accordance 
with choices predicted by the TTB heuristic relative to their accordance with choices predicted by 
COMP (for a similar design, see Scheibehenne & von Helversen, 2015). To this end, participants were 
shown complete cue information about the decision options, and they were provided with cue 
validities. This task design differs from the task Pohl et al. (2013) used to investigate ego-depletion 
effects on RH usage. Participants of their task were required to retrieve cue information from memory 
                                                          
2
 Though implementing non-compensatory strategies like TTB in the ACT-R architecture revealed that the 
execution of such strategies may be less simple than commonly assumed (Marewski & Mehlhorn, 2011) 
3
 Indeed, in the children study, those 9-10 year olds who had correctly learned to use a compensatory strategy in 
a compensatory environment suddenly showed a decision behavior more in line with TTB in the last block of the 
decision task. This strategy shift has been interpreted in terms of fatigue and might suggest therefore that TTB 
could be easier to apply. 
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and the options presented to them were the names of American cities which participants could or could 
not have known (making recognition a potential decision cue). One could assume that the finding by 
Pohl et al.—that ego-depletion increases participants’ reliance on simple heuristics like RH—may be 
constraint to decision tasks involving the retrieval of cue information, because memory-based 
decisions are often considered as especially effortful (Bröder & Schiffer, 2003). Using a decision 
paradigm where cue information was visually presented during decision making, and considering 
another decision heuristic (TTB),
4
 we aimed to generalize the effect of ego-depletion on heuristic 
decision making and to also find support for its persistency.    
Method 
Participants 
Sixty-four Heidelberg University students participated in this study for either monetary 
compensation (6€) or partial course credit. Three participants were excluded from this sample due to 
extremely loud noise outside the laboratory during the experimental session. The final sample 
comprised 61 participants (10 male; Mage = 23.20).    
Materials, Design and Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of up to six, but they worked individually on the tasks in 
partitioned cubicles. Participants first received instructions for the decision task. Their task was to 
choose from two unit funds the one that they expected to be more likely to have a higher return. Each 
fund was described by the recommendations of six financial experts (cues) who either recommended a 
fund (+) or not (-). The experts were said to vary in their validity, which was explained as the extent to 
which their recommendations were successful in predicting the more profitable fund. As in previous 
research using similar tasks (Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 2008; Scheibehenne & von Helversen, 2015), the 
term validity was thoroughly explained and example-illustrated. Participants then received information 
about the experts’ validities: 0.87, 0.76, 0.67, 0.61, 0.57, and 0.54. They were informed that during the 
decision task, the validity rank of each expert would always be indicated right next to the 
corresponding expert's picture. After the decision-task instructions, participants were told that they 
would first perform an additional attention task for 7 minutes—the ego-depletion manipulation—
before performing the decision task.  
 For the supposedly attention task, all participants received a neutral text about the history of a 
German city (Mannheim). Participants in the no-depletion group were instructed to just copy the text 
(hand-written). Participants in the ego-depletion group also were instructed to copy the text, but they 
received the additional instruction to skip the letters “e” and “n” when transcribing the text. This 
                                                          
4
 Participants of our task had no prior knowledge about the choice options which were simply labeled A and B. 
Thus they could not apply a RH but had to rely on the cue information provided to them. Participants could 
either process the information in a straightforward TTB-manner or in a (more effortful) weighted-additive/equal-
weight manner.    
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procedure, which requires participants to override their well-established writing habits, has proven 
effective in depleting participants’ self-control strength (e.g., Bertrams, Baumeister, Englert, & Furley, 
2015). Assignment to the two groups was determined randomly. After 7 minutes of transcribing the 
text, participants were signaled individually (by the computer) to stop. All participants then answered 
a four-item manipulation check, asking them about the self-control they exerted during the 
transcription task (e.g., How effortful did you find the transcription task?; Bertrams et al., 2015). 
Answers were given on scales from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very), where higher scores indicate stronger 
depletion. 
Afterward, participants performed the decision task which comprised 50 trials. On each trial, 
they were shown a pair of different funds (labelled A and B) for each of which they were shown the 
recommendations (+ or -) of the six experts. The experts and their recommendations were presented in 
descending order of their validities (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1. Example trial of the decision task. Participants had to choose the more profitable of two funds 
and were shown the recommendations from each of six experts, ranked by their validity. A plus sign 
indicates recommendation. In this example, take-the-best predicts the choice of Fund A, whereas 
compensatory strategies predict the choice of Fund B (Text has originally been shown in German).  
For all participants, we used a set of 50 pairs for which TTB and COMP make opposing 
choice predictions (order of presentation was randomized). The provided validities (chance-corrected) 
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implied a compensatory decision environment. However, we did not specify a ‘correct’ solution for 
the decision pairs and participants received no choice feedback and incentives. This also means that 
participants of this study were not required to learn a certain strategy; rather, we were interested in the 
choice behavior participants spontaneously show given their knowledge of the cue validities. With six 
cues and the validities mentioned, there were 95 pairs in total for which TTB and COMP predicted 
opposing choices. Of these 95 pairs we chose our final set of 50 pairs in a way that for 30 pairs the 
most-valid cue (0.87) was the best-discriminating cue—i.e., the cue on which TTB bases its choice; 
for 10 pairs the second-most valid cue (0.76) was the best-discriminating cue; and for another 10 pairs 
the third-most valid cue (0.67) was the best discriminating cue
5
. Thus, within subjects, the factor 
validity rank of best discriminating cue (expert) was varied. Varying the validity rank of the best cue 
was meant, among others, to counteract the possibility of a monotonous task routine which could have 
appeared when always the most valid cue was the best discriminating cue. Furthermore, we considered 
this factor in our analyses to test whether or how the validity rank of the best cue would affect 
participants’ reliance on this cue. In a recent study (Dummel & Rummel, 2015), we found that 
decision makers who predominantly made choices in line with TTB showed less confidence in their 
decisions the lower the validity rank of the best cue was. One might expect therefore that decision 
makers may become less likely to follow the best cue (TTB) the lower the validity of this cue is (as a 
result of their being less confident of the less valid cues). The design of the present study was a 2 (ego-
depletion: depletion vs. no-depletion) × 3 (validity rank of best discriminating cue: 1st, 2nd, 3rd) 
mixed-factorial design with the first factor manipulated between subjects and the second factor varied 
within subjects. Our dependent variable was the extent to which participants made choices in line with 
TTB.  
Results 
Manipulation check  
Participants in the depletion condition had significantly higher scores on the manipulation-
check measure (M = 2.71, SE = 0.12) than participants in the no-depletion condition (M = 1.91, SE = 
0.09), indicating that the manipulation was successful, F(1, 59) = 27.43, p < .001.   
Main Analysis 
Individual choices were analyzed via a multilevel logistic regression. The multilevel approach 
is most appropriate for our data structure for two reasons. First, it takes into account dependence 
between different choices made by the same person and the nested structure due to the mixed design 
(cf. Hayes, 2006). Second, by using a logit link function to relate participants’ choices to the predictors 
                                                          
5
 For clarification, the COMP sub-strategies equal-weight and weighted-additive made identical choice 
predictions for 40 out of the 50 pairs. For the remaining 10 pairs, equal-weight would have predicted a guess. 
We did not distinguish any further between weighted-additive and equal-weight on the basis of these 10 pairs, 
because modelling the guessing of the equal-weight strategy would have required an individual strategy-
classification approach rather than considering overall adherence rates.  
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at hand, we account for the dichotomous nature of the outcome variable (i.e., a choice could have been 
either TTB-consistent or COMP-consistent). In the present case, using participants’ single choices as 
the outcome variable is especially preferred over using aggregated choice proportions, because 
proportions are not normally distributed (Hox, 2010; for further arguments, see Jaeger, 2008). In fact, 
in both groups of our sample, choice proportions significantly deviated from a normal distribution 
according to the Shapiro-Wilks test (ps < 0.05). Being extensions of standard regression models, 
multilevel regression results can be interpreted in a similar way, that is, the coefficients estimated via 
multilevel regression can be interpreted like unstandardized beta weights in regression analyses. For 
multilevel analyses there is currently no common agreement on how to conduct power analyses. 
However, simulations by Maas and Hox (2005) suggest that a minimum of 50 level-2 and 7 level-1 
observations are necessary to obtain parameter estimates of acceptable accuracy. Our design met these 
criteria as we had 61 level-2 (subjects across groups) and 50 level-1 (choices within subjects) 
observations.    
In our model, the outcome variable choice (for which 1 indicated TTB-consistency and 0 
indicated COMP-consistency) was regressed on the two dummy-coded factors ego-depletion 
manipulation (1 = depletion; 0 = no-depletion) and validity rank of best discriminating cue as well as 
their interaction. For ease of interpretation of coefficients, we recoded the three-levels factor validity 
rank in a way that we combined the second and third level of this factor into one single level (coded as 
1) and contrasted this level to the first level of the factor (coded as 0). This way, only one contrast (1 
0), comparing the first with the combined later levels, had to be included into the model as the 
predictor for the factor validity rank of best discriminating cue.
6
 In line with recommendations by 
Barr, Levy, Scheepers, and Tily (2013) we attempted to maximize the random effects structure. 
Specifically, we included by-subjects random intercepts and slopes as well as by-item random 
intercepts. The multilevel analysis reported here was conducted in R using the glmer function of the 
package lme4 (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, Walker, 2015) 
The coefficients estimated via multilevel logistic regression are depicted in Table 1. As shown 
there, the extent to which participants made choices in line with TTB (relative to COMP) was 
significantly predicted by both the ego-depletion manipulation and the validity rank of the best 
discriminating cue. The interaction was not significant. In line with our hypothesis, Figure 2 shows 
that the proportion of TTB-consistent choices was higher for depleted participants (M = 0.42, SE = 
0.04) than for non-depleted participants (M = 0.32, SE = 0.03). Specifically, the odds of a TTB-
consistent choice for depleted participants were 2.7 times higher than the odds for non-depleted 
                                                          
6
Dummy-coding of a three-levels factor requires that one level be assigned as reference level against which each 
of the two remaining levels is then compared–each with a separate contrast. Thus, with a three-level factor two 
contrasts would enter the regression for this factor. We ran a model with the full three-levels validity-rank factor 
being dummy-coded, where we used the 1st rank as reference level. The results of this model were similar to the 
results of the model reported here: Depletion and validity rank (both contrasts) were significant predictors (ps < 
0.039), whereas none of the interactions was significant (ps > 0.117). To facilitate interpretation of the 
coefficients, we decided to report the simpler model in our main analysis.   
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participants (see Table 1). Furthermore, the odds of a TTB-consistent choice for pairs with the second- 
or third-most valid cue as best discriminating cues (M = 0.44, SE = 0.03) were 3.18 times higher than 
the odds for pairs with the most valid cue as best discriminating cue (M = 0.30, SE = 0.03).  
 
Table 1 
Multilevel Logistic Regression Analysis Predicting Take-The-Best-Consistent Choices From Ego-Depletion Manipulation and 
Validity Rank of Best Discriminating Cue  
Predictor Coefficient SE Odds 95% CI Wald Z p Bayes Factor 
Ego-depletion 
manipulation 
0.99 (0.48) 2.70 
[0.04, 
1.98] 
2.06 0.039 BF10 = 1.2 
Validity rank of best 
discriminating cue 
1.16 (0.34) 3.18 
[0.49, 
1.84] 
3.44 0.001 BF10 = 34.6 
Ego-depletion 
manipulation × validity 
rank 
-0.50 (0.38) 0.61 
[-1.30, 
0.27] 
- 1.30 0.192 BF01 = 3.0 
Note. SE = Standard Error; CI = Confidence Intervall; BF = Bayes Factor 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Mean proportions (± standard errors) of TTB-consistent 
choices as a function of the two manipulated factors ego-depletion 
manipulation and validity rank of best discriminating cue. 
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We also examined participants’ decision times to check whether the groups differed in the 
amount of time they required to make their decisions. For the analysis of decision times, we removed 
individual outliers, which were defined as decision times smaller than 300ms and greater than 
individual mean plus 2.5 standard deviations (0.03%). Participants in the ego-depletion condition were 
slightly slower (M = 3.66, SE = 0.15) than participants in the no-depletion condition (M = 3.36, SE = 
0.12), though this difference was not significant, F(1, 59) = 0.69, p = 0.410. We descriptively also 
analyzed decision times separately for those choices made in line with TTB and those choices made in 
line with COMP.  Interestingly, participants of both groups were somewhat slower when making TTB-
consistent choices as compared to when making COMP-consistent choices (depletion condition: MTTB-
consistent = 3.76, SE = 0.22; MCOMP-consistent = 3.55, SE = 0.20; no-depletion condition: MTTB-consistent = 3.44, 
SE = 0.18; MCOMP-consistent = 3.28, SE = 0.16). We will discuss this issue in more detail in the Discussion 
section.  
Discussion 
Choices differ in the amount of information on which they are based and the present finding 
shows that decision makers who were ego-depleted prior to decision making were more likely to make 
choices in line with the TTB heuristic compared to participants who were not depleted. Basing one’s 
choice on the best discriminating cue, a decision maker does not need to consider and integrate 
additional information, so TTB-consistent choices may reduce cognitive effort and may become 
preferable in a state of ego-depletion—a finding which is in line with the notion of an adaptive 
decision maker (Payne et al., 1988).  
The effort-reducing function of TTB has previously been demonstrated in studies where 
decision makers’ cognitive capacities were reduced at the time of decision making via time pressure 
(Rieskamp & Hoffrage, 1999; 2008). Our finding that TTB-consistent choices become more likely in a 
state of ego-depletion adds to this existing literature. Importantly, our research extends these findings 
by showing that the likelihood of making simplifying choices, such as TTB-consistent choices, is not 
only affected by features inherent to the decision situation itself (time pressure) or by individual 
differences variables (e.g., age; Mata, Schooler, & Rieskamp, 2007); but it is also affected by temporal 
states of ego-depletion which are due to events completely unrelated to the decision situations. That is, 
the completion of a task involving self-control strength but which had nothing to do with the 
subsequent decision task led to a greater reliance on the information provided by the best 
discriminating cue (TTB) than on the combined information of less valid cues (COMP).  
This finding is well in line with the study by Pohl et al. (2013), who found greater reliance on 
the RH among depleted participants compared to non-depleted participants. In their study, however, 
participants performed a depleting act prior to each decision; it remained unclear therefore whether the 
effect of ego-depletion on strategy selection is of only short durability or whether it may persist over a 
longer period of time. The results of our study, where the depletion and the decision task were 
completely separated in time, provide support for the latter assumption—i.e., the effect of ego-
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depletion on decision making may be relatively persistent (see also Pocheptsova et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, using a decision paradigm where cue information was completely shown to participants 
(as is often the case, for example, in consumer magazines), we were able to show that the effect of 
ego-depletion on decision making is not restricted to the use of RH and to situations where cue 
information has to be retrieved from memory, but it also holds for the TTB heuristic and for situations 
where information search comes relatively easy.  
Our hypothesis that a task involving self-control strength may subsequently lead to a higher 
rate of TTB-consistent choices was based on the assumption that both the self-control task and the 
decision task draw on a single, limited self-regulatory resource (Vohs et al., 2008). However, there is 
some debate on whether the effects of ego-depletion could not also be explained by factors other than 
ego-depletion (for an overview, see Hagger, Wood, Stiff, & Chatzisarantis, 2010). For instance, Job, 
Dweck, and Walton (2013) found typical depletion effects only for those people who believed that 
cognitive resources are limited; for those people who hold an unlimited resource theory, however, no, 
or even a reversed, depletion effect was found. This finding challenges the assumption that depletion 
effects stem from reduced cognitive resources, and they suggest that mechanisms other than limited 
resources may underlie depletion effects. In the present study, we did not assess participants’ implicit 
theories about their cognitive resources, so we do not know whether our manipulation may only have 
worked for a subset of participants with a limited-resource theory. But the finding of a general 
depletion effect in this study, even without considering an additional moderator, suggests that our 
depletion manipulation did affect participants’ choice behavior. The mechanisms underlying this 
effect, however, need to be addressed in future studies.  
It is possible, for example, that the depletion task had a negative impact on participants’ mood, 
as they may have perceived the task as irritating. Scheibehenne and von Helversen (2015) recently 
showed that, compared with a positive mood induction, a negative mood induction led to a higher 
proportion of TTB-consistent choices in a subsequent decision task. Negative mood has been 
suggested to narrow attentional focus and this may be conducive for TTB-consistent choices, as they 
require participants to focus on only one cue. Another explanation for our depletion effect could be 
that the depletion task reduced participants’ motivation for the decision task. As a consequence, 
depleted participants may have considered information from a single cue as sufficient to make their 
choices (i.e., lower decision threshold). Such an account, however, would suggest that depleted 
participants would have made faster decisions on average than non-depleted participants. The decision 
times of both groups did not differ significantly from each other though. Descriptively, depleted 
participants were even somewhat slower than non-depleted participants. This observation is in line 
with a fatigue or a cognitive resources account of the depletion effect. That is, compared with non-
depleted participants, depleted participants may have felt more tired, or their executive functions may 
temporarily have been impaired (e.g., Schmeichel, 2007), which may have generally slowed their 
subsequent decisions. As a result of their fatigue or their impaired executive functions, depleted 
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participants may also have become more likely to make choices in line with TTB, because such TTB-
choices may have simplified the decision process.  
Note, however, that simplifying the decision process does not necessarily mean that decision 
makers ignored information when they made TTB-consistent choices (see Dummel, Rummel, & Voss, 
2016, for example). That is, choice outcomes in line with TTB do not necessarily imply that decision 
makers actually used a TTB strategy. It is possible that decision makers in general processed cue 
information completely and, realizing that there is high conflict among cues, they may have tried to 
resolve the conflict by integrating the information in a compensatory manner, that is, by summing up 
the (validity-weighted) values. Depleted decision makers, however, might have perceived this 
integration process as more difficult than non-depleted decision makers, which is why the finally 
became more likely to choose the option favored by the best cue—as some kind of simplifying ‘rule-
of-thumb’. 7  Although speculative, the assumption that information may probably have not been 
ignored when choices were made in line with TTB receives some support when considering 
participants’ decision times. Specifically, if for TTB-consistent choices information had been ignored 
one would at least have expected somewhat faster TTB-consistent than compensatory choices, but, as 
outlined in the Results section, the pattern was even reversed. An interesting avenue for future studies 
might be to systematically examine the decision processes underlying TTB-consistent choices and, in 
particular, how a depletion manipulation might affect these processes (i.e., whether it affects the 
amount of considered information or the way in which the considered information is processed).  
Another interesting observation in this study was that participants generally relied more 
frequently on the best discriminating cue (TTB) when the cue’s validity was lower rather than higher. 
At first glance, this finding seems paradoxical—why would a decision maker more frequently go with 
a third-rank cue than with a first-rank cue? A plausible explanation may be, however, that it is not only 
the validity rank of the best discriminating cue that matters, but also the amount and weight of those 
cues that could possibly contradict this cue. That is, when a first-rank cue points to one of the decision 
options, there are still five other cues that could point to the other option, and a decision maker may 
want to acquire information about these cues; if the lower-rank cues disagree with the first-rank cue, a 
decision maker may probably not want to go with the first-rank cue because of the amount and weight 
                                                          
7
 In the depletion condition, we observed a frequency of 42% TTB-consistent choices, which might also suggest 
that depletion increased guessing, as a choice could either have been consistent with TTB or with COMP. We 
thank an anonymous reviewer for this careful suggestion. It should be noted, however, that this indication of 
guessing (42%) is only at the group-level. To check whether ego-depletion indeed increased guessing at the 
individual-level, we ran the following analysis. In our task, a choice could either have been consistent with TTB 
or with COMP. If an individual was guessing in this task, a binomial test conducted on the 50 choices of this 
individual would have turned out non-significant. For each individual we therefore conducted a binomial test on 
the individual choice data. In the control condition the binomial test was non-significant (indicating a guessing 
pattern) for 7 out of 31 participants; in the depletion condition the binomial test was non-significant for 10 out of 
30. Although descriptively slightly higher, the proportion of guessing individuals in the depletion condition did 
not differ significantly from the proportion of guessing individuals in the control condition, as indicated by a 
non-significant Chi square test,  p =  .249. Therefore, we suggest that the group-level frequency data (42% in the 
depletion condition) were not due to systematic guessing patterns at the individual level.  
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of the other cues. When the third-rank cue is the best discriminating cue, however, then there are only 
three remaining cues, which in addition are of relatively low validity. In this case, a decision maker 
may prefer a mental short-cut and rely on the third-rank cue without considering the remaining cues. 
Further research is necessary however to better understand how decision makers evaluate the utilities 
of different cues beyond the cues’ validities. 
 In sum, the present research shows that the choice behavior of decision makers can be 
affected by tasks unrelated to the decision situation. When the decision-unrelated task is effortful, 
subsequent choices are more likely to be in line with a simplifying heuristic than when the unrelated 
task is less effortful.  
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